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This dissertation introduces the concept of biological imagination, a new analytic 
framework for Jewish literary and cultural production in the United States. The Biological 
Imagination in Twentieth-Century Jewish American Culture argues that from the turn of the 
twentieth century to the present, Jewish American authors across genres repeatedly turn to 
themes and forms of biology—ranging from evolution to racial typology, to genetics—in order 
to locate Jewish inheritance in the body. While biological knowledge itself has been approached 
with understandable wariness since the Holocaust, due to its association with the race science 
that fueled the Nazi genocide, the dissertation illustrates that both in spite of, and because of, 
Jews’ vexed historical relationship to biology, Jewish American authors continue to infuse their 
works with biological knowledge after the historical chasm of 1945. That Jewish literary and 
cultural production should continue to incorporate, or obsess over, biological theories of 
inheritance, complicates the historical narrative of Jews in the United States as well as the way 
that Jewish American literature can be understood within American ethnic literature today. 
The biological imagination necessitates reexamination of the literary and cultural 
circulation of many of Jewish American culture’s central concerns, including language, 
immigration and assimilation, race and ethnicity, and gender and sexuality. Not only does 
biological knowledge enrapture fictional characters, but biological models of inheritance also 
deeply structure works’ narrative and poetic forms. Furthermore, this cultural phenomenon 
extends beyond literature, from photography in the 1910s, to contemporary television series. The 
dissertation assembles sources in English and in Yiddish, from the 1890s to the present, 
viii 
including The Rise of David Levinsky by Abraham Cahan, The Promised Land by Mary Antin, 
The Family Carnovsky by Israel Joshua Singer, Focus by Arthur Miller, Gentleman’s Agreement 
by Laura Z. Hobson, A Few Words in the Mother Tongue by Irena Klepfisz, Sources by 
Adrienne Rich, and Portnoy’s Complaint by Philip Roth, as well as the composite photography 
of Francis Galton and the Amazon series Transparent. More often evoking mystery than 
certainty, the biological imagination at once responds to and highlights the elusiveness of Jewish 




Chapter 1 Introduction: No Systematic Study of Any Branch of Science 
 
“I made no systematic study of any branch of science…For what enthralled my imagination in 
the whole subject of natural history was not the orderly array of facts, but the glimpse I caught, 
through this or that fragment of science, of the grand principles underlying the facts” — Mary 
Antin, The Promised Land1  
 
Mary Antin’s 1912 autobiography, The Promised Land, is named not as a reference to the 
biblical land of Israel, but to her adopted nation, the United States. Remarkably, the author 
comes across yet another “promised land” toward the end of the book: Darwin’s theory of 
evolution. When this revelation arrives, the author writes, “…the high peaks of the promised 
land of evolution did flash on my vision in the earlier days, and with these to guide me I rebuilt 
the world, and found it much nobler than it had ever been before, and took great comfort in it.”2 
Antin learns about Darwin in a club for natural history hobbyists, organized by a settlement 
house that had served her and her immigrant family in Boston. The club takes her on excursions 
to the nature beyond Boston’s city limits, and she attends lectures, all of which reveal to her the 
“kaleidoscopic bits of stupendous panorama which is painted in the literature of Darwinism.”3 
While critics of Antin’s text have long commented on the implications of her bestowing the 
United States with the title of “promised land,” they have only just begun to address what it 
means for the theory of evolution to receive this distinction as well.4 
 
1 Mary Antin, The Promised Land, ed. Werner Sollors (New York: Penguin Classics, 2012), 258. 
2 Antin, 262. 
3 Antin, 258. 
4 See for instance Sarah Wilson, “The Evolution of Ethnicity,” ELH 76, no. 1 (2009): 247–76, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/elh.0.0032; Lori Jirousek, “Mary Antin’s Progressive Science: Eugenics, Evolution, and the 
Environment,” Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 27, no. 1 (2008): 58. 
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What is perhaps most significant about this intellectual turn is that Antin so 
enthusiastically, so unequivocally embraces biological knowledge, even if she may at times 
disregard its specific details (as is evident in the epigraph above). She seems to find in biological 
knowledge both clarity and mystery and equates it to the revelatory longing of seeing the holy 
land that one has not yet entered. As I show in the first chapter of this dissertation, the manner in 
which Antin incorporates Darwin’s theory of gradual change over millennia might generate 
narrative contradictions with the general political message of her autobiography, which was 
published amid the immigration debates of the early twentieth century and has long been 
understood as a straightforward account that flaunts the speed and ease of her assimilation to 
American life. Nevertheless, I also take seriously her proclamation that biological knowledge is 
for her a holy land, with high peaks that ennoble her entire world.  
This dissertation illustrates how biology would continue to enrapture Jewish authors in 
the United States in the century to follow. I will grant that from the standpoint of the twenty-first 
century critic, simply placing the words “Jewish” and “biology” together, for some, amounts to 
an essentialist red flag. Indeed, such a wariness has prevailed in much of post-Holocaust Jewish 
culture, and in American culture as well, with strong associations to eugenics, to deterministic 
notions of race and ethnicity, and perhaps most prominently in this context, to the Nazi genocide 
of Jews in World War II. In scholarly discourse, biological knowledge is less often regarded with 
the great promise that Antin found in it, and more often associated with immense pain. While 
significant historical research has looked at the relationship between Jews and biology, from 
medicine to racial thought, from the nineteenth century leading up to the Holocaust, little 
scholarship exists about what of these cultural and intellectual trends have carried over that 
historical chasm.  
 3 
From the early twentieth century to the early twenty-first century, Jewish American 
authors have continued to infuse their works with themes and forms of biology—specifically 
those related to biological theories of inheritance—both in spite of and because of Jews’ vexed 
historical relationship to biology. This phenomenon, which I call biological imagination, has 
been heretofore unremarked on by scholars as a sustained current of Jewish American literature. 
It encompasses literary and cultural projects that are inspired by biology’s narrative potential, or 
those committed to dramatizing its political dangers. Authors’ biological imaginations have been 
guided (though not necessarily determined) by prevailing biological paradigms—from evolution, 
to eugenics and racial typology, to genetics—throughout the century. Just as the forms of literary 
engagements with biological theories—as well as their artistic or rhetorical effects—change over 
time, intersecting historical and science-historical contexts illuminate that this story is neither 
linear nor uniform.  
For instance, an unintentional echo to Antin’s “promised land of evolution” can be found 
in Adrienne Rich’s 1983 poetic cycle, Sources, in which the poet probes at her relationship to 
Jewish history, the Holocaust, the land of Israel, and the United States. Describing her felt 
connection to Jewish women of previous generations who sailed in different directions from her 
own ancestors, she writes: 
“They say such things are stored 
In the genetic code — 
 
Half-chances, unresolved 
Possibilities, the life 
 
Passed on because unlived — 
A mystic biology? —”5 
 
 
5 Adrienne Rich, Sources (Woodside: The Heyeck Press, 1983), 28. 
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What is this mystic biology of Rich’s? What is this promised land of Antin’s? For now, we can 
at the very least note that while Antin portrays biology through the language of Jewish tradition, 
Rich describes a Jewish inheritance as biological. In each chapter of this dissertation, the 
biological imagination responds to—and in fact highlights—the elusiveness of Jewish 
inheritance for Jewish authors in the United States. To this effect, the biological imagination 
marks a phenomenon in which authors locate a Jewish inheritance in the body, rather than in 
intellectual, religious, or textual traditions. Biological knowledge thus renders the body itself as a 
site marked by Jewish history, language, or practice (extending beyond the most commonly 
acknowledged practice of circumcision, which only applies to the male body). 
Conceiving of Jewish inheritance as bodily, through biological forms, renders it 
imaginatively manipulable beyond formal biological knowledge—such as when a non-Jewish 
character in Laura Z. Hobson’s novel, Gentleman’s Agreement (1947) imagines that his body has 
mutated in response to antisemitism. He believes, “A mutation had been produced in the bunched 
nerves, in the eardrums that caught nuance, in the very corneas that gave him sight” (119). Or, in 
the phenomenon’s contemporary iterations beyond literature (from contemporary television to 
podcasts), American Jews troubled by the idea that they do not speak Yiddish and that the 
language is being “diluted,” imagine that the language in some way lives in them and is passed 
along genetically.6 Not merely the realm of fantastical laymen, this sort of language surfaces in 
Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi’s 2018 tribute to the Hebrew poet and translator Chana Bloch when she 
writes, “…we women with English on our tongues, Yiddish in our DNA, and Hebrew in our 
 
6 Hillary Frank, “When Mom Says Oy! And Dad Says ¡Ay!,” The Longest Shortest Time, n.d., 
https://longestshortesttime.com/episode-124-when-mom-says-oy-and-dad-says-ay/. At one point in this episode, the 
guest, Rebecca Lehrer, says, “But maybe…we absorbed it, and it’s sort of like in our DNA now...” 
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heart…”7 The biological imagination more often evokes mystery than certainty, yet it can teach 
us much about how Jewish authors in the United States conceive of Jewish inheritance. 
Critical Context  
It should perhaps go without saying—yet I cannot pass up the opportunity to make this 
explicit—that this dissertation is extremely wary of biological determinism. Rejecting any 
sweeping celebration of biological theories of inheritance, I offer instead curiosity about the 
forms of literary and artistic production that have been shaped by authors’ engagement with such 
theories. If anything, this dissertation is a supplication that we simply not look away from them. 
Reading—indeed, reading generously—these literary texts through the lens of the biological 
theories that they put forward, and alongside the popular scientific discourses of their moments, 
is to me at once an important historicization and an important ethical project. This is not a project 
of recuperating texts or scientific theories that by now have been left by the wayside, but rather a 
project of acknowledging how and why it is that some biological ideas seem dangerous to us 
today. And given this, we also ought to seriously consider how to treat literary works that attest 
to past scientific ideas’ imaginative hold on artists and authors of various stripes. 
I am sympathetic to the tendency in Jewish American literary studies, as in the field of 
American ethnic literary studies more broadly, to regard biology with decided skepticism. 
Specifically, when the word “biology” appears in this scholarship, it is most often posed as 
regressive current against which to gain critical traction.8 Such dismissal is on display in 
Benjamin Schreier’s sweeping critique of the field of Jewish American literary studies; for him, 
 
7 Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi, “The Roads Taken,” Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 36, no. 2 
(August 7, 2018): 21, https://doi.org/10.1353/sho.2018.0018. 
8 When biological thought has been considered as a generative current within Jewish American literature, it has been 
regarded most seriously as a talisman of modernity. See, for instance, Wilson, “The Evolution of Ethnicity.” 
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a “biologistic”—that is, essentialist, naturalized, and static—definition of Jewish identity as a 
literary hermeneutic marks intellectual laziness, and serves as an obstruction of theorization, 
imagination, and critique.9 Likewise, Zohar Weiman-Kelman aligns biology with 
heteronormativity and historical determinism.10 In the study of American ethnic literature more 
generally, as early as the 1980s Werner Sollors famously proposed the model of “descent” plus 
“consent” so as to turn away from “...grounding close readings of text on static notions of 
descent, and on primordial, organicist, sometimes even biological—but in all cases largely 
unquestioned—concepts of ethnic group membership.” 11 The stakes for Sollors are not only 
analytical, but ethical and political: illustrating how the very same American culture that 
proposes a consent-based melting-pot ideology has also propagated cruel descent-based 
programs such as Jim Crow laws, segregation, and racialized limitations on immigration. Indeed, 
how can we not regard “biology” qua “descent” with hesitation, Sollors challenges us, when for 
many marginalized groups in the United States, the opportunity to consent (or not) to an ethnicity 
is a privilege not always granted?  
My own answer to this quandary is that the ethical imperative that these scholars point 
out can hold true, even as we probe the dissemination of biological knowledge in American 
culture, in search of nuance. In this regard, I follow scholars such as Britt Russert and Shawn 
Michelle Smith, who have explored ways that African American intellectuals made use of the 
 
9 Benjamin Schreier, The Impossible Jew: Identity and the Reconstruction of Jewish American Literary History 
(New York ; London: NYU Press, 2015), 19; Schreier’s term “biologistic” is similar or what Cynthia Ozick has 
called “biographical” or “parochial” definitions of Jewish literature, meaning a practice of categorizing any text as 
“Jewish," so long as it was composed by an author also easily categorized as Jewish. Cynthia Ozick, “Toward a New 
Yiddish,” in Art & Ardor: Essays (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1984), 153. 
10 Zohar Weiman-Kelman, Queer Expectations : A Genealogy of Jewish Women’s Poetry (Albany: SUNY Press, 
2018), xii. 
11 Werner. Sollors, Beyond Ethnicity: Consent and Descent in American Culture, xiii, 294 p. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), 11, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/. 
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theories and methods of race science in order to argue against slavery and racism in the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.12 This is a “critical tradition” that Nancy Leys Stepan 
and Sander Gilman have also marked, arguing that those targeted socially by the scientific 
theories of their moment tend to adopt a scientific idiom in order to dispel such stereotyping or 
targeting—precisely because the authority of science often requires them to do so.13 Scholarly 
studies such as these point out that just as biological paradigms change over time, the meaning of 
biology for literary authors and cultural producers is also historically specific. When biological 
knowledge is itself central to the object of study, it can be seen as contingent, and “biology” need 
not serve as shorthand for uncritical notions of ethnic identities. 
Within Jewish studies, a significant corpus of scholarship has emerged in recent decades 
about the scientific construction of the Jewish body, particularly in Europe. These rich studies of 
British and German race science, Jewish responses to evolutionary theory, and the role of Jews 
as practitioners and subjects of medicine up until the 1930s are the ground upon which I build 
my own arguments. My work is especially indebted to scholars such as Mitchell B. Hart, John 
Efron, and Sander Gilman, who have shown with great nuance the ways in which non-Jews and 
Jews alike have turned to biology to make meaning of Jewishness. Since the 1990s, the corporeal 
turn in Jewish studies has made space for the exploration of what constitutes a body as Jewish, 
and the various modes of knowledge that make the very idea of a “Jewish body” possible.  
 
12 Britt Rusert, Fugitive Science: Empiricism and Freedom in Early African American Culture (New York: NYU 
Press, 2017); Shawn Michelle Smith, “‘Looking at One’s Self through the Eyes of Others’: W.E.B. Du Bois’s 
Photographs for the 1900 Paris Exposition,” African American Review 34, no. 4 (2000): 581, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2901420. 
13 Nancy Leys Stepan and Sander L. Gilman, “Appropriating the Idioms of Science: The Rejection of Scientific 
Racism,” in The Bounds of Race: Perspectives on Hegemony and Resistance, ed. Dominick LaCapra (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991), 82–83. 
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In this dissertation I argue that we can use the sensibility of Jewish body studies to expand the 
definitional bounds of “Jewish texts.” Over a decade ago, Jewish body scholars from across 
disciplines overwhelmingly responded to the criticism that their field spuriously de-centers 
Jewish texts (labeled the “text-body” problem, which approximated a “mind-body” problem), by 
assuring that texts and textuality are still at the heart of their scholarly enterprise—for instance, 
that studies look at how the Jewish body is constructed within Jewish religious and cultural 
canons, from the Mishnah to S.Y. Abramovitch’s The Travels of Benjamin the Third (1878) to 
Isaac Bashevis Singer’s “Yentl the Yeshivah Boy.”14 This response, while true, does not fully 
acknowledge the potential intervention of studying the imbrication of Jewish bodies and texts. 
Beyond insisting on the imbrication of text and body, I offer that this insight necessarily causes 
us to identify and understand Jewish literature differently. 
Take, for example, Mary Antin, whose experience of keeping kosher caused an internal 
cry when she attempted to eat pork, or Maurice Fishberg and Israel Zangwill who wrote that they 
could see the mark of Jewish suffering on the faces of Jewish individuals, or contemporary 
figures who posit that they carry Yiddish in their DNA. In each of these cases, Jewish traditions, 
languages, and histories are by no means irrelevant. However, the authors telegraph their 
investment in Jewish tradition through the body, and specifically through biology, rather than 
through forms of intertextuality more traditionally sought out in studies of modern Jewish 
literature. 
 
14 A 2005 symposium in Jewish Quarterly Review addressed this issue from the perspectives of multiple disciplines. 
The symposium introduction and several contributions are cited here. David N. Myers, “Introduction: Reflections on 
the Discourse of the Body in Jewish Studies,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 95, no. 3 (2005): v–vi; Daniel Boyarin, 
“Response to Leon Wieseltier,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 95, no. 3 (2005): 443–46; Sharon Gillerman, “More 
than Skin Deep: Histories of the Modern Jewish Body,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 95, no. 3 (2005): 470–78; 
Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “The Corporeal Turn,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 95, no. 3 (2005): 447–61. 
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Perhaps the most telling example would be to the titular character David Levinsky from 
Abraham Cahan’s novel, The Rise of David Levinsky, whose body could never release itself from 
his yeshivah hand gestures. Where other works of modern Jewish literature might use copious 
textual allusions to signal the characters’ deep knowledge of Jewish texts, it is David’s “yeshivah 
gesticulations” that index the character’s entanglement with Jewish textual traditions. At the time 
of the novel’s publication, gestures, posture, and mannerisms were all central points of 
observation in the quest to understand Jewish biological inheritance. It is true that Cahan already 
serves for many as a key figure in the history of Jewish American literature (especially literature 
written in English by members of the era of mass immigration). However, by reading for the 
ways that Cahan writes about the body, and about biology, we can set off on new trajectories for 
reading Jewish American literature. These new paths could entail looking to the photographic 
representations of “Jewish types” published alongside the initial serialization of David Levinsky 
in McClure’s magazine (as I do in the third chapter of this dissertation), and investigating the 
role of photographic racial typology in a transnational Jewish culture more broadly. 
If this argument aims to reconcile the text-body problem (or at least come down on one 
side of it), it also provides new avenues for a problem that seems always to plague Jewish 
American literature in general. Like other modern Jewish literatures not written in historic 
Jewish languages, there seems always an impossible task to define what a “Jewish text” is. By 
reading for the biological imagination, this dissertation expands the definition of a “Jewish 
text”—especially for those written in languages not typically counted as “Jewish languages.” I 
argue that this does not amount to a thinning of Jewish textual tradition, but a need to recalibrate 
the analytic frameworks that allow us to recognize and read Jewish literature. This dissertation 
is—at times implicitly or explicitly—a rebuke of the perpetual handwringing inside and outside 
 10 
the academy about the ultimate hollowness or inevitable demise of Jewish American literature.15 
It is also an attempt to circumvent gate keeping and canon adjudicating in favor of a more open 
study of these works. 
Race in the Twentieth Century: Historical and Science Historical Background 
This dissertation’s case studies span across more than a hundred years: from the early 
twentieth century to the early twenty-first century. Within this historical time frame, race became 
a contested concept in biological and popular scientific discourses of inheritance, as scholars in 
the burgeoning interdisciplinary field of Science Technology and Society (STS) studies have 
comprehensively recorded.16 Jews are often only implicitly a part of this story, and they do 
admittedly fit slightly askew within it. Jews are both the population whose state-sanctioned racial 
victimization in the Holocaust caused the scientific community to turn against the concept of 
race at mid-century, and a population that is no longer considered to be a race in a contemporary 
American culture still very much shaped by racial distinctions. Insofar as Jews—particularly 
Ashkenazi Jews, meaning those of Eastern European descent—are understood to be far less 
vulnerable to racism than many others in the United States, the scholarly neglect of their 
relationship to race science and biology since 1945 might reasonably seem like a less than urgent 
lacuna to fill. However, it remains a critical lack, which has become especially salient as Jews 
 
15 Irving Howe, “Introduction,” in Jewish-American Stories (New York: Signet, 1977), 1–17; William Deresiewicz, 
“The Imaginary Jew,” May 10, 2007, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/imaginary-jew/; David Bezmozgis, 
“The End of American Jewish Literature, Again,” Tablet Magazine, September 17, 2014, /sections/arts-
letters/articles/bezmozgis-american-jewish-literature. 
16 Troy Duster, Backdoor to Eugenics, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2003); Duana Fullwiley, “The Biologistical Construction 
of Race: `Admixture’ Technology and the New Genetic Medicine,” Social Studies of Science 38, no. 5 (October 
2008): 695–735, https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312708090796; Ann Morning, “Does Genomics Challenge the Social 
Construction of Race?,” Sociological Theory 32, no. 3 (2014): 189–207; W. Carson Byrd et al., “Biological 
Determinism and Racial Essentialism: The Ideological Double Helix of Racial Inequality,” The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 661, no. 1 (September 1, 2015): 8–22, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716215591476. 
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have been among those increasingly targeted by rising white supremacy in the United States—a 
movement whose definition of Jews is indeed biologically articulated.17 
This dissertation argues that the twentieth century did not witness a linear progression of 
cultural attitudes and scientific norms around a biological Jewishness. As earlier chapters attest, 
Jews were discussed in American culture as a “race” at the turn of the century. Even as Jews’ 
status as a distinct, “pure race” was contested as early as the late nineteenth century, their racial 
designation remained a legitimate (albeit unanswered) scientific question for decades to follow. 
In the earlier decades of the twentieth century, Jews, as well as other “white races” (those less 
desirable groups of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe) were the frequent subjects of 
eugenic studies (i.e., the scientific effort to perfect the human population by controlled breeding, 
selecting for desired traits). At this time, the American eugenics movement was highly 
influential, both at home, where it was used to justify legal discrimination, from segregation to 
immigration restrictions, and abroad, where it served as a model for Nazi Germany.18 The United 
States’ eugenics trend was papered over, though, when Americans deemed the Nazis’ national 
program of racial hygiene a bridge too far. To this day the Holocaust is often understood as the 
historical turning point, which caused eugenics and the “science of race” to lose favor in 
scientific and political discourse.  
Broadly speaking, the postwar reaction to Nazi race science changed how biology could 
be used to understand race in American public culture writ large. Accounts of the postwar 
 
17 Aaron Panofsky and Joan Donovan, “Genetic Ancestry Testing among White Nationalists: From Identity Repair 
to Citizen Science,” Social Studies of Science, July 2, 2019, 030631271986143, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312719861434. 
18 Stefan Kuhl, The Nazi Connection: Eugenics, American Racism, and German National Socialism (Oxford 
University Press, 2002); James O. Whitman, Hitler’s American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi 
Race Law (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2017), https://www-degruyter-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/viewbooktoc/product/487115. 
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reckoning with biological racism written by social scientists such as Duana Fullwiley and Jenny 
Reardon point to UNESCO’s two “Statements on Race,” published in 1951 and 1952, in 
response to the Nuremberg Trials, as crucial moments that mark this change. These statements 
rejected race as a valid scientific category, pushing it outside the bounds of legitimate scientific 
discourse. Even as the country held fast to racial categories, science would disentangle itself 
from the politicized terminology of race and dispense with former modes of inquiry that went 
along with it. “New genetics,” the name given to the biological study of heredity in the postwar 
period, has long been heralded as apolitical and non-ideological.19 While scientific advances 
since midcentury did in fact constitute a new genetics (for instance, the discovery of the double 
helix in 1953, or the ability to determine nucleotide sequences in the late 1970s, and to 
mechanize this process in the 1980s), recent accounts such as Reardon’s have begun to challenge 
earlier understandings of postwar biology’s ideological neutrality, as well as its methodological 
“newness.”20 Still today, while geneticists may not use the word “race” as a scientific term, 
prevailing “population” categories often mirror—and therefore reinforce—North American 
racial categories.21  
It is not surprising, then, that the Human Genome Project began raising ethical concerns 
in the 1990s, and that contemporary scientists and STS scholars warn of the ethnic determinism 
 
19 Jenny Reardon, Race to the Finish: Identity and Governance in an Age of Genomics, In-Formation Series xii, 237 
p. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/. 
20 Veronika Lipphardt, “‘Geographical Distribution Patterns of Various Genes’: Genetic Studies of Human Variation 
after 1945,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological 
and Biomedical Sciences 47 (September 2014): 50–61, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2014.05.006; Jonathan Marks, 
“The Origins of Anthropological Genetics,” Current Anthropology 53, no. S5 (April 2012): S161–72, 
https://doi.org/10.1086/662333; Alondra Nelson, The Social Life of DNA: Race, Reparations, and Reconciliation 
After the Genome (Boston: Beacon Press, 2016). 
21 Fullwiley, “The Biologistical Construction of Race”; Morning, “Does Genomics Challenge the Social 
Construction of Race?” 
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made possible through the latest craze of genetic ancestry testing. Among them, American 
literature scholar Patricia E. Chu has argued that contemporary human genetics attempts to 
“separate phenotype from genotype and allow for a benign deployment of race.”22 Likewise, 
Madhu Dubey has expressed skepticism toward the superior social impact of DNA, stating, 
“Focused on invisible cells and molecules instead of skin and anatomy, genomic concepts of race 
are presumably inaugurating a perceptual shift.”23 Nevertheless, Dubey suggests that, 
“Contemporary popular understandings of DNA…revalidate the race concept by way of spurious 
synonym (DNA=blood=race),” echoing a similar critique made by theorists Karen E. Fields and 
Barbara J. Fields.24  
Yet this is where Ashkenazi Jews’ place in this larger narrative becomes more 
complicated. To the extent that race is a social project, the boundaries of these categories are 
never stable. And Jews are a prime example of the fluidity of racial borders. As most scholars 
indicate, in the postwar period, many Jews (particularly, but not only Ashkenazi) have lost much, 
if not all, trace of racial marking within the American rubric of whiteness, or in effect “became 
white.”25 Now racially unmarked, Jews’ difference registers most clearly as religious or cultural, 
 
22 Chu’s project, still in process, considers the ethnic novel specifically, because of that form’s associations with 
communicating a particular idea about social and civic inclusion. While Chu describes a particular paradox that she 
understands to dovetail in the last decade of the twentieth century, creating a distinctly new form of the American 
ethnic novel, these less-than-compatible changing scientific and social paradigms have a longer history. P. E. Chu, 
“The American Genome Project: A Biopolitical History of the Contemporary Ethno-Racial Novel,” American 
Literary History 25, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 209, https://doi.org/10.1093/alh/ajs074. 
23 Madhu Dubey, “Racecraft in American Fiction,” Novel: A Forum on Fiction 50, no. 3 (November 1, 2017): 370, 
https://doi.org/10.1215/00295132-4194968. 
24 Dubey, 369; See also Karen Fields and Barbara J. Fields, Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life 
(Verso Books, 2012). 
25 Eric L. Goldstein, The Price of Whiteness: Jews, Race, and American Identity (Princeton University Press, 2006); 
Karen Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says about Race in America (Rutgers University 
Press, 1998) Even though Karen Brodkin’s framework of Jews as “white folks,” does not necessarily leave much 
space for the possibility of non-white Ashkenazi Jews—or for non-Ashkenazi Jews for that matter—it is useful for 
the purposes of this dissertation insofar as Brodkin contributes to the idea that Ashkenazi Jews who might have been 
read as “off-white” in early twentieth-century United States came to be read as white by the end of that century. 
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rather than inherent to the body.26 And yet, while the term “Jewish race” is hardly ever heard in 
mainstream contemporary American culture, “Ashkenazi Jewish” is commonly treated as a 
“population” in genetic study.27 Whereas Ashkenazi Jews’ “whitening” over the course of the 
twentieth century attests to the social construction of race, their treatment in biological discourse 
continues to reflect a notion of stable, static, “pure races.” Of course, as Ann Morning has 
argued, any attempt to “objectively” group individuals or populations for scientific study is 
necessarily a social construction.28 One of the main tenets of the field of STS is that we cannot 
separate science from society—scientific knowledge is still created by human beings, who do not 
magically vacate their cultural positions when they enter the laboratory. Therefore, the seeming 
anomaly of Ashkenazi Jewish ancestry, as a population but not a race, both supports and 
complicates the scholarly understanding of the science of race since the second half of the 
twentieth century. Ironically—or, perhaps precisely due to the mainstream success of the racial 
un-marking, or whitening, of many Jews in the United States—very little attention is paid to how 
the biological discourse of human variation has impacted Jews or Jewish culture post-45.29  
 
While this study intersects with the idea of “Jews as white folks,” I do not ask whether, how, or why some Jews are 
white within the United States in the 21st century; I will instead analyze how specific texts express specific anxiety 
around whiteness for American Jews, which should not be conflated with a sense of guilt alone. 
26 Mary C. Waters, Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America (University of California Press, 1990), 18–19 
Waters’ work builds off of Herbert J. Gans’s concept of “symbolic ethnicity,” which defines ethnicity as an elective, 
enjoyable, and only intermittent activity. It has not always been the case that American Jews fit into this category. 
27 Daphna Birenbaum Carmeli, “Prevalence of Jews as Subjects in Genetic Research: Figures, Explanation, and 
Potential Implications,” American Journal of Medical Genetics 130A, no. 1 (2004): 76–83, 
https://doi.org/10.1002/ajmg.a.20291. 
28 Morning, “Does Genomics Challenge the Social Construction of Race?,” 203. 
29 There are, of course, exceptions. See for instance the following special issue. Noah A. Rosenberg and Steven P. 
Weitzman, “From Generation to Generation: The Genetics of Jewish Populations,” Human Biology 85, no. 6 (2013): 
817–23. 
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Thus, the postwar period saw simultaneous—slightly overlapping—projects of the de-
biologizing of race and the de-racializing of Jews in public discourse. Significantly, each 
phenomenon has its own complicated narrative. And the two have sometimes seemed more at 
odds than logically correlated, as Jewish authors have used the science of race in order to 
legitimate their claims that Jews are not a race. Indeed, this dissertation traces a trend extending 
from the anthropological writing of Franz Boas in the 1910s, to Hobson’s anti-antisemitism 
novel of 1947, in which the very grounds for denying the existence of a unique Jewish race was 
the “fact” of race as a valid scientific category. Many biological arguments against the 
distinctiveness of a Jewish race were by no means arguing against the concept of race itself. If 
anything, they argued for what Matthew Frye Jacobson has called “re-racialization,” rather than 
anti-racism.30 The fact that the phrase “Jewish race” should today register to my own ear as 
sinister and pseudoscientific, while race should continue to determine just about every aspect of 
American life, highlights the extent to which all scientific ideas about race are constructed and 
socially contingent.  
Taking all this in, the persistence of the biological imagination in postwar Jewish 
American literature presents something of a puzzle. That Jewish literary and cultural production 
should continue to incorporate, or obsess over, biological theories of inheritance complicates the 
historical narrative of Jews in the United States as well as the way that Jewish American 
literature can be understood within American ethnic literature today. Of course, works that 
express the biological imagination are not always in conversation with ideas of race. And yet, we 
might go so far as to note that in moments when it is possible to think about Jewish inheritance 
 
30 Matthew Frye Jacobson, “Becoming Caucasian: Vicissitudes of Whiteness in American Politics and Culture,” 
Identities 8, no. 1 (March 2001): 93, https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2001.9962685. 
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through biology, yet in absence of racial ideas, that absence is itself revealing and historically 
contingent. 
Dissertation’s Trajectory 
The chapters of this dissertation are organized both historically and thematically, moving 
from the beginning of the twentieth century to the beginning of the twenty-first. However, as my 
dissertation treats materials from approximately a century of Jewish American culture, I do not 
purport to provide exhaustive coverage; nor is my goal to trace precise, causal, linear 
connections. Rather, I have selected an assortment of cases, which stand independently and yet 
intertwined in their use of biological imagination.  
Chapter 2 and chapter 3 provide what could be understood as two distinct (yet also 
overlapping) starting points for this story. Chapter 2 introduces the phenomenon of biological 
imagination in two key texts for the “immigrant generation” of Jewish American literature: The 
Promised Land (1912) by Mary Antin and The Rise of David Levinsky (1917) by Abraham 
Cahan. The subsequent chapter provides new stakes for reading Cahan’s work within the 
framework of biological imagination. It moves laterally to look at the series of Jewish 
“photographic types” printed in a McClure’s magazine article, which supplemented the initial 
serialization of David Levinsky in 1913. Whereas the first chapter on Antin and Cahan looks at 
the way that these immigrant “rise” narratives incorporate theories of evolution, the following 
chapter places its source materials within a scientific and popular practice of creating, framing 
and reading photographs of Jewish faces as racial types. Chapter 4 continues to address the 
theme of racial typology by analyzing the ways in which Jewish American novels contested 
Jewish racial typology in response to the Holocaust. These novels narrate characters negotiating 
new relationships to biological theories of inheritance. Chapter 5 looks at a contemporary 
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phenomenon also engaged in the re-disciplining of the biological imagination, in which modern 
Jewish cultural producers attempt to resist the idea of a “biological model” of Jewish (or Yiddish 
linguistic) inheritance, despite frequently being pulled into a discourse of a “heritable Yiddish.” 
The conclusion to the dissertation delves into the contemporary phenomenon of Jewish genetics 
and points toward its literary antecedents from the late-twentieth century. 
As this brief sketch shows, the organization of this dissertation—as well as the stories it 
relates—resists any neat trajectories of biology becoming popular and then unpopular. Nor 
should readers reach the end of this dissertation and gather that biology has found a surprising 
resurgence in the contemporary practice of genetic ancestry testing, any more, I hope, than they 
should reflect on Rich’s poem from the 1980s describing “a mystic biology” and believe that it 
stands as a literary or historical anomaly. Instead, these case studies show that across the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, there exists continual resistance, questioning, and attempts 
to re-shape, the biological imagination. Indeed, the struggle over a biological understanding of 
inheritance unites all of these chapters, each described in greater detail below. 
Outline of Chapters 
Chapter 2 establishes the phenomenon of biological imagination through two literary 
texts that often serve as a bedrock of the Jewish American prose tradition in the twentieth 
century: The Promised Land (1912) by Mary Antin and The Rise of David Levinsky (1917) by 
Abraham Cahan. Here I elucidate both of these texts’ often ignored commitments to evolutionary 
theory. Bringing together genre readings and critical ethnic readings of both texts, I argue that 
these intellectual commitments to biology heighten certain tensions with regards to scale 
inherent to their generic constructions as autobiographies. I argue that seeing the political and 
narrative implications of Jewish immigrant literature’s embrace of biological knowledge forces 
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us to reconsider the role of biological theories in the immigration debates of the early twentieth 
century. 
Chapter 3 demonstrates further implications of the biological imagination in David 
Levinsky, by analyzing the series of Jewish “photographic types” published alongside the novel’s 
initial serialization in McClure’s magazine. The chapter traces the broader scientific and popular 
discourse of Jewish photographic typology, beginning with the British eugenicist Francis 
Galton’s late nineteenth-century composite photographic Jewish types. Despite the popular 
association of photographic “capture” with instantaneous apprehension, these photographs 
initiated a typological process of seeing, which promised the ability to see through time, and 
encouraged viewers to see Jewish history visibly manifest on a subject’s face. The chapter 
illustrates how early twentieth-century photographic projects used this discourse of typology to 
facilitate—or frustrate—racial intelligibility. 
Chapter 4 looks at the biological imagination in the direct shadow of the Holocaust. I 
argue that authors of Jewish American fiction levied critiques of American antisemitism by 
dramatizing the aforementioned typological process of seeing. Doing so allowed them to portray 
American antisemitism as rooted in visuality and race science. The novels Di mishpokhe 
karnovski/The Family Carnovsky (1940-1, 1943) by Israel Joshua Singer, Focus (1945) by 
Arthur Miller, and Gentleman’s Agreement (1947) by Laura Z. Hobson each uniquely narrate the 
re-forming of the Jewish American biological imagination on both sides of the pre- and post-war 
divide.  
Chapter 5 argues that the biological imagination offers generative possibilities for the 
Queer Yiddish movement within Jewish American culture. Despite the artistic and critical 
movement’s avowed aims to offer alternatives to a “biological model” of Yiddish inheritance, I 
 19 
contend that an idea of “heritable Yiddish” often pervades Queer Yiddish art and critique, 
bolstered by an analysis of the bilingual (Yiddish-English) poetry of Irena Klepfisz. By offering 
a genealogy of “heritable Yiddish”—assembling sources ranging from Franz Kafka to Uriel 
Weinreich, to the contemporary Amazon series, Transparent (2014-2019)—this chapter seeks to 
explicitly articulate what is often taken for granted in Queer Yiddish critique: that biologically 
informed notions of Jewish cultural transmission are active in postwar Jewish culture and 
difficult to discard.  
In the conclusion to the dissertation, I discuss the contemporary cultural phenomenon of 
Jewish genetics. Widespread Jewish American participation in genetic discourse (through 
genetic ancestry testing and Jewish genetic history) stands as the contemporary moment’s most 
significant iteration of the biological imagination. This conclusion points to the current 
moment’s antecedents in late twentieth-century Jewish American culture and letters: in 
particular, Adrienne Rich’s cycle of poetry, Sources (1982), which is suffused in genetic 
imagery. I use Sources (and the brief counterexample of Philip Roth’s Portnoy’s Complaint 
(1967)) to highlight the ability of genetic knowledge to produce new models of Jewish diaspora. 
Together, these sources point to the endurance of the biological imagination in Jewish American 
culture. The conclusion, and the dissertation as a whole, helps us to make sense of the 
contemporary proliferation and power of narratives woven out of biological knowledge. 
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Chapter 2 “The Promised Land of Evolution:” The Role of Evolutionary Thought in Early 
20th-Century Jewish American Immigrant Narratives 
 
In the early twentieth century, the authors Mary Antin and Abraham Cahan published 
major literary works about Eastern European Jewish immigrants finding America—and then, 
finding evolutionary theory. As immigrant narratives, Antin’s The Promised Land (1914) and 
Cahan’s The Rise of David Levinsky (1917) fit into what is now legible as a tradition in Jewish 
American prose literature: a “rise” narrative following the life of an individual born in Eastern 
Europe, who arrives in the United States as a traditional Jew with little in the way of secular 
education or economic resources, and then eventually assimilates to American culture and finds 
success—whether educational or economic.31 The texts’ emotional tenors serve as foils for one 
another:32 Antin’s narrative appears extremely earnest in its message of embracing the American 
way of life; Cahan’s is satirical, if not altogether sardonic.33 However, in spite of these two texts’ 
strikingly different tones and purported political agendas, both protagonists ultimately claim to 
be deeply influenced by evolutionary theory—or, as described by Antin, “the promised land of 
evolution.”  
 
31 This is a version of the American “rags to riches” trope typified in the works of Horatio Alger and perhaps most 
famously realized in The Rise of Silas Lapham by William Dean Howells. Howells was an important champion of 
Cahan and his work. The title The Rise of David Levinsky is certainly paying homage to Howell’s novel. 
32 As Werner Sollors notes, “Antin’s Promised Land started with the divided world of Russia and ended on a note of 
unified fulfillment in America; Cahan’s Levinsky inverts this process and shows the successfully assimilated 
protagonist reminiscing about his lost Old World identity.” Werner Sollors, “Immigration and Modernity 1900-
1945,” in The Cambridge History of Jewish American Literature, ed. Hana Wirth-Nesher (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), 92. 
33 6/30/21 11:36:00 AM 
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Antin’s and Cahan’s works were published toward the end of a roughly 40-year period 
(1881-1924), in which the United States saw its highest level of Jewish immigration in its 
history. This wave of Jewish immigration coincided with and contributed to searing national 
debates over the “changing face” of America, which culminated in federal legislation intended to 
curb this trend.34 The immigration debates of the early 20th century were shaped by nativism, 
racism, and xenophobia, and intellectually underwritten by a growing American eugenics 
movement. Accordingly, we might assume that the mention of Spencer or Darwin in early 
twentieth-century immigrant texts would cast a deterministic, essentialist pall over the works. 
However, as I show in this chapter, the place of evolutionary biological thinking in David 
Levinsky and the Promised Land (and in this moment of Jewish American culture) is rather more 
complex. These texts make use of evolutionary theories in order to conceive of potential 
dynamism within the strictures of programmatic Americanization. Within these narratives, 
biological theories of inheritance and evolution allow for a new schema of how the Jewish past 
lives in these “made over” immigrants. 
Tensions in Scale and the Biological Imagination 
The genre of autobiography is critical to both works. This chapter will continuously 
return to the respective conventions used within evolutionary theory and within the genre of 
autobiography to represent history and transformation, the individual and the group. Antin’s is a 
more sincere iteration of the autobiography, whereas Cahan’s could be understood as a fictional 
 
34 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was met by additional acts in 1907 (to keep out Asian immigrants beyond 
Chinese and Japanese) and 1917 (to limit South and East European immigrants, and require a reading test). The 
Immigration Act of 1924 (Johnson Reed Act) implemented the starkest quota system, which mandated that 
immigration should allow for the United States to maintain the national/racial proportions of the year 1890. Asian 
immigrants were excluded from this formula. “Milestones: 1921–1936 - Office of the Historian,” accessed March 1, 
2017, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/immigration-act. 
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parody of the form. Nevertheless, the autobiographic genre sets narrative parameters for both 
texts and informs my analysis. In particular, I attend to the genre’s constitutive tension between 
the auto- and the ethno-, the need to speak for one’s self, and the need, as Antin puts it, to “speak 
for thousands.”35 This need to speak for the self and the need to speak for a larger community has 
been a central concern in scholarship on Jewish life writing.36 The genre’s competing impulses—
to serve as a representative example of a large group, and to narrate an individual, extraordinary, 
life—constitutes what I call a tension in scale.  
Yet this is only the first tension in scale identifiable in Cahan and Antin’s texts. The 
second is the logical tension of applying evolutionary theories to the story of an individual within 
a literary work. Perhaps it seems fitting that the idea of “evolution” would appeal as a model for 
narrating self-development. Indeed, Darwin’s theory of evolution addresses history and 
temporality, and his work is rich with plot.37 However, his gradualist theory contends that an 
individual does not herself evolve or mutate, but rather serves as what Gillian Beer has called 
both a “vehicle and a dead-end.”38 Therefore, the very adoption of evolutionary theory (which 
functions on the scale of environments, species, and populations) in an autobiographic narrative 
presents a further tension in scale.39 Seeing the connection between these two seeming paradoxes, 
 
35 Antin, The Promised Land, 72. 
36 Perhaps most tellingly, Marcus Moseley’s 2006 monograph on Jewish autobiography is titled Being For Myself 
Alone. Marcus Moseley, Being For Myself Alone : Origins of Jewish Autobiography (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2006); See also Anita Norich, “The Family Singer and the Autobiographical Imagination,” 
Prooftexts 10, no. 1 (January 1, 1990): 91–107; Alan L. Mintz, “Banished from Their Father’s Table” : Loss of 
Faith and Hebrew Autobiography, Jewish Literature and Culture (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). 
37 George Levine, Darwin and the Novelists: Patterns of Science in Victorian Fiction (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1988), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/. 
38 Gillian. Beer, Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot, and Nineteenth-Century Fiction 
(London ; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 43. 
39 Alexis Harley argues that this very logical tension has not stopped many—including 19th-century natural 
scientists themselves—from conceiving of personal development through the theoretical model of evolution. Alexis 
Harley, Autobiologies: Charles Darwin and the Natural History of the Self, xvii, 213 pages (Lewisburg 
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these two tensions in scale, will offer insight into the ways that Cahan and Antin narrate 
assimilation and grapple with the notion of a bodily Jewish inheritance. Both tensions can be 
identified in both texts, but I will first introduce two brief illustrations from The Promised Land. 
Antin writes self-consciously about the generic tension in scale in her autobiography. 
Indeed, she brings our attention to the question of exemplarity early on in the text, famously 
asking in mock humility, “Should I be sitting here, chattering of my infantile adventures, if I did 
not know that I was speaking for thousands?”40 She then continues, “I might say ‘you’ or ‘he’ 
instead of ‘I.’” Perhaps it is not surprising that Antin semantically sidesteps her gender in order 
to emphasize the universality of her story, seeing as representative status and the very practice of 
writing autobiography were themselves usually reserved for men.41 Antin reports to her readers 
that her rationale in providing autobiographic detail is the possibility that readers can extrapolate 
from her life the vast, universal pattern of Jewish life and immigration. That is, for Antin the 
tension between the autobiographic and the ethnographic is quite easily resolved through an 
assertion of synecdoche, that she is a part for a whole. In fact, the very potential for ethnographic 
insight gives her the mandate to write her autobiography.  
However, in other passages, she reaches an apparently opposite conclusion. Antin brings 
our attention to the contradiction between evolution and autobiography toward the book’s end, 
when she acknowledges her desire to reconcile her sense of individual significance and a 
 
[Pennsylvania] : Lanham, Maryland: Bucknell University Press ; Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 
2015), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/. 
40 Antin, The Promised Land, 72. 
41 Referring to her own youth here, Antin writes of her non-gendered “infantile adventures” and claims that the 
pronoun of her protagonist could as easily be a universal “you” or “he” as it could be “I,” though never a she. This 
passage amounts to a bold claim of representativeness—such a claim, as Anita Norich has argued, would not 
typically be granted to the female author of an autobiography. Norich, “The Family Singer and the Autobiographical 
Imagination.” 
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newfound knowledge of the “geological ages.”42 She writes, “Thinking in aeons and in races, 
instead of in years and individuals, somehow lightened the burden of intelligence, and filled me 
anew with a sense of youth and well-being.”43 Natural science affords Antin a larger scale of 
thinking: on the level of “aeons” rather than “years,” and “races” rather than the “individual.” It 
allows her to deny her own personal significance. Here, learning about natural science causes 
Antin to conclude that she is not a sufficient part for a whole: the scale of the individual seems 
ultimately too small for synecdochal representation. Therefore, biological knowledge 
reintroduces the generic tension of autobiography that Antin had seemingly so easily cast aside. 
This insight is especially ironic, because it arrives at the very end of the book—when the 
autobiographical subject ought to be nearing the completion of her bildung. Yet Antin repeatedly 
describes this intellectual coming of age and the mental lightness it affords her as akin to youth. 
She writes later, “I did not become a finished philosopher from hearing a couple of hundred 
lectures on scientific subjects. I did not even become a finished woman. If anything, I grew 
rather more girlish.”44 Not only is Antin “filled…anew with a sense of youth and well-being”—
this sense of youth is a markedly gendered one. Beyond “girlish”—a specific form of youthful 
femininity—she also expresses later that on days that she spent exploring the woods, she was 
inclined to “play the tomboy”—another female presentation of gender, tied to youth. Even the 
other descriptions in this passage, “a finished philosopher” and “a finished woman,” point to 
gendered positions—a philosopher can seek truths that apply to all, whereas a woman can only 
speak for herself (if that). This moment challenges what we had imagined to be a narrative of 
 
42 Levine, Darwin and the Novelists, In Antin’s time, geology served as a model science for biology. 
43 Antin, The Promised Land, 261–62. 
44 Antin, 262. 
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complete development or rise: scientific knowledge causes her to move playfully back in time, 
rather than toward a pre-determined telos. And perhaps most surprisingly, causes her to describe 
herself in gendered and feminine terms within this reversed development. In other words, the 
acknowledged tension involved in mapping Mary’s intellectual and personal development onto 
scientific theories of evolution also serves to undermine some of the text’s prior claims about the 
genderless (or male) universal significance of the narrative.45   
Exploring the relation between these two tensions in scale—the generic and the 
scientific—will invite us to see how crucial biological imagination is to the narratives formed in 
both The Promised Land and David Levinsky. These texts not only incorporate biological 
theories, but their protagonists also pledge allegiance to them. What difference does it make that 
these authors turned to biology, rather than any other secular or privileged form of knowledge, in 
order to make sense of these Jewish immigrants’ lives? As I will later elaborate—in spite of its 
popular perception as nefariously teleological—evolution in particular contributes a complex 
conceptualization of history and temporality and is therefore ripe for narrative engagement. 
Moreover, Darwin’s biological theories can, perhaps surprisingly, draw our attention to material 
and social change, even as the protagonists wonder over the idea of an essential or constant, 
Jewish bodily inheritance. 
The biological imagination here is a creative negotiation of a particular kind of 
knowledge; biology is a way of knowing about the material body, but not a shorthand for it. This 
 
45 A note on the names I use in this chapter: Mary Antin is both the protagonist and the author of The Promised 
Land. In this chapter, in order to differentiate between these two roles or “versions” of her, I will generally use the 
name “Antin” to refer to the author of the Promised Land and the name “Mary” to refer to the person we encounter 
in the text. This is admittedly a slippery distinction. In order to maintain an equitable sense of presumed intimacy 
between myself and each of the protagonists, I will refer to David Levinsky, the eponymous protagonist of Cahan’s 
novel, as “David,” even though critics of the novel often refer to him as “Levinsky” (as can be found in passages 
brought into this chapter.) I will refer to the novel as David Levinsky. 
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is a crucial distinction within a field like American immigrant literature in which there is often 
skittishness about the very word. Biology is often taken to mean “essence” or “essentialism.”46 
For instance, Sarah Wilson argues that as much as race, bodies, and physical difference were 
critical elements of Cahan and Antin’s moment’s prevailing progressive “melting pot” discourse, 
“Literary discourse seemed to promise the best means of being faithless to biology and 
materiality.”47 Wilson defines the literary in opposition to the biological. I agree with the analysis 
that an American “melting pot” discourse could be a way of shaping the world, with disregard 
for apparent material constraints. And yet, I caution against equating biology too neatly with 
material reality. I will instead explore moments in Antin and Cahan’s texts in which biological 
knowledge is an integral part of precisely the literary turn that Wilson so aptly describes.  
The authors considered in this chapter do not write about biological theories seamlessly, 
rationally, or free of complication. The internal tensions and contradictions are apparent on the 
surfaces of the texts. We must approach these authors’ handling of biological knowledge with 
care, precisely because materiality and physical bodies were so important to the debates around 
assimilation in the Progressive Era. Seeing as Antin’s and Cahan’s works follow immigrants 
from a linguistic, religious, ethnic minority, their application of evolutionism is implicated in the 
burgeoning discourse of Americanization and ethnicity. Accordingly, this chapter will also 
explore the scientific, intellectual, and political, context surrounding David Levinsky and The 
Promised Land, with special attention to the theories of Darwin and Spencer, their reception in 
 
46 For instance, Jonathan Freedman, Klezmer America: Jewishness, Ethnicity, Modernity, xi, 388 p. (New York: 
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Jewish culture and the role of biological vocabulary in debates around immigration and 
Americanization. 
David Levinsky: A Satire of Social Darwinism 
In Abraham Cahan’s novel detailing the life of an early twentieth century industrialist, 
David (the titular character) often uses Spencerian and Darwinian principles to understand his 
transformation in the United States, and in order to rationalize his capitalist activities. This might 
be how readers today would expect to encounter the theories of Darwin in an immigrant 
narrative, considering that, according to Greta Jones, Darwin “was used from the beginning as a 
defense of ‘laissez faire’ capitalism.”48 Gilded Age American tycoons often invoked Spencer in 
order to both naturalize and rationalize their economic activities. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, in 
the novel, David attributes his initial discovery and interest in Spencer to his frustration with the 
cloak-makers’ union that organizes his employees.49 He applies evolutionary theory in order to 
understand not only Americanization, but also wealth accumulation and social mobility. 
Evolutionary theories provide David with an authoritative model to legitimize his pre-existing 
attitudes as a manufacturer and allow him to view himself as a “Victor of Existence.”50 
Nonetheless, Cahan’s own ideological and educational background presents a useful foil 
to that of David. The fact that Cahan was the editor of New York’s most prominent Yiddish 
socialist daily newspaper should lead readers to consider the fictional interpretation of Spencer 
 
48 Greta Jones, Social Darwinism and English Thought: The Interaction Between Biological and Social Theory 
(Brighton, Sussex : Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Harvester Press ; Humanities Press, 1980), 35. 
49 Abraham Cahan, The Rise of David Levinsky, Reprint edition (New York, N.Y., U.S.A: Penguin Classics, 1993), 
282. 
50 Cahan, 283. 
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and Darwin as satirical.51 Still, Cahan’s own view of Spencer would better be described as 
fruitful rather than entirely cynical. In fact, as Steven Cassedy has pointed out, Cahan’s 
investment in Spencerian theory might be more appropriately attributed to his Russian education 
than to his own experience of Americanization. Cassedy places Cahan as a part of a generation 
of Russian Jewish intellectuals who emigrated to the United States already educated and invested 
in radical politics. As such, Cahan and his peers had been introduced to Spencer and Darwin 
within the context of Russian nihilism. Cahan felt that his role was to bring the ideas espoused by 
Spencer to American audiences. For instance, in one speech that Cahan gave and then published 
as an article in the Workmen’s Advocate, he cited Spencer in an effort to educate his audience 
about Realism, which in his view served a necessarily political and social function. In his fiction, 
however, Cahan represents Spencer as an American novelty that enlightens the Russian-born 
protagonist.  
In David Levinsky, much like in the Promised Land, Darwinian and Spencerian 
paradigms are a late arrival in David’s education, but David describes his encounter with these 
ideas as one of recognition rather than discovery. When he reads an editorial citing “the survival 
of the fittest” and “the struggle for existence,” he thinks, “Why, that is just what I have been 
saying all these days.” He continues, “I almost felt as though Darwin and Spencer had 
plagiarized a discovery of mine.”52 He thinks of a story his friend Nodelman had told him about 
fighting chickens, and it occurs to him that they had essentially come up with the same theory 
themselves. What The Promised Land presents as a mind-opening, paradigm-shifting, ecstatic 
revelation (by calling Darwin’s theory “the promised land”), is sardonically cast in Cahan’s 
 
51 Steven Cassedy, To the Other Shore: The Russian Jewish Intellectuals Who Came to America, xxiii, 197 p. 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 130, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/. 
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novel as circular, self-legitimizing encounter. Spencer and Darwin’s writing about natural 
selection provides the same wisdom as an allegory about animals, yet of course, biology’s 
scientific authority distinguishes it from the folktale. 
Even though David sees such a clear connection between the laws of evolution as laid out 
by Spencer and Darwin and his own ideas about competition, there are crucial differences 
between their theories and his own personal credo. David describes the theory he has developed 
as, “The able fellows succeed, and the misfits fail. Then the misfits begrudge those who 
accomplish things.”53 David’s philosophy plays on the language of Spencer—“able” rings with 
physicality; the “able fellow” is not only one who can do something but one who is “able-
bodied.” A similar play on words occurs in which the “misfit” is both one who does not fit in, as 
well as one who is not “fit,” let alone “the fittest.” However, David’s idea is far more 
personalized than Spencer’s, as it is about the human emotion of resentment. He is not asking or 
answering questions about why some people fail and others succeed. He is asking how an 
individual should live in a world ostensibly governed by such laws as Survival of the Fittest. And 
yet these theories neutralize the moral struggle he may feel regarding his exploitation of workers 
and accumulation of vast sums of money. The explanation for resentment or guilt within the 
capitalist system is simply: Nature. And this is a nature that applies on the level of the individual, 
and the group. 
As his story goes on, David continually invokes the “struggle for life,”54 and sees 
business through the lens of “survival of the fittest.”55 For instance, when he moves his business 
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to a tonier neighborhood, he describes the move as “an official confirmation of my being one of 
the fittest.”56 In this expression of proper Social Darwinism, David interprets the dogma of 
“survival of the fittest” similarly to the Protestant Ethic. David constantly looks to his economic 
successes as confirmation of his personal status as “fittest,” much like individuals might look to 
their economic success as validation that they have God’s grace. Just after David moves his 
offices to Broadway, he feels that his wealth is still inadequate. He declares, “My fortune was 
not climbing rapidly enough…Why, there were so many illiterate dunces who had not even 
heard of Darwin and Spencer who were worth more,” tying his economic worth to his having 
read Darwin and Spencer. 57 Further cementing these theories’ quasi-spiritual status, David 
believes that his very knowledge of the theories of fitness are a part of what earns his spot on the 
sliding scale of “economic fitness.” 
This attitude about the power of knowing Darwinian and Spencerian theories creeps up as 
soon as David is made aware of them. At first, as noted previously, David is elated to encounter 
these thinkers’ ideas. But then he admits, “when I dipped into Social Statistics, I was overborne 
by the wondrous novelty of the thing and by a sense of my own futility, ignorance, and 
cheapness.”58 The writing was so dense and complex that it made him acutely aware of his own 
lack of erudition and worth. Once he rereads and comprehends the books, though, he thinks, “It 
was as though all the wonders of learning, acumen, ingenuity, and assiduity displayed in these 
works had been intended, among other purposes, to establish my title as one of the victors of 
 
56 Cahan, 347. 
57 Cahan, 347–48. 
58 Cahan, 282. 
 31 
Existence.”59 There seems to be a double meaning here, regarding the scientific works’ medium 
and message. The message (the theory of “Survival of the Fittest”) allows David to see himself 
as fit; but so does the fact that these books are so complex, so challenging to grasp, and so 
comprehensive in their scope. The accomplishment of reading these works and being able to 
appreciate their “wonders of learning, acumen, ingenuity, and assiduity” ultimately transfers 
those attributes to the reader. These theories come to serve as cultural markers, much like any 
sign of educational distinction. His biological knowledge is not only an internal lens used for his 
own self-reckoning, but also an external badge that he can wear. 
He goes on to use the names, “Darwin” and “Spencer” as currency for his own upward 
mobility. When David decides to move into his own furnished room, he is pleased to find a 
bookcase there, and thinks, “I am going to buy a complete set of Spencer and some other books. 
Won’t the bookcases look fine! I shall read, read, read.”60 In David’s fantasy, he will read 
endlessly, and his books will also, primarily, act as furnishing. They will make his room “look 
fine.” Elsewhere, Cahan writes sardonically of female characters who are interested in 
cultivating their own personal taste and performed identities through books. David’s meditation 
on the bookshelf is perhaps most reminiscent of Flora, the protagonist in “The Imported 
Bridegroom” (1896), who has a “neat little library” and views herself as unique among her peers 
because she reads the novels of Thackery and Dickens.61 These novels furnish her bedroom and 
signal her hopes of upward mobility. Flora falls into a common trope for female characters in 
Realist texts—a silly young girl who reads too many novels and believes that her life should look 
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like one. In David we find a similar phenomenon, though rather than faith in the narrative model 
of fiction, he has faith in the narrative model laid out in the theories of Spencer and Darwin. A 
faith which the novel casts in a similarly critical light.  
Later, at a crucial point in the novel, David is mocked and challenged by a fellow 
travelling salesman named Loeb, and David uses Spencerian and Darwinian concepts in order to 
defend his status among his peers. After someone mentions the concept of competition, David 
“hastened to refer to the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest,” after which, “Loeb dared 
not burlesque [him].”62 David wields his knowledge of biology as a cultural shibboleth, and his 
application of evolutionary theory to understand capitalism is received as such by the other 
businessmen. Being conversant in these theories, and performing knowledge of them, ultimately 
earns David his place among the “stars” of the smoker car.63 Thus, David proves he is one of the 
“fittest” and signals access to elite forms of secular American knowledge. In these scenes, 
whether in the intimate spaces of a furnished apartment or a smoker car, the value of Spencerian 
theory and “survival of the fittest” is conferred on the individual. And indeed, it seems to easily 
support American capitalist individualism. 
The Mock Autobiography 
The novel’s status as mock autobiography might be lost on readers who encounter it 
today in a tidy Penguin Classics paperback edition. But the novel’s original instantiation as a 
serialized narrative published in McClures magazine across several months in 1913 amplify its 
place in the autobiographic genre. The series was published as “The Autobiography of An 
American Jew,” with editorial framing never once using the words “fiction,” “story,” “sketch,” 
 
62 Cahan, The Rise of David Levinsky, 329. 
63 Cahan, 329. 
 33 
or “realism,” but instead claiming that the protagonist, “has a career more sensational than could 
be conjured up by any man’s imagination.”64 The magazine strove to make Cahan’s creation 
invisible; it blurred the line between realist fiction and reality, as the magazine told readers that it 
would show, “by concrete example, the minute workings of that wonderful machine, the Jewish 
brain.”65 Of course, the most basic generic boundary between the biography and autobiography is 
the “auto”: the author who writes their own story. If part of the autobiography’s unique authority 
comes from the intimacy of author and subject, implicit in this authority is a purported accuracy, 
a verisimilitude, a promise that events “actually happened.” In this regard, the literary form of 
the autobiography proves valuable to a magazine that publishes mostly nonfiction.  
At the same time, Cahan was hyper-visible in the framing. Presenting the 
“Autobiography” of David Levinsky, “by Abraham Cahan” diminishes any illusion that what 
was printed was truly a life story written by the protagonist himself. In the introduction to the 
series, the editor emphasized that this immigrant narrative was filtered through an “expert,” so as 
to represent the “type” with accuracy.66 This is what Brent Hayes Edwards would call an 
“authenticating” introduction, which prepares readers to be taken “inside” the space of the 
other.67 The fact that Cahan was a journalist and newspaper editor—and not only a published 
author of American-brand realist fiction in English, hailed by William Dean Howells as a “new 
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star of Realism”68—contributed to this authentication. According to the magazine’s introduction, 
Cahan’s position as editor of the Yiddish-language daily, the Forverts/Forward, authorizes him 
as the so-called chronicler of David’s so-called life.69  
The editorial insistence on accuracy in the preface is striking. It claims that, “Levinsky is, 
in fact, an actual type; his story reproduces actual characters, occurrences, and situations taken 
from real life.”70 Actuality, factuality, and reproduction of reality all bind the fictional story. The 
editorial voice asserts that Cahan’s narrative, “shows, as no invention could do…” what in the 
Jew’s character has allowed for his economic success. Implicitly and explicitly, they claim that 
this story and this character are not invented. It seems oxymoronic to the genre to present an 
autobiography written by another, and to purport the veracity of fiction. These contradictions 
only compound upon the tensions in scale, inherent in autobiography: a life narrative of a 
particular, extraordinary individual, who also can serve as an ethnographically representative 
figure or “type” (a concept explored in the chapter to come). Yet it highlights the Realist desire 
for truth and accuracy. So too, this framing of Cahan’s story also points to the desire to see 
scientific observations, theories, or hypotheses play out in an individual’s life. 
Darwinism and Narrative 
Cahan’s satirical novel illustrates the deterministic potential of biological imagination in 
early twentieth-century American immigrant narratives. However, some less popularly 
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considered elements of Darwin’s theories can lead to altogether different sorts of immigrant 
narratives. Over the past several decades, scholars in Victorian studies in particular have 
illustrated how Darwin’s works, such as Origin of Species and Descent of Man, can be treated as 
literary texts. Not only are Darwin’s naturalistic writings almost relentlessly metaphorical and 
densely emplotted, they were simultaneously a great influence on literature and deeply 
influenced by literature.71 This section will give a primer on Darwinian theory as it pertains to the 
investments of Antin and Cahan’s texts on the levels of narrative and American ethnicity. To do 
so, it is crucial to distinguish between Spencer (aligned with “social Darwinism”) and Darwin, 
and how they each conceived of teleology, competition, and heterogeneity—all concepts of great 
consequence for an ethnically diverse society.  
Charles Darwin did not originate the concept of Evolution, but he is the biological thinker 
whose name is most often associated with it. To a great extent, Darwinian thought in American 
culture has been funneled through “Social Darwinism”—which is itself far more aligned with the 
evolutionary theories of Darwin’s contemporary, Herbert Spencer. Spencer was immensely 
popular in the post-bellum United States (even more so than Darwin). By the beginning of the 
twentieth century, even though Spencer’s explicit popularity had waned, his theories had 
nonetheless already permeated the culture.72 The system that Spencer offered was, above all else, 
monolithic and universal; he drew upon biology, geology, and political economy, and forged a 
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theory that would speak to all of these areas.73 When Spencer writes of “mass” and “bodies,” 
these terms are meant to describe as divergent things as celestial bodies, molecules, the earth’s 
surface, and factory workers. This is because Spencer presented social laws as instantiations of 
general principles. 74 Spencer did not purport to apply—he synthesized.75 This insistence on a 
universal, synthetic theory is one of the key differences between Spencer and Darwin’s views of 
society’s relation to the natural world. Spencer wrote that, “Instead of civilization being artificial, 
it is a part of nature; all a piece with the development of the embryo or the unfolding of a 
flower.”76 Spencer’s theory explicitly analogizes the embryo-into-individual development and 
societal or species developments. For Spencer, this universal view of evolution occurs on every 
level and throughout every form. 
One more key distinction between Spencer and Darwin’s differing views of evolution 
would be their attitude toward teleology. Spencer, like Darwin, theorized evolution as increasing 
complexity over time. However, Spencer viewed evolution teleologically, as the transition “from 
an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent heterogeneity.”77 According to his 
theory, anything homogenous was unstable (a “moving body”), in that it would inevitably 
become heterogeneous. Moreover, this inevitable, increasing heterogeneity only took place up 
until a certain point of equilibrium or “equilibration,” where the increase in complexity would 
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cease.78 Therefore, even if Spencerian theory supports an understanding of evolution involving 
increased complexity and heterogeneity, this heterogeneity is ultimately in service of a defined 
end. As such, teleological notions of evolution are indebted to Spencer, even if they are 
technically “social Darwinist.” 
Darwin contributed to evolutionary theory the conceptualization and naming of the 
process, “natural selection.” Natural selection explains how species evolve, adapt, and survive in 
particular environments. Darwin was influenced by the geologist Charles Lyell, the champion of 
Uniformitarianism (a geological gradualist theory). Gradualism—which theorizes a slowly, 
constantly changing natural world—directly opposes catastrophism—which theorizes that the 
world undergoes change in rare, large-scale events. Darwin’s predecessors, practitioners of 
natural theology, modeled their view of the natural world after astronomy. 79 Because of this, 
they tended to understand nature as static and harmonious, governed by laws that keep balance, 
rather than cause continuous change.80 By comparison, Darwin’s insistence on history, surprise, 
and complexity appears rather radical.  
Darwin’s investment in history and change over time is precisely where his theories rub 
up against teleological thinking. In Social Darwinism, there are certain species or races that 
ought to—or will inevitably—survive where others die out. Admittedly, the idea of Natural 
Selection is often interpreted as a natural progression toward only the strongest winning out. 
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Alternately, the critic Elizabeth Grosz remind us, we could see that in Darwin’s idea of 
evolution, there is actually no telos, only mutating in yet-unimagined directions, over a great 
period of time.81 As Levine has argued, “Darwin sees adaptation as contingent and incomplete, 
however breathtakingly wonderful it can be.”82 In Grosz’s and Levine’s readings of Darwin, 
evolution is contingent, rather than inevitable; always in the middle of a process, and therefore 
lacking any defined endpoint. In other words, these scholars invite us to see Darwin’s theories as 
resisting teleology.  
When we consider the salience of Darwin’s theories in contact with American culture and 
American debates about immigration, one might presume that Darwinian theories would 
mandate teleological Americanization and assimilation. However, Darwin’s theories—especially 
the assertion of a natural tendency toward variation among individuals and among species—can 
instead be seen as antithetical to a teleological, coercive Americanization. As many 
acknowledge, Darwin’s writings on the workings of nature transpose social theories coming out 
of industrializing Britain—Malthus’s concept of “struggle for existence,” most notably—onto 
the natural and animal world.83 Spencer famously transposes this very same Malthusian idea into 
the social, economic, and biological concept of “survival of the fittest,” writing in his Principles 
of Biology that his concept was but a different terminology of “natural selection.”84  
Darwin himself writes about “struggle for existence” in On the Origin of Species in a 
decidedly ambivalent and cautious manner. He notes that, “I use the term Struggle for Existence 
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in a large and metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another…”85 This point 
is both striking and often ignored when we think of Social Darwinism. Understanding the 
“Struggle for Survival” as a metaphor, or a catchall phrase, to describe interdependence of one 
species on another is indeed very different in tenor from the cultural notion of “survival of the 
fittest,” theorized by Spencer—even if it seems an insufficient denouncement of Spencer’s brand 
of the theory. Darwin’s explanation is consistent with one of the main rallying cries in Origin 
about diversity within species and between them: that no species is independently created ex 
nihilo, and following that logic, no species emerges, endures, or evolves alone.86 Moreover, even 
when he analogizes the natural world and the social world, he presents an image that is peaceful, 
cooperative, and interdependent. Darwin writes, “[t]he advantage of diversification in the 
inhabitants of the same region is, in fact, the same as that of physiological division of labour in 
the organs of the same individual body…”87 This corporal analogy communicates a shared goal 
of life (rather than a zero-sum competition among species) within a single environment.88 Even 
though a phrase like “struggle for existence” is often understood to be encoded with teleology, 
Darwin asserts that he understands the term “struggle for existence” to describe a non-
competitive, non-teleological, symbiotic phenomenon.  
Darwin’s cooperative definition of “struggle for existence” is further elaborated in his 
descriptions of contemporaneous diversity—a concept that is of particular interest when we 
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consider Darwin’s influence on authors of American immigrant literature. Regarding Darwin’s 
interest in diversity, scholars often point to his famous “entangled bank” passage, in which he 
writes, 
“It is interesting to contemplate an entangled bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds, with 
birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through 
the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each 
other, and dependent upon each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws 
acting around us.”89  
 
The image of the “entangled bank” that Darwin asks us to contemplate encompasses a diversity 
of flora and fauna, all moving and existing together—a balance that is not static, but one that 
bustles interdependently. Even within this illustration of synchronic difference, there is internal 
movement of the various pieces, and the underlying laws that have created the various pieces 
continue to govern them in the present. This passage asks us to appreciate the continuation of the 
“laws”—to see these evolutionary forces as both past and present. In Darwin’s entangled bank, 
we find at once a natural world that has a history, that is diverse, and that is constantly, slowly 
changing.  
This brief foray into evolutionary theory will help to appreciate, in the following section, 
just how differently Antin’s and Cahan’s autobiographic subjects each understand the theories of 
Darwin. Popular conceptions of evolution that presume a definite endpoint have been influenced 
by the thoughts of Spencer far more than by those of Darwin (even if the former paid homage to 
the latter). Oftentimes in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the popular 
dissemination of evolutionary thought did not necessarily differentiate between Lamarck, 
Darwin, and Spencer as we might imagine—no doubt, the fact that Spencer himself wrote of his 
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theories as building off of these other scientists contributed to the conflation. 90 In the popular 
press, the evolutionists were often mentioned together, and not in opposition. It is therefore 
useful to acknowledge the significant intellectual differences between the various evolutionary 
thinkers while simultaneously recognizing the popular blurring of them. Moreover, accounting 
for the common blurring that occurred between the various evolutionary theories in the wider 
culture illustrates how a scientific discourse becomes a literary discourse through biological 
imagination, such as in The Promised Land. 
The Promised Land and Programmatic Change 
The title of Mary Antin’s 1912 autobiography, The Promised Land has most often been 
understood as a reference to the United States—the land to which she emigrated from Russia, her 
own “Egypt.” The Promised Land has become nearly synonymous with the early-twentieth-
century Jewish immigration narrative: Antin’s autobiographic subject goes from Malinke to 
Mary, and as she moves through public schools and settlement houses, she is consumed by a 
desire to learn and to become American. Through a settlement house, she joins a club for natural 
history hobbyists, attending lectures on insects and scientific theories, and taking excursions to 
the nature surrounding Boston. In the narration of these experiences, Antin uses the book’s titular 
phrase again, to describe her encounter with the theories of Darwin. She writes, “…the high 
peaks of the promised land of evolution did flash on my vision in the earlier days, and with these 
to guide me I rebuilt the world, and found it much nobler than it had ever been before, and took 
great comfort in it.”91  
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In The Promised Land, Darwinian evolution provides a model for reconsidering and re-
conceptualizing change as Antin presents it throughout the majority of the book. Unlike Cahan’s 
protagonist, Antin’s use of Darwinism ultimately runs counter to common perceptions of 
evolutionary theory circuited through social Darwinism.92 Lori Jirousek has argued that Antin 
“strategically incorporate[es] the discourses of eugenics, evolution, and environmental reform,” 
and she thereby “demonstrates the potential of informed minorities to resist or reshape dominant 
scientific or pseudo-scientific theories,” even as “she also shows the constant danger of being 
subsumed by these theories.”93 Jirousek is most interested in the apparent tension in Antin’s text 
between coexisting scientific theories of eugenics and environment—the latter of which played 
into a progressive reformist politics. Significantly, Darwin’s gradualist evolutionary model 
complicates the apparent, starkly pro-assimilation message of Antin’s book. The version of 
Darwinian thought that inspires Mary is mysterious rather than deterministic: it represents an 
unforeseeable future, as well as the ways in which the past exerts itself in the present. Therefore, 
in The Promised Land, Darwinian evolution provides a non-programmatic understanding of 
change—whether spiritual or material—which stands as an alternative to coercive assimilation. 
This is a model of Americanization that allows for variation in the present and unpredictability in 
the future.  
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Evolutionary theory is therefore difficult to reconcile with the majority of the Promised 
Land, which offers a programmatic narrative of Americanization and assimilation. Critics who 
study Antin tend to emphasize the seemingly performative unreality of her immigrant narrative. 
Even her contemporary, Horace M. Kallen criticized her as a representative of self-styled 
exceptional immigrants, who represent their Americanization as “too self-conscious and self-
centered, their ‘Americanization’ appears too much like an achievement, a tour de force, too 
little like a growth.”94 For Kallen, Antin’s Americanization is too controlled, too boastful, too 
swift. Some might consider assimilation rather crudely on a sliding scale, as Hanna Wirth-
Nesher points out, through which we ask, “how much Jewishness lost, how much Americanness 
absorbed.”95 Yet even this is not stark enough for Antin’s narrative. As Michael P. Kramer has 
put it, “The Promised Land does not present hybridity as an option”96—Antin emphasizes 
transformation rather than measured loss and absorption. In light of Antin’s rather relentless 
presentation of her completed, transformative immigrant trajectory, we must understand, as 
Sunny Yudkoff has argued, that “something has been lost in the creation of the autobiography.”97 
This can even be seen on the level of language, as the initial source material for the Promised 
Land consisted of letters that Antin wrote to her uncle in Yiddish, which were then translated to 
English and published as From Plotzk to Boston in 1899. 
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Antin tips readers off to the craft of the autobiography in the more self-reflexive moments 
of justifying her role as autobiographer. In the book’s famous first line, she writes, “I was born, I 
have lived, and I have been made over. Is it not time to write my life’s story?” She then 
continues: 
“I am just as much out of the way as if I were dead, for I am absolutely other than the person 
whose story I have to tell. Physical continuity with my earlier self is no disadvantage. I could 
speak in the third person and not feel that I was masquerading. I can analyze my subject, I can 
reveal everything; for she, and not I, is my real heroine. My life I have still to live; her life ended 
when mine began.” 98 
 
Antin thus explicitly constructs a separation between the author and the self that she narrates. 
She writes that she has been “made over” and “reborn” to such an extent that she can write her 
autobiography as though it were another’s biography. The young Malinke/Mashka is another 
person, such that Antin can narrate her in the third person, and is even willing to forgo the 
crucial autobiographical I. In other words, there is no continuous essence throughout the text, or 
between the author and autobiographic subject. This at once shores up the narrator’s objective 
stance toward the autobiographic subject at the beginning of the text and heightens the sense of 
total transformation in The Promised Land.  
The transformation narrated in the text can also be understood within the convention of a 
conversion narrative—a conversion from the Jewish religion to the American civil religion. And 
yet, the new promised land, the Darwinian theory of evolution, resets Mary’s position as one 
who has been converted or religiously redeemed. Describing how it felt to learn about evolution, 
she positions herself as Moses, who at the end of the Deuteronomy, does not enter the Land of 
Israel, but does see it from a mountaintop. Likewise, Mary does not grasp the theory in entirety, 
but “…the high peaks of the promised land of evolution did flash on my vision in the earlier 
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days…”99 In this figuration, Mary presents the new “promised land of evolution” as a far-off, yet 
unreached spiritual height—she is no longer the confident, completely “made over,” assimilated 
American, which she claims to be in the introduction. This new promised land suggests not 
perfect transformation but anticipation of an ungraspable unknown. 
Therefore, Darwinian theory provides an alternative perspective on the change narrated 
throughout the autobiography. Indeed, Antin draws direct comparison between immigration and 
learning about Darwinism. Of learning about natural history, she writes: “Vastly as my mind had 
stretched to embrace the idea of a great country, when I exchanged Polotsk for America, it was 
no such enlargement as I now experienced, when in place of the measurable earth, with its paltry 
tale of historic centuries, I was given the illimitable universe to contemplate, with the numberless 
aeons of infinite time.”100 In this comparison, Antin rhetorically binds evolutionary thought to her 
immigration to America—her new and former “promised lands.” Evolution drives her to 
consider unquantifiable mystery. Unlike the seamless, discrete change presented in the earlier 
chapters, Antin is inspired by the incremental change over immeasurably long temporal ranges, 
described in gradualist evolutionary theories.  
Antin describes the inspiration and intellectual growth afforded by Darwinism as both 
limitless and limited. She also refers to the “kaleidoscopic bits of stupendous panorama which is 
painted in the literature of Darwinism,” mystically combining two kinds of sight: the panoramic 
and the kaleidoscopic.101 A panorama allows a viewer to glimpse a wide scene, simultaneously. It 
is an artificial condensation and flattening—even if everything in a panorama exists 
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synchronically, it is typically impossible for the eye to capture the entire scene on its own. The 
kaleidoscope, on the other hand, provides a small view with a sequence of changing relations 
between different shapes, colors, and objects. These metaphors of sight remind us of the grand, 
sweeping nature of Darwinian theories, as well as its interest in mystery, surprise, and 
unpredictability. Antin thus shuttles between the gritty specifics of biological observation and the 
large philosophical affordances of the branch of knowledge: describing her fascination with the 
“microscopic perfection of a solitary blossom,” or the magnificence of the various creatures that 
make up a forest.102 When she describes, “the glimpse I caught, through this or that fragment of 
science, of the grand principles underlying the facts,” she continues to frame her insight as 
partial and magnificent.103  
Antin’s invocation of the “kaleidoscopic,” also echoes Darwin’s “entangled bank:” 
presenting a swarming, active, cooperative present. Wilson saliently notes the irony of describing 
one’s view of history as “kaleidoscopic.” After all, “Kaleidoscopes do not produce progress; they 
produce difference.”104 Therefore, the invocation of a “kaleidoscopic view,” according to Wilson, 
suggests that Antin is making sense, not of her own history, or the national history, but of the 
contemporaneous variations she sees in the United States ethnic order.105 I wish to complicate 
this slightly, because Darwin’s writings are indeed concerned with synchronous variation, and 
particularly with the ways that synchronic variation illustrates the relation between the past and 
the present. Therefore, Antin’s image of seeing kaleidoscopically and panoramically resonates 
 
102 Antin, 259. 
103 Antin, 258. 
104 Wilson, “The Evolution of Ethnicity,” 253. 
105 Ibid. 
 47 
with the temporal element of synchronic difference in Darwinism—that the present moment’s 
diversity is merely a phase in which laws of nature continue to unfold. Indeed, Darwin provides 
Antin not only a new lens to turn upon her own transformation; evolutionary theory might 
provide a viable option for narrating her present relation to a Jewish past. 
Darwinist Approaches to Jewish History 
While Antin and Cahan’s literary works stand out for their interest in Darwinist thought, 
they also fit into a wider context of Jewish thinkers grappling with the meaning of evolutionary 
theory. Like most other religious establishments, American Judaism initially rejected organic 
evolutionism, but by 1890s, Reform and traditionalist (which would become Conservative) Jews 
had mostly accepted it—and even came to use it as a theoretical resource to support their own 
stances on Judaism’s future.106 So too, by the early twentieth century, there already existed a 
trans-Atlantic discourse that scientifically constructed the Jewish body as racial or 
pathological—a scientific discourse in which Jews and non-Jews both took part.107 At the same 
time, Darwinism made way for a robust philo-Semitic counter-discourse, which Mitchel B. Hart 
has described as, “an interpretive tradition about Jews and Judaism,” that made use of a 
“Darwin-related vocabulary.”108  
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Within this context, many wished to demonstrate that Judaism was in particular 
alignment with eugenics. Jewish religious praxis and laws became the site for Darwinist 
interpretation, as racial thinkers presumed that Jewish legal prescriptions determined the 
biological makeup of the Jewish people.109 In 1910 Francis Galton, the father of eugenics 
himself, told the editors of London’s Jewish Chronicle that, “It may be said that from the days of 
Moses the Jews have been ‘eugenists’ [sic].”110 Likewise, the American eugenics movement 
leader G. Stanley Hall addressed Jewish audiences, gladly comparing the Jews’ and the Yankees’ 
(meaning White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) common “appreciation for eugenics, noted in the 
Bible.”111 Natural selection also provided a framework to understand Jewish survival amid 
Christian persecution in Europe.112 For some Jewish intellectuals, this interpretive mode 
strategically reshaped an age-old question—how and why do the Jews survive?  
Much like in earlier debates around Enlightenment and emancipation, this nineteenth-
century interest in Jews’ survival (and distinctiveness) focused on the experiences of oppression 
and the ghetto environment. Whereas the Enlightenment stance had held that oppression and 
ghettoization caused Jewish degeneracy, Social Darwinism allowed Jews to argue that the 
opposite was true: they concluded that oppression, the continual threat of violence, and the 
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ghetto environment all contributed to a process of natural selection.113 Viewing the ghetto as a 
blessing of biological inheritance was a radical reversal, marking not only a shift in viewing Jews 
as healthy rather than diseased, but also a shift in seeing the urban environment as one that could 
cultivate physical vigor over generations. This newer interpretive strand was not without its 
critics. In fact, the German Jewish historian Heinrich Graetz suggested that Jews’ survival in 
spite of their weakness and vulnerability was the test case to disprove the cruel law of survival of 
the fittest (or what he called, “Might before Right”).114 Crucially, both stances demonstrate a 
broad interest and investment in Social Darwinist concepts as potential keys for turning over 
long-standing questions about the status of Jews within majority Christian nations, and how to 
narrate Jewish history. 
Even though prominent Jewish social scientists such as Franz Boas and Maurice Fishberg 
insisted that Jews were not a “pure race”—at the same time as Jews were commonly subjected to 
eugenicist studies and immigration policies—other Jewish thinkers participated in eugenics, or 
“Jewish racial thought” as well.115 The very existence of these two opposing approaches to the 
biological study of Jewishness reveals the deep ideological basis of this field. Hart sums up the 
double bind of these scientifically informed conceptions of Jews and Judaism as, 
“A racialized medical discourse giveth and it taketh away. The Jews are healthy, and they owe 
this both to their religion and to their history; but they are also given over to mental illness, 
which their rituals are powerless to prevent. The Jews are white; they are no savage race. More 
than the other civilized races, they appear to be immune to the devastation of tuberculosis. Yet, 
again, they are a race apart, with their own ‘racial particularities’ that not even researchers into 
race and health have fully explained.”116 
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The two sides of this debate demonstrate the ability of any political view to bend knowledge, 
scientific or otherwise, into its own image. Nonetheless, at stake in scientifically-informed 
discourses of Jewish difference in Europe and the United States were questions that had been 
tossed around since the Enlightenment: questions of the bodily element of Jewish difference, of 
Jews’ uncertain relationship to “Civilization” and “Culture,” and of the degree of heritability of 
said nebulous Jewish difference.  
Slanted Readings and Soft Inheritance 
Like the aforementioned “Jewish racial thinkers,” Antin and Cahan take advantage of 
evolutionary theories in order to imagine (and interrogate) a material presence of history within 
individual beings. Evolution explains how the individual exists only as the result of past events 
of the world. When Antin discusses history, inheritance, and self, she combines the theories of 
Lamarck, Spencer, and Darwin, to form “slanted readings.” These allow her to reconcile a bodily 
Jewish inheritance with a universal one. Antin meditates on bodily inheritance in a scene in 
which Mary tries to break away from Jewish tradition: she is presented with ham and feels 
determined to eat this “unjewish meat,” despite a great internal struggle. She writes, “I ate, but 
only a newly abnegated Jew can understand with what squirming, what protesting of the inner 
man, what exquisite abhorrence of myself.”117 Antin describes a visceral reaction, through an 
image of her inner man’s squirming, protesting body: a bodily agency that is both hers and not 
her own. 
As she continues, she invokes the concept of recapitulation—the scientific theory that 
ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, or that the individual’s development reenacts the history of 
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the species’ and civilization’s development. Earlier, Antin had written, “I have to recapitulate in 
my own experience all the slow steps of the progress of the race.”118 Now, upon the un-Jewish 
meat, she reflects, 
“And to think that so ridiculous a thing as a scrap of meat should be the symbol of something so 
august! To think that in the mental life of a half-grown child should be reflected the struggles 
and triumphs of ages! Over and over and over again I discover that I am a wonderful thing, being 
human; that I am the image of the universe, being myself; that I am the repository of all the 
wisdom in the world, being alive and sane at the beginning of the twentieth century. The heir of 
the ages am I, and all that has been is in me, and shall continue to be in my immortal self.”119  
 
Antin strikingly narrates the struggle with an inherited history—at once specifically Jewish and 
universal. Young Mary reenacts an age-old struggle for Jews to move beyond Judaism, tribalism, 
or particularism. She recapitulates a greater pattern of history, even though she is only a “half-
grown child,” who has not lived through this history directly, and does not understand its 
significance. When she calls herself “the heir of the ages,” she also perpetuates the progressive, 
evolutionary idea that civilization’s vast legacy has reached its apex, that, “we inherit the world 
at its pinnacle of development,” as Beer describes it—and that this long history is housed within 
her.120 In this moment of rejecting her habit of keeping kosher, the autobiography resolves the 
tension in scale, by relying on recapitulation more than Darwinism. She reiterates that her story 
has the power of synecdochal representation: her personal development reflects the development 
of not only Jews, but the entire human race. Yet of course, she is only able to recognize herself 
as an image of the universe, an heir of ages because of her visceral reaction to the piece of un-
Jewish meat—that is, because her body had incorporated Jewish custom. 
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The Rise of David Levinsky, too addresses the issue of inherited Jewish history and soft 
inheritance, specifically through the novel’s repeated interest in accents and gestures—or what 
Wirth-Nesher calls, “the body remembering.”121 Beyond the novel, gesticulations and embodied 
traits were key to nineteenth-century scientific inquiries into Jewish physical difference.122 
Gesticulations, accent, and posture were central to the Lamarkian approach of “soft inheritance,” 
which argued that an individual’s acquired traits can be passed onto their descendants. 
Gesticulations for David, much like Mary’s “inner man,” stand as an embodied Jewish history. 
Throughout the novel, David is constantly observing and meditating on habits, mannerisms, and 
gesticulations—the movements that live in the body—as a key part of physical difference. He 
presents them as a sort of agency that is distinct from the self. 
David’s fellow traveling salesman, the Jewish, American-born Loeb, ridicules David for 
his “Talmud gesticulations” or “yeshivah hand gestures,” reminding David that he displays the 
bodily mark of Eastern European Jewish culture. In the very same scene in which David 
discusses Spencerian and Darwinian theories in order to prove his rise, Leob taunts David over 
his lingering, unchanging outsider status, his embodied past. David recalls: 
“One of the many things about which he often made fun of me was my Talmud gesticulations, a 
habit that worried me like a physical defect. It was so distressingly un-American. I struggled 
hard against it I had made efforts to speak with my hands in my pockets; I had devised other 
means for keeping them from participating in my speech. All to no avail. I still gesticulate a great 
deal, though much less than I used to.”123 
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Other scholars have noted the significance of David thinking of his hand gestures as a physical 
disability.124 At another point David also describes not having been born in America as a 
“physical defect,” which “no surgeon in the world was capable of removing”125; this supposed 
defect of being foreign-born “asserted itself in many disagreeable ways.” 126 The novel thus 
presents an alienated relationship between the self and the body’s habits— memories of the 
body, which seem to exert agency of their own.  
Loeb’s teasing loudly asserts that no such gestures were passed down to him, yet it also 
suggests an anxiety that such mannerisms might lurk within. Later in the novel, Loeb jokes that 
David must never speak on the telephone, since he uses his hands as much as his voice when he 
speaks. David responds, upset that Loeb would make fun of a fellow Jew in front of gentiles. He 
asks Loeb, “aren’t you a Jew yourself?” to which Loeb replies, “Of course I am…and a good 
one, too. I am a member of a synagogue. But what has that got to do with it? I can speak on the 
telephone.”127 Loeb distinguishes between the kind of Jew David is—one who was educated in an 
Eastern European yeshivah—and the kind that he is—one who is the member of a synagogue. He 
also makes clear that the gesticulations have nothing to do with any inherent essence of 
Jewishness; they are the embodiment of cultural background and lived experience.   
While David feels that Loeb is “holding up our whole race to the ridicule of the gentiles,” 
Loeb is careful to separate himself from the object of his mockery.128 Benjamin Schreier has 
written, regarding the usage of the word “race” within David Levinsky, that, “Certainly, ‘race’ as 
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it appears in the novel is far from being simply biological or otherwise deterministic; instead, the 
term displaces fundamental indeterminacy about what Jewishness—specifically American 
Jewishness—actually amounts to.”129 This particular scene challenges the notion of a stable 
Jewish “race” to which both men automatically belong, or an inherited Jewish essence that they 
both share. In the distinction between Loeb and David, we are presented with bodies marked 
differently by experiences of Jewish text and practice—the Talmud and the synagogue. Through 
this recurring struggle over gesticulations, embodied Jewish history, and “race,” the novel points 
up the tension in scale of the ethno- vs. the auto- biography. These men’s interactions challenge 
the possibility of David’s ethnographic or even biological, representativeness.  
Biological Americanization 
These literary portrayals of Americanization as bodily and biological projects for the 
protagonists fit into a larger biologically inflected discourse in the immigration debates of the 
era. Often times, authors and politicians took population-level view, such as in the very same 
issue of McClure’s in which David Levinsky was first serialized. In an accompanying article by 
Burton J. Hendrick titled, “The Jewish Invasion of America,” the author (a notorious muckraker) 
writes, for instance, of Jews’ involvement in particular industries as “race displacement.”130 
Around the same time, authors debated the degree of physical change experienced by individuals 
upon immigration. Franz Boas famously studied a group of American-born children of Jewish 
immigrants who grew taller than their parents; for Boaz this illustrated biological plasticity and 
adaptation to environment. The physical change served as proof that immigrants could adapt to 
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American life and did so.131 Boas and his school of anthropologists challenged his 
contemporaries who argued for static racial inheritance and the heritability of culture.  
Political writers too debated what it meant to be a first- or second-generation American in 
the era of mass immigration. A number of Jewish American intellectuals used biological imagery 
and concepts of inheritance to write about the spiritual or cultural challenges of Americanization. 
In 1916 Edward Steiner wrote of the “hyphen” (that which distinguishes the “hyphenated 
American”), 
“…like the lobes and glands and other now useless impedimenta which I, in common with other 
human beings, have inherited from my ancestors of varied species, who knew how to use them. 
That these useless parts may become inflamed and dangerous…the difficulty is not with the 
hyphen, but with the inflamed hyphen; and because it has become a somewhat contagious disease 
manifesting itself in different ways, I shall, after enumerate them, discuss the various remedies 
proposed…” 132 
 
Whereas Theodore Roosevelt most famously characterized the “hyphen” as a divided loyalty, 
Steiner did not necessarily present it as ethically suspect. He did, however, stress that it is a 
potential danger. Rather than seeing the hyphenated identity as one burdened by contradiction, 
he saw it as a kind of latent bodily excess akin to the appendix: inconsequential in the present yet 
pulsing with connections to the past and future.  
The American philosopher and champion of pluralism, Horace M. Kallen wrote of a 
similar anatomical excess in his 1924 essay, “Americanization.” He referred to “the present 
concretions of the vestigial past,” which were now irrelevant “imported behavior-patterns of the 
community life, with its memories, folkways, habits and traditions,” which get “dammed and 
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frustrated,” and then flow “back into the organism and efforts recoil upon itself”133 Figured as 
such, the past is a potent and material presence within the individual, but its significance, 
purpose, or consequence is ultimately mysterious to that very person in which these forces 
reside. For Kallen—like for Steiner, as well as Antin and Cahan—the environment causes the 
alienation between the individual and this embodied vestige of the past. While his writing is 
merely invoking an organic metaphor, his argument that history is an active and present force in 
any given moment also perpetuates Darwinian ideas of the laws of nature continually 
unfolding—whether in an entangled bank or on the banks of the United States.  
Kallen was also one of the most well-known Progressive thinkers to give voice to the 
conflict between what Sollors calls “consent and descent,” or choice and nature, in American 
ethnicity.134 Kallen himself placed these two things in opposition in the 1915 essay “Democracy 
Versus the Melting Pot,” wherein he emphasized the permanence of old-world legacies, even in 
spite of Americanization. Of the individual American, he wrote, “whatever else he changes, he 
cannot change his grandfather.”135 Accordingly, Kallen presented a qualitative difference 
between the two identity markers on either side of the hyphen: being American is, “… acquired 
not inherited, and hence not transmitted,” and therefore, “each generation has to become 
‘Americanized’ afresh…”136 To Kallen, Americanness is continually in-process, and never 
guaranteed, while whatever is pre-American is not only heritable, but inescapable.  
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Ethnographic Detail in the Autobiographical Narrative 
In The Rise of David Levinsky, David’s father dies when he is a young child. He 
expresses that even as a child he understood the solemnity of death and memorial rituals for his 
father, because “There is a streak of sadness in the blood of my race. Very likely it is of Oriental 
origin. If it is, it has been amply nourished by centuries of persecution.”137 David attributes his 
sadness to geographic origin and inherited experiences, which live in “the blood of [his] race”—
that is, to Lamarckian soft inheritance. Within the context of a life narrative, this explanation 
seems somewhat odd. Do centuries of persecution or Oriental origins really allow a child to 
understand the sadness of his father’s untimely death? Why should David explain his personal 
experience of a significant life event as though it is simply an instantiation of racial 
characteristics acquired through inherited experience? While theories of inherited trauma have 
become increasingly accepted as of late, this instance illustrates the awkwardness of accounting 
for personal details and experiences through racial origins and generalizations. It points to the 
genre’s struggle between the ethnographic and the autobiographic (even in fictionalized 
autobiography). If life’s details and events could be explained by such general scientific facts, 
then why write (or read, for that matter) the story of a particular individual’s life? 
Indeed, I have argued throughout this chapter that the tension in scale for immigrant 
autobiography (representing both the exemplary individual and the example who “speaks for 
thousands”) is amplified by these authors’ choice to apply biological theories of evolution to the 
literary project of writing a single life. In order to use these theories to make meaning about an 
individual’s life, we have to not only make a synecdochal leap of scale, we also need to question 
some of the assumptions about what an individual is, or how much an individual matters. 
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Evolutionary theory’s insistence that the individual holds little significance seemingly 
undermines narratives of development in which we are asked to be utterly interested in the life of 
a single individual.  
These overlapping and mutually intensifying tensions present a logical bind, in which 
pieces simply cannot line up: synecdoche will not always apply, nor will any theoretical 
apparatus or generic convention used to narrate a life. The affordances of autobiography, 
ethnography, and evolutionary theory are at once competing and compounding in both Cahan’s 
and Antin’s works. Yet these decidedly inconsistent schemas of the individual’s relationship to 
history, the future, and the new nation are precisely what allow these works to create narratives 
that contest programmatic Americanization—albeit partially or imperfectly—through the 
biological imagination. For Antin especially, biological theories of evolution make space for 
dynamism rather than stasis, unpredictability rather than prescription. Within both texts, biology 
allows the protagonists to imagine a Jewish inheritance that resides in their bodies—precisely the 
parts of the Jewish past that they had willed themselves to dismiss, but could not. Thus, in 
presenting competing logics through the autobiographic genre and through biological theories of 
inheritance, the texts implicitly reveal the tenuousness of the sort of swift, agential assimilation 
that American culture had presented as a logical and civic necessity. 
Antin’s autobiography concludes with a proclamation of her relationship to history. She 
states, “No! It is not I that belong to the past, but the past that belongs to me...Mine is the whole 
majestic past, and mine is the shining future.”138 This is nothing if not self-aggrandizing. Yet it 
also might tell us something about how evolutionary thought allows Antin to reconcile her 
individual role in a history beyond her own lifespan. Antin negotiates between two things 
 
138 Antin, The Promised Land, 286. 
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violently at odds: the past and the future, or specifically between the Jewish immigrant past and 
her American present and future. Biology allows her to imagine that both reside within her. 
Rather than imagining that her past has a hold on her—whether in the form of her squirming 
inner man, or in David’s case, in the form of gesticulations and accent—she claims a hold on the 
past. Even if the past exerts itself within her body, its location there renders her its owner. 
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Chapter 3 “A Type That Produces”: Seeing Through Time in Jewish Photographic Types 
 
In 1911, Maurice Fishberg, a Jewish American physician and physical anthropologist 
who emigrated to the United States from the Russian Empire in the late nineteenth century, 
described the paradox of his moment’s scientific conception of the Jewish racial type. In the 
tract, The Jews: A Study of Race and Environment (1911), Fishberg opens a chapter titled 
“Jewish Types” with the following contradiction: although on the one hand “all acknowledge 
that the Jewish type cannot be distinguished by separate physical traits such as stature, 
complexion, head-form, nose, etc.,” on the other hand, “it is nevertheless the prevailing opinion 
that the Jew’s physiognomy is typical, that his cast of countenance is uniform, and that one can 
pick out a Jew from among a thousand non-Jews without any difficulty.”139 In this line, Fishberg 
provocatively sums up a seemingly impossible question: if there exist no known distinct Jewish 
physical traits, then why would so many people be confident that they could visually determine 
Jewishness?  
In Fishberg’s moment, Jews’ racial status was viewed as a legitimate, yet unanswered 
scientific question. And typological thinking, which requires viewing all members of a classified 
group as “replicas of or deviations from” the type, provided a framework for determining a 
 
139 Such a statement might be surprising in the middle of a book recounting copious scientific findings on Jewish 
physical traits including those cited above, and illustrated with many photographs of various Jewish “types.”Some 
photographs’ captions include, “Russian Jewess, Mongoloid Type” (115), “Galician Jew, Ruthenian Type” (116), 
“Galician Jews, Negroid Types” (117). Fishberg, The Jews, 90. 
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biologically distinct Jewish group.140 Yet Fishberg’s observation invites further interrogation of a 
larger typological visual practice. What did these onlookers believe they saw when they saw a 
Jewish type?  
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, many scientists and racial thinkers used 
photography to represent or create Jewish “types,” which were often surprisingly un-interested in 
displaying specific “typical” physical features. Instead, across scientific and popular 
publications, the textual apparatuses around these photographic “Jewish types,” instructed 
viewers in a visual practice of looking at Jews in order to see a transhistorical racial essence. 
Significantly, this discourse did not merely instruct viewers in how to look at Jews, it also 
described a special (essential) way that Jews themselves were able to see. These Jewish types 
were conceived, produced, and reproduced through the imbrication of the intellectual framework 
of biology with the visual technology of photography. Containing competing impulses to 
reproduce the real and to produce the ideal, they stood at the nexus of changing norms in turn-of-
the-century scientific image making. Yet this paradox, too, fueled Jewish photographic types: the 
camera’s authoritative ability to reproduce reality provided credence to the ostensible Jewish 
racial ideal, made visible in a photograph. This typological discourse established a racial 
visuality that drew the invisible into the realm of the visible.  
Perhaps the most famous American theorization of race as rooted in a complex visuality 
remains W.E.B. Du Bois’s concept of “second sight,” in which the Black American is,  
 
140 Throughout the chapter, I also use the term typology over physiognomy or taxonomy, because of its meaning 
originating in the natural sciences as a form of classification according to general types. The word “typology” 
emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, originating in the natural sciences, and was taken up in such fields as 
archeology and linguistics, as well as in other social sciences Robert C. King, William D. Stansfield, and Pamela K. 




“…born with a veil, and gifted with a second-sight in this American world,—a world which 
yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the 
other world. It is this peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking 
at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks 
on in amused contempt and pity.”141 
 
According to Du Bois, the Black American sees the world through a veil, and sees the self 
“through the eyes of the other.” Thus, visuality—looking and being looked at, or in some cases, 
being refused the right to look—initiates racial double consciousness. 142 “Second sight” is the 
“gift” of knowing how the other sees and the ability to enact this sight one’s self; yet it is also the 
curse of always seeing the self in that way. As such, Du Bois theorizes that there can be a 
specific way of not only seeing race, but of seeing as a race. Most broadly, the concept of 
“second sight” offers a model of seeing race that is circular, iterative, and dynamic. Du Bois’s 
specific schema of a racial visuality is not directly analogous to what I track in this chapter. 
Nevertheless, the typological process of looking similarly establishes a layered, protracted 
visuality. 
Indeed, despite the popular association of photographic “capture” with instantaneous 
apprehension, the typological process of seeing was necessarily durational and iterative. Jewish 
photographic types were established through the dynamic interplay of looking and being looked 
at, through the mental calculus of determining whether the individual “replicates or deviates 
from” the racial ideal, and through imagining history visibly manifest on a subject’s face. This 
form of visuality promised the ability to see through time, yet also took place in time. While I 
situate the Jewish typological discourse in the history of race science and scientific image 
making, we can even more specifically understand typology’s dynamic visual process as a 
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scientifically sanctioned method to systematize the chaotic sightlines found in the urban contexts 
in which these photographs all emerge. Such dynamism in these photographic sources can enrich 
our understanding of racialized visuality at the turn of the twentieth century, including (but not 
limited to) Du Bois’s concept of “second sight.” Together, these images and the visual practices 
surrounding them invite us to reconsider the temporality ascribed to race photography and 
racialized looking in this period. They also reveal how biology inflected this range of visual 
practices.  
This is but one consequence of the chapter’s inquiry into Jewish photographic types. I 
will map out the modes of looking brought about through the textual contexts in which these 
photographs circulated; I analyze the captions, scientific analyses, and ethnographic or narrative 
framing that informed how these photographs came to be read as types, and in turn came to 
propagate the racialized, biological determination of Jewishness. I trace the visual practice of 
creating Jewish photographic types back to the eugenicist Francis Galton in late nineteenth-
century England. My analysis of Galton will lay the groundwork for understanding the biological 
and typological framing of the ethnographic photographs that accompanied the first serialized 
printing of Abraham Cahan’s The Rise of David Levinsky in 1913. The 1913 photographic types 
in turn deepen our understanding of the biological investments in Cahan’s novel. They highlight 
the significance of racialized visuality in the biological imagination in Jewish American 
literature, and the mutual significance of literary, photographic, and scientific conceptions of 
“the type.” 
Further sources reveal photography and typological discourse’s potential to obscure racial 
typological legibility, illustrating how the form can be used to either facilitate or frustrate a 
racialized gaze. Specifically, I compare a photo series that ran in the Forverts (Jewish Daily 
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Forward) in the 1920s and 30s called “Tipn fun yidishe froyen [Types of Jewish Women]” 143  to 
Du Bois’s photographic project called “Types of the American Negro” (1900)—which is notably 
not a project of Jewish photographic typology. However, Du Bois remarkably displays how 
photography and typological discourse can be manipulated in order to subvert the main claims of 
racial typology—namely racial homogeneity and stasis. At the same time as Du Bois was 
theorizing the racialized subject’s double consciousness, Jewish thinkers in the United States and 
Europe, such as Fishberg, Franz Boas, and Israel Zangwill were also working through their own 
understandings of how visual practices and typological discourse established Jews as a race. 
Visuality would frame their counter-discourse to race science and set its limits. 
Placing the “Type” in the History of 19th-Century Scientific Images 
The very notion of a “Jewish type,” rendered photographically, intersects with a tangle of 
changing scientific practices in the late nineteenth century. Physiognomy—the study of facial 
features and their relationship to character—was centuries-old by this point, and had been used 
for such varied pursuits as astrology, fortune-telling, etiquette, literature, and art.144 Yet in the 
nineteenth century, both lay and expert practitioners worked to promote and re-make 
physiognomy as science.145 The project to scientize physiognomy, according to Sharrona Pearl, 
“was not about redirecting the way people saw, but rather about systematizing and sanctioning 
what they were doing.”146 And yet, the aims of this scientized physiognomy did transform over 
 
143 In cases such as this, in which the producers of the images are Jewish themselves, such a title might serve as 
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the course of the nineteenth century—in no small part linked to the study of anthropology and 
the advent of photographic technology—from understanding the individual to describing group 
characteristics.147 Physiognomy, by the late nineteenth century, was prominently used to distill 
and identify group types—whether these groups were distinguished by race, nationality, 
criminality, or sanity.148 A photograph of a type as such would be read less for knowledge of the 
individual, and more for knowledge of the group it represents. The photographs of “Jewish 
types” examined in this chapter fall within this newer practice. 
The nineteenth century also saw a change in what the very word “type” meant in the 
zoological, anatomical, and botanical fields, though move occurred in the opposite direction: 
“types” shifted from embodying the “ideal” to indicating the “characteristic,” or individual. For 
centuries prior, the typical had referred to the “typus” or the archetype, “rarely, if ever, embodied 
in a single individual.”149 Yet in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—to the 
confusion of many practitioners—botanists came to rely on characteristic, “authentic” specimens 
(“holotypes”) over the ideal, “typical” specimens. Botanists called the new practice the “type 
method.”150 This change, according to science historians Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, is a 
part of the nineteenth century’s corresponding shifts in epistemic virtues and in modes of 
scientific image-making. To briefly summarize their wide-ranging history of said shift: under the 
epistemic virtue practiced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, called “truth-to-nature,” 
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scientific images represented ideals, averaging out the oddities or imperfections found in specific 
items. In this mode, teams of artists and scientists established a way of seeing “past the surface” 
of objects “to underlying forms.”151 By contrast, under the subsequent epistemic virtue of 
mechanical objectivity, scientists aimed to avoid interpretation and idealization in their scientific 
images. In this mode, they used technologies such as photography, or worked to develop the 
discipline to see like a machine when drawing or observing nature.152 Thus, the paradigm in 
scientific image-making shifted from the drive to produce an image of the ideal, to the drive to 
reproduce the image of the characteristic or authentic. While this shift was not necessarily 
determined by the advent of photography, it was very much tied to it. 
There is some friction between Pearl’s and Daston and Galison’s respective historical 
narratives regarding how photography may have influenced the meaning of the “type” in the late 
nineteenth century. Daston and Galison construct a particular narrative of the changing 
paradigms of the “type” (from the ideal to the characteristic). Yet Pearl’s narrative around the 
use of photography in order to represent group types (or using physiognomy to “describe the 
group”) challenges the notion of a tidy correlation between mechanical reproduction and the aim 
to represent the particular or individual.153 In fact, photographic renderings of Jewish types from 
this period could be said precisely to strive to represent an underlying form—that is, race. 
Granted, Daston and Galison themselves note that these epistemic virtues do not perfectly 
replace one another, but rather “They accumulate into a repertoire of possible forms of 
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knowing”: a repertoire where these various techniques can influence and shape each other.154 In 
that vein, this chapter’s various examples of photographic racial types, from Galton’s racial types 
created through composite photography to McClure’s photograph of the “pure type of an 
Arabian Jew,” attest the blurring between the competing impulses for what a scientific image 
ought to do: produce the ideal or reproduce the authentic. These photographic types, which 
borrow the drive for the ideal on the one hand, and the assurance of objective reproduction on the 
other hand, are the context in which seemingly antithetical scientific impulses get muddied.  
For the purposes of this chapter, I generally use the term “type” or “racial type” to 
indicate an image of the ideal, the underlying form, or as Elizabeth Edwards’ calls it, the 
“abstract essence of human variation,” rather than an image of a “characteristic” individual.155 
This is simply in accordance with the sources I am analyzing, which are photographic and aim to 
represent racial, facial “types.” Significantly, when it comes to race, the “type” tends to mean the 
ideal embodiment, rather than a characteristic example. I also use the term “photographic type” 
to refer to photographs that have been captioned or deemed, “type,” such as “types of Jewish 
women,” or “an intellectual Russian Jew—a type that is found in large numbers in American 
universities.”156 By referring to the images themselves, rather than their subjects, as types, I aim 
to emphasize the productive power of the photographs and their discursive framing, which are 
themselves expressions of the biological imagination. Of course, this won’t be the final word on 
the matter: the sources analyzed will continue to invite the question of production versus 
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reproduction. Photography—and the medium’s complex associations with reality and 
mechanical reproduction—crucially blurs the line between capturing and conjuring Jewish racial 
types.  
Photography, Visuality, and Race 
Visual scholars over the last several decades have illustrated how starting in the 
nineteenth century, photography played a significant role in nationalist projects and in creating a 
science of race. Since its inception, photography has been granted a special status as “indexical,” 
creating (and purporting to fulfill) a photographic pact that the photograph’s referent is real, or in 
the words of Roland Barthes, “that-has-been.”157 Yet photography’s special relationship to reality 
is by no means inherent; rather, it has often been cultivated in institutional contexts and in its use 
by the state, for instance, to record and surveille criminality.158 Within various national contexts, 
typological photographic projects served to establish distinctions between groups and create 
racial identities. Photography was adopted quickly in the 19th-century by anthropologists and 
incorporated as a tool for the study and ossification of race.159 As Pearl notes, photography was 
heralded “as the redemptive technology of physiognomic claims,” even though, “the strength of 
photographs was precisely that they were not reproductions but productions made by 
photographers, who could and did emphasize physiognomically meaningful symbols.”160 All the 
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same, “through photography,” as Edwards argues, “the ‘type,’ the abstract essence of human 
variation, was perceived to be an observable reality.”161 That is to say, the medium’s purported 
objectivity provided cover for the impulse to interpret or to represent an ideal or “underlying 
form”—an impulse conveyed in the texts that frame these photographic projects of racial types. 
In addition to exemplifying a group’s defining physical characteristics, typological 
discourse promises that racial types draw the invisible to the surface of the visible. As with 
physiognomy, the logic of racial typology claims to find the internal evident in the external, the 
spiritual in the physical, and the group in the individual.162 The type’s purported power is 
precisely its ability to bring these opposing elements together, and to paradoxically represent one 
through the other. If photographic typology can ostensibly make abstract racial essence into an 
observable reality, then this claim also seems to collapse the distinction between the invisible 
and the visible, while at the same time relying on the very distinction in order to bolster 
typology’s representational claims. 
As we will come to see, photographic typological projects such as Galton’s 
simultaneously uphold visuality as the epistemological holy grail of race, while also placing 
significant pressures on the medium’s own premise—and promise—of representation. On the 
one hand, it has been established by scholars over the last several decades that visuality and the 
power of looking have served as the grounds of racial difference in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. While Du Bois theorized racial consciousness visually in 1903 as “second 
sight,” still to this day, as Shawn Michelle Smith has argued, “Race is conceived not simply 
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through representation but also through acts of looking…racial identification and recognition are 
negotiated through, and even instigated by, racialized gazes in a racist culture.”163 On the other 
hand, even if from today’s vantage point, we understand that visuality is key to the construction 
of race, this does not mean that it has in fact been the key to the exposure of racial essence, as 
these historical racial thinkers and photographers would contend. The 19th-century emergence of 
racial photography was bound up with contradictions, including what historian Amos Morris-
Reich calls “the tension between the belief in self-evident racial difference and its actual social 
elusiveness.”164 Indeed, the racialized gaze’s historical and epistemological significance is not 
equivalent to the ontological self-evidence of race.  
Yet these two concepts are difficult to disentangle, precisely because they were 
established as logical corollaries. Many scholars have argued that a reliance on visuality—in 
other words, on features perceptible to the eye—has gone hand-in hand with the development of 
the concept of race as an intractable, ontological bodily difference, as opposed to race as 
malleable and contingent.165 By the end of the nineteenth century, race was conceived, according 
to George W. Stocking Jr., as “the permanent inherited physical differences which distinguish 
human groups.”166 Race, once considered a fluid, flexible category (the result of climate or 
culture), became known as a defining, stable characteristic of the body. Yet of course a 
conceptualization of race as permanent and visible relies, as Robyn Wiegman notes, “on a series 
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of bodily fictions assumed to unproblematically reflect the natural meaning of flesh.”167 It would 
seem, then, that the “realness” of race became tied to its visible status as well as to its purported 
permanence.  
If the promise that race is visible is so closely entwined with the idea that it is also 
permanent, then the claim of seeing race turns easily into seeing permanence—which is to say, 
seeing across time. This very notion feeds into one of the most significant aspects of Jewish 
photographic typology: its claim to represent long temporal scopes or to access distant history. 
The typological process of looking supposedly allows viewers to observe distant history by 
looking at a photographic type. The claim of seeing a racial history manifest in an individual’s 
face is by no means unique to Jewish types. However, Jewish physical ambiguity dials up its 
significance. In the absence of consistent physical traits, the notion of a visible history became 
especially pronounced in discussions of Jewish racial typology and has even at times 
overshadowed phenotypic descriptions in typological discourse. In this manner, photographic 
typology fits within a broader project, which I trace throughout this dissertation, of imagining a 
bodily Jewish inheritance or access to Jewish history through biological knowledge.  
This idea of the photographic type as a representation of long or distant history might 
seem rather surprising. After all, the photographic medium is often associated with brief 
temporality (even instantaneity). However, Jewish photographic types, such as those created by 
English scientist Francis Galton, were hailed in their time for a unique ability to access, or 
represent, a distant history. Moreover, the pedagogical function of typological discourse made 
this mode of looking possible for individuals on a wider scale. Sara Blair has called this concept, 
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“arrest:” a mode of seeing, which “borrow[s] a transcriptional agency from the operations of the 
camera” and allows Jews (or any Other) to be seen as fundamentally outside of modernity and 
temporality.168 Citing William Dean Howells, who wrote in 1896 that, “Splendid types of that old 
Hebrew world” are visible on the busy streets of the Lower East Side, Blair argues that this 
visual practice effectively “relegate[es] its inhabitants to a static, typological past.”169 Blair 
emphasizes arrest, but I would point out that there is also another form of temporal manipulation 
at work in this layered visual practice. Not only are the inhabitants relegated to the past, but 
Howells’ mode of seeing (which Blair describes as “photographic”) purportedly allows him to 
see into the past: he imagines himself able to access the ancient world through looking at those 
he calls Jewish “types.” However paradoxical, scientific practices and the modern technology of 
photography inform this typological mode of seeing the Jew as static—as a type. Yet such is 
precisely the power of typological visuality—to see through time by imagining that the racial 
type is constant throughout history. Imbedded within this concept of arrest lies a protracted, 
dynamic process, which unsettles the notion of photography’s momentary visuality.    
As we will see in the first example (the composite photographs of Francis Galton), I 
argue that typological discourse is deeply invested in temporality in these cases, precisely 
because of the ambiguity of Jewish physical distinctiveness. This encompasses the tendency of 
some race scientists to incorporate an older anti-Semitic notion of an appraising or alchemical 
Jewish gaze into their descriptions of Jewish types. They instruct viewers to engage in a 
sustained process of looking and being looked at, a typological process which unfolds in time, 
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even as many Jewish photographic types also promise to access ancient history or condense 
longer periods of time.  
Galton and Jacobs: Creating Composite Photographic Types 
The English eugenicist Francis Galton’s late nineteenth-century composite photographs 
stand as the most prominent project of Jewish photographic typology. I begin my study of Jewish 
photographic types with Galton, not only for chronological reasons, but also because his ghost-
like photographic images are so explicitly, methodically, produced. Galton often figures 
significantly in scholarly accounts of racial photography, racial types, and physiognomy 
(including accounts such as mine, which focus on the United States). However, full attention is 
not always paid to these images’ specificity as Jewish typological images, nor to the question of 
how they might relate to other typological images of Jewish subjects in the United States. 
Galton’s images might exemplify what we think of as “photographic types,” in that they were 
explicitly racial, and interpreted for clues to illuminate a trans-historical racial essence. These 
Jewish photographic types came about after Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, and known in 
his day as the “father of eugenics,” developed some of the first statistical methods for studying 
inheritance. Notably, Galton first used his composite photography method to produce “types” of 
criminals and consumptives, meaning that from the beginning, his was a project of negative 
visuality. In these images, which he also called “pictorial statistics,” Galton created a new 
photographic technology that would blend multiple photographs and help discern an 
underlying—not initially visible—type among a group of individuals. Galton created the 
composite images by exposing multiple photographic images on top of each other for an equal, 
brief period of time—as a result, commonalities would become increasingly opaque and visible, 
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and variations from the central form would fade away.170 The composite type, no doubt, also falls 
outside of the photographic pact, or the promise of, “that-has-been,” which Barthes has described 
as inherent in the photographic form, because these images portray faces that have never existed. 
Galton’s images were self-consciously typological productions, rendered through photographic 
technology. 
 
Figure 1 Francis Galton, Composite Portrait of the “Jewish Type,” 1885 
Galton understood his process of distinguishing core, common features to be capable of 
revealing the underlying form—the pure, ahistorical “type”—from which all individuals 
deviate.171 Allan Sekula has called Galton’s composite images a merging of “the desire to look” 
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and “the desire to measure.”172 Galton’s method was indeed mechanical, but it was a method of 
mechanically averaging and idealizing. He was driven to determine underlying, essential truths 
about a group, yet believed the best means to do so was through mechanical production. Daston 
and Galison write that on the one hand, he “aimed at an ideal type that lay ‘behind’ any single 
individual;” on the other hand, he sought the “ideal not with what he and others had come to see 
as subjective idealization (stemming from ‘biases,’ ‘fancies,’ and ‘judgment’) but with the quasi-
automated procedures of mechanical objectivity.”173 His photographic typological process is, 
therefore, a combination of “truth-to-nature” and “mechanical objectivity,” a limit case for the 
supposed incompatibility of these epistemic virtues and scientific image-making practices.  
Galton came to create his Jewish composite types only at the urging of English Jewish 
social scientist, Joseph Jacobs. Jacobs’ intention for Galton’s type was to represent a singular 
condensation of racial features. The type created in these composite photographs would be 
homogenizing, essential, and ideal. Yet these photographic types were more of an experiment 
than we might imagine: the purpose was to answer the question, is there a Jewish type? To 
begin, Galton visited a Jewish boys’ school in London and captured photographs of multiple 
students, facing the camera and in profile, which he then exposed on top of each other in order to 
create the composite images. Ultimately, Jacobs read the images as affirming a Jewish type. 
Beyond the opinions of Jacobs and Galton, this photographic endeavor and the resulting images 
were hailed as a great achievement, a racial type which proved that racial types existed at all.174 
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Yet Galton himself, while impressed with his visual creation, did not believe that they proved 
that the Jews were a pure race. 
In making these images, the decision to represent Jewish males was deliberate, as Galton 
wrote that he did not believe that making a type of Jewish women would be possible, because 
they exhibited too much physical variation. 175 Whatever the scientific basis for this judgement 
that only Jewish males could be typical, it also happens to echo the trend in Victorian caricature 
of representing the image of the Jew as always male (and always Ashkenazi).176 In England and 
beyond, the typical or stereotypical construction of the Jewish body is almost always male. 177 
However, Galton’s notion that a Jewish female type is impossible edges close to an admission 
that there is, more generally, ambiguity around Jewish physical distinctiveness. Moreover, by 
photographing boys, Galton does not capture characteristically masculine facial features such as 
beards, which are often associated with Jewish men (variation in facial hair among photographic 
subjects might also have caused a problem for the composites). Consequently, the images of 
immature male faces, labeled the “Jewish type,” contribute to a relatively common, feminized 
conception of Jewish masculinity. Galton’s specific selection of photographic subjects (not 
female, not mature, etc.), can be understood, then, as a failsafe against the implicit problem of 
Jewish physical variation. 
Regardless of whether or not Galton interpreted the composite images as “pure types,” he 
and Jacobs both interpreted the images for their power to condense time. In particular, Galton 
evaluated their aesthetic or mimetic value in regard to their ability to represent an extended 
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timeframe. Galton compares his composite portraits to the “ideal pictures of the great masters” 
and suggests that his composite portraits of the Jewish type approach painting’s quality in a way 
that a standard photograph cannot.178 He writes, “Perhaps the most real difference between a 
photographic portrait and a good painting is that the former is merely an exact representation of 
one phase of a sitter’s individuality, while the latter may be a composite of an indefinite number 
of phases.”179 So then, the great difference between a photograph and a painting is the temporal 
breadth represented in the single image. Even though a composite portrait includes many 
individuals’ visages, captured photographically, Galton proposes an equivalence between this 
multitude of faces and multiple phases. With this stated condensing of time, these images 
constitute what Sekula calls a “collapsed archive,” an ability to know a great deal simply by 
giving a presumably quick look.180 The collapse or condensation, Galton attests, corrects for what 
is otherwise a shortcoming in photographic representation; he extends the image’s indexicality, 
by multiplying the moments that a photograph can represent. Galton thus articulates the formal, 
aesthetic power of the composite photograph—and the formal requirement of a photographic 
type—an ability to represent an extended period of time. 
The composite portraits of the Jewish type enact a different alchemy of temporal 
representation for Jacobs. In a sense, photographs, as Alan Trachtenberg has suggested, always 
perform their own kind of alchemy when they “confer value through metamorphosis; to take a 
picture of some thing or person is to turn what the eye sees into a tangible image, an object of 
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new value.”181 Yet Jacobs believed these images to be “pure types,” meaning that they show the 
Jewish facial features passed down in their pure form throughout generations. Galton’s type is 
meant to represent a singular condensation of racial features. By collapsing many images into 
one, Jacobs purports that the photograph enacts a kind of metamorphosis different from what 
Galton described: he saw Galton take many images of the “Modern Jew” and create an image of 
the “Ancient Jew.”  
To wit, Jacobs suggests that this image might allow the viewer to move through time. In 
their written interpretations of the images, both Jacobs and Galton often mention the “type of the 
Modern Jew” in their writings, as though to suggest that the “Modern Jew” might be distinct 
from the “ancient Jewish type.”182 Jacobs especially cites the Hebrew Bible and the Mishnah, as 
well as Assyrian bas reliefs in his writing, seeking evidence to connect the composite images 
with written descriptions or images from the past.183 At the time, this was a common practice in 
anthropology, phrenology, and archeology, used to ascertain what the ancient Hebrews looked 
like. Yet Jacobs expresses his awe for this photographic technology, which allows the viewer to 
see history in a novel way, 
“…the photographic lens seems, in these composites to traverse the aeons of time and bring up 
into visible presentment the heroes of the past. In these Jewish composites we have the nearest 
representation we can hope to possess of the lad Samuel as he ministered before the Ark, or the 
youthful David when he tended his father’s sheep.”184  
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In other words, according to Jacobs, the composite photograph allows viewers to see how the 
past is present in the modern Jewish type. By “traversing the aeons of time,” these images 
collapse the distance between the past and the present. The camera lens, according to Jacobs, has 
conjured into photographic realness, a character from the past, whose trace could never have 
touched the camera lens. Like Galton, Jacobs suggests that the composite photographic type of 
the Jew manipulates time, by rendering a history visible and present. Yet the idea that the camera 
lens should “traverse the aeons of time,” I argue, further constitutes a typological process insofar 
as it describes looking—performed by the camera lens and by the viewer of the photograph—as 
not only contracted but also protracted. Even as this process allows one to see the past and 
present touch, it also must take place in time, aided by the scientists’ discursive framing. 
Constructing a Jewish Gaze 
One crucial site for these scientists’ framing of images as types was the construct of the 
Jewish gaze. Here, scientists could instruct readers in a cycle of looking and being looked at, 
which would allow viewers to identify and create Jewish photographic types. Jacobs instructs 
readers to assess Galton’s composite photographs feature by feature, ultimately telling them to, 
“Cover up every part of composite A but the eyes, and…I fancy anyone familiar with Jews 
would say, ‘Those are Jewish eyes.’”185 Galton and Jacobs—along with many other racial 
thinkers around the turn of the twentieth century—produced Jewish types not only by gazing at 
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Jews, but also by constructing a notion of a particular Jewish gaze. In many typological projects 
the subject’s gaze promised a different, though also crucial, representational power: It became a 
locus for the coordination of internal and external characteristics. Jacobs took the Jewish gaze for 
granted, writing, “Most people can tell a Jew when they see one, there is a certain expression in a 
Jewish face which causes them to be identified as such in almost every instance.”186 As Sander 
Gilman has written about Galton and Jacobs’ project, Jacobs found “the absolute Jewishness of 
the gaze” in Galton’s images.187 
Yet they were by no means alone in this insistence on the Jewish gaze, or in emphasizing 
the notion of a Jewish expression more generally. When Fishberg describes artistic renderings of 
the Jewish face, he pays attention not only to discrete facial features—eyes, forehead, nose, 
lips—but also “the expression in the dark eyes,” which he writes “is very difficult to describe.”188 
Even Fishberg, who ardently opposes the notion of the Jewish type, writes that in the Jewish 
gaze, “There is a suggestion of what [American economist William] Ripley calls a suppressed 
cunningness.”189 Another English biologist, Redcliffe N. Salaman claimed to find in subjects of 
mixed descent a particular Jewish gaze or facial expression and, crucially, used photographs as 
evidence of this.190 The Jewish gaze was even more central to the work of Russian-born German 
gynecologist and anthropologist Carl Heinrich Stratz, who wrote that a particular Jewish gaze, 
rather than any measurable physical characteristics, distinguished the Jewish type. Stratz used 
photographs to study and display this Jewish gaze and to identify “true” Jewish descendants all 
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over the world; his subjects included Jewish women from Palestine, as well as women from 
many other regions, such as Japan, who otherwise would not identify as Jewish, but who 
nonetheless displayed a Jewish facial expression.191 It is no coincidence that for Salaman and 
Stratz, like Galton and Jacobs, the visual technology of photography became the medium to 
express and substantiate their theories about the Jewish gaze. They, too, used the camera’s 
reputation for mechanical reproduction to substantiate these racial ideals. 
Galton for his part made detailed observations about the gazes of his artificial Jewish 
photographic subjects, as well as the gazes of the Jewish people he saw in the London 
neighborhood where he took the boys’ photographs. He recalled, 
“The feature that struck me most, as I drove through the adjacent Jewish quarter, was the cold 
scanning gaze of man, woman, and child, and this was no less conspicuous among the 
schoolboys. There was no sign of diffidence in any way of their looks, nor of surprise at the 
unwanted intrusion. I felt, rightly or wrongly, that every one of them was coolly appraising me at 
market value, without the slightest interest of any other kind.”192 
 
Galton assesses the Jewish inhabitants of the London neighborhood much in the same way that 
Blair describes William Dean Howells and other observers of New York’s Lower East Side 
having done: they all take a photographic approach in order to see inhabitants typologically, as 
static remnants of the past. In the Jewish gaze, Galton locates the Jewish propensity for 
commerce, which he identifies as their racial essence, their underlying form. Therefore, the 
discourse of the Jewish gaze allows Galton to render an anti-Semitic stereotype visible and 
manifest in Jewish bodies for him to see. He also emphasizes that the cycle of looking and being 
looked at takes place both within the confines of the photographic encounter and when he is out 
on the street. This circular gazing process is not limited to the photograph, but instead informs 
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his other visual encounters. It naturalizes both the typological concept of the Jewish gaze and the 
typological mode of looking at Jews. 
The construct of the Jewish gaze has a long history, and like physiognomy writ large, was 
standardized and scientized through racial discourse. For centuries, Christians in Europe 
imagined that Jews were uniquely able to discern what is valuable. Through this association, the 
“Jew’s eye” came to mean something high in value. As Trachtenberg has mused upon the 
circular logic of this phrase, “What has value in ‘a Jew’s eye’ is value itself, the transformation 
of things through the alchemy of finance and commerce into ‘worth.’”193 Later, as Gilman notes, 
racial thinkers who located racial essence in the Jewish gaze or Jewish eyes claimed to find 
visible evidence of Jewish psychological pathology there.194 If physiognomy posits a relationship 
between facial features and character, the manner in which one uses or conducts the face makes 
this relationship visible. The ephemeral gaze, unlike more concrete or measurable facial features, 
straddles the border between internal and external characteristics, between the physical and the 
spiritual. Therefore, the discourse of the gaze grants leeway in constructing racial typology 
where visual ambiguity persists: if one cannot easily or consistently identify particular physical 
traits on racialized bodies, Jewish or otherwise, then the gaze could stand as an essentially 
Jewish feature available for the camera and the eye to capture. Typologists’ interest in the Jewish 
gaze points to a key ambivalence in photographic typology and the typological process regarding 
the value of the visible and the material. 
 
193 The expression, “Jew’s eye [Jewess’ eye]” meaning something highly valuable, derives from Shakespeare’s 
Merchant of Venice. 
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Photographic Types in and Around Literature 
Understanding photographic types and the layered visual practice that attend them thus 
invites us to reconsider a text at the center of the previous chapter: The Rise of David Levinsky 
(1915) by Abraham Cahan. Readers may recall that Cahan’s fictional character David Levinsky 
was first presented to readers in McClures magazine as “in fact, an actual type.”195 In the same 
issue, an article by the muckraking journalist Burton J. Hendrick, titled “The Jewish Invasion of 
America,” was published with an array of photographic images, which were also described as 
“types.” Significantly, only the first five illustrations in the article are photographs, and all 
subsequent images, also of subjects’ faces, are sketched drawings (presumably due to cost). All 
but one of the photographs’ captions use the word “type,” as does one drawing, which labels its 
subject a “typical push-cart peddler.”196 However, unlike the character David’s status as a 
singular, representative, Jewish type, these images of Jewish immigrants published in McClure’s 
within “The Jewish Invasion of America” suggest a proliferation of Jewish types. The diverse 
array of Jewish immigrants displayed are labeled as arrivals from Italy, Bulgaria, Jerusalem, 
Kiev, and Galicia. This very variety of illustrations presents a challenge for a single cohesive 
reading of them.  
Nevertheless, the textual apparatus around the images (the ethnographic article and the 
photographs’ captions) imbed the images in a typological discourse. The photograph on the first 
page frames all that follow as racial photographic types. This photograph shows a teenage boy in 
three-quarter view, wearing a collarless shirt and a tall pointed fur hat. He is described in the 
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caption as, “a pure type of the Arabian Jew.”197 The image is cropped in such a way that the top 
of the boy’s head juts beyond the photograph’s brick-wall background and onto the page. His hat 
is placed in between the author’s first and last names, visually enacting an invasion of its own. 
Together, the boy’s apparently non-Western dress, his identification as an Arabian Jew who 
emigrated from Jerusalem, and his description as a “pure type” frame him racially, and tinge 
Hendrick’s article from the outset as a story of Oriental others descending upon the United 
States. Most significantly, the term “pure type” borrows directly from the biological language of 
racial typology, meaning one who descends from an isolated or not “admixed” group. Therefore, 
even if the photographs themselves challenge the idea of a single “Jewish type” in their very 
plurality, their textual framing activates the language of racial typology. This framing casts a 
shade of race science over the idea of a Jewish “invasion,” in effect heightening the nativist 
anxiety coursing through the article, and perhaps in Cahan’s story as well.  
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Figure 2 First Page of McClure’s Article, “Jewish Invasion of American,” April 1913 
Understanding how Hendrick introduces the literary type (David) can inform our reading 
of these photographic types. Here too, as in Galton’s photographic type, the Jewish literary type 
mixes the opposing drives to reproduce and to idealize—though, through different methods. In 
this issue, McClure’s frames Cahan’s fictional tale as an “autobiography,” at the same time as 
Hendrick describes the character as in fact, an actual type. Such an association between the real 
and the type chafes against the common literary meaning of “type” as in an archetype or 
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stereotype, or alternately as “a symbol for someone or something.”198 Nonetheless, the 
magazine’s prologue to Cahan’s story calls David, the type, “more sensational than could be 
conjured up by any man’s imagination.”199 By emphasizing the reproduction of the real, 
McClure’s teaches readers to view Cahan’s character as a type according to prevailing scientific 
norms, rather than literary norms. 
Accordingly, Hendrick’s description of David as a type shares much in common with the 
epistemological tension of photographic types. This is especially resonant when Hendrick 
purports that Cahan’s realist fiction demonstrates, “by concrete example, the minute workings of 
that wonderful machine, the Jewish brain.”200 On the one hand, Hendrick’s description of David 
as a type and as a concrete example is informed by the value of mechanical objectivity 
(especially as it relates to the effort to reproduce nature, or the real, which was a key component 
in realist literature). On the other hand, his valorization of the type is also informed by the 
seemingly opposed drive to present David as an ideal representative of a racial essence—through 
whom we can peek at “that wonderful machine, the Jewish brain.” By portraying David, rather 
than the author, as a machine, Hendrick assures readers of his reproducibility. Hendrick, unlike 
Galton, promotes the Jewish type—both literary and photographic—as captured, rather than 
created, reproduced rather than produced. Yet, of course, the emphatically fictional status of 
Cahan’s story—as well as our previous examples of photographic types—should orient us to see 
all of these literary and photographic types as constructed, as produced, especially in their claims 
of providing access to a historically static racial essence. 
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Within the article, the photographs’ captions naturalize the mode of looking that allows 
viewers to see the photographs as types. One of the article’s largest images is a photographic 
portrait in profile of a Washington Census Bureau employee who is called, “An intellectual 
Russian Jew—a type that is found in large numbers in American universities.”201 The claim that a 
type is “found in large numbers” suggests that these “types” preexist photographic reproduction. 
The caption conveys ubiquity and reproducibility, such that seeing this photograph allows 
viewers to envision the group of individuals that the man represents. The description, then, 
implicitly invites the audience to enact such typological interpretation upon the “large numbers” 
of these individuals, whom they might find outside the pages of McClure’s, and to assess 
whether they conform to or deviate from the published image. In other words, these captions 
instruct readers in a typological process that can be applied to both photographs and people. This 
is a visual process that conceals itself in its claim of reproducing the real.  
 
201 Hendrick, 126. Another photograph portrays an eighteen year-old rabbinical student, whom McClures calls, “a 
representative type of the intellectual young Jewish immigrant” (128). 
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Figure 3 Image of Census Bureau Worker from McClures, April 1913 
The seams of this visual practice show a bit more in another photograph and caption 
which also teach viewers to see typologically. This photograph shows a newly arrived eleven-
year-old Hungarian Jewish girl, “A type that produces many New York school-mistresses.”202 
Consistent with my interpretation of the previous photographs, this caption unambiguously 
points to the type’s existence outside the bounds of the photograph. Yet more striking in this 
instance is the fact that the caption suggests not only that the “type” precedes the photographic 
image, but also that her status as a type precedes the fulfillment of her typical occupation—or 
possibly even predetermines her future action. Those who look at this image of a girl can thus 
see not only her peers who might “replicate or deviate from” her type, but also can ostensibly see 
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her future (as well as that of her peers). Related to a more common claim that Jewish history is 
evinced on the face of a Jewish type, this caption—by claiming that the type “produces many 
school mistresses”—also offers the ability to access a diachronic temporality. Moreover, the idea 
that we can foretell the girl’s future is surprisingly similar to the idea of a labeling the narrative 
of a literary type as not “conjured up by any man’s imagination,” or as “autobiography”—the 
presumption being that the true story writes itself. This girl, or, at least her face, can present the 
story herself. Unlike David’s autobiography, which must be delineated in narrative, this girl’s 
life can be condensed, and viewed in this one photographic image. The caption teaches viewers 
to appreciate the photographic type for in its ability to compress or dilate time and to serve as a 
stand-in for narrative. 
 
Figure 4 Image of Hungarian Jewish Girl From McClure’s, April 1913 
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At the conclusion of his article, Hendrick tells readers, “The writer has contented himself 
chiefly with recording facts, and has only incidentally touched upon the racial traits and training 
that have made possible this success” of Jews in America; for a closer look at the racial traits, he 
invites us to read Cahan’s story.203 Yet these photographic types, I contend, also fill in this 
supposed gap about Jewish racial traits, by activating the visual language of racial typology. The 
photographs and their discursive framing invite readers to perform the typological process of 
discerning whether an image replicates, or deviates from, the Jewish racial ideal. Their framing 
also promises viewers the ability to see through time when they look at a photographic type. This 
particular collection of Jewish photographic types in McClure’s points to the role of popular 
media in circulating this form of biological imagination. Moreover, these photographic types and 
their relation to those created by nineteenth-century scientists invite us to reconsider how we 
read Cahan’s novel and its connections to popular science. 
Typology Against Urban Chaos 
I have thus far framed the Galton and McClure’s images as photographic types, within a 
natural scientific tradition of image making. Yet there is another tradition that these projects can 
fit into: urban photography. Nearly all of the McClure’s photographs illustrate Jews in New York 
and Galton took his photographs in a London boys’ school; my analysis of both sets of images 
has suggested that the typological mode of seeing can extend from the photographic type to 
photographer’s and viewer’s sightlines on city streets. So too, Blair’s concept of “arrest” and the 
photographic mode of seeing racialized others typologically is developed specifically to theorize 
photography and visuality in Manhattan’s Lower East Side. Even if these typological images of 
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faces do not seem to represent the chaos of urban experience—although little imagination is 
required to see how similar these photographs are to the criminal mugshot204—it is productive to 
reflect on the ways that these images are a part of turn-of-the-century urban photography. In 
particular, photographic types bring in an explicitly biological scientific perspective to this field.  
American photography focusing on the urban poor most notably gained traction through 
the book, How the Other Half Lives: Studies Among the Tenements of New York (1890) by Jacob 
Riis.205 The book contains photographs (and drawn reproductions of photographs), mainly taken 
by the author himself, which accompany his detailed descriptions of life in Manhattan’s poor, 
immigrant-filled neighborhoods. The images portray the city streets and dark, cramped 
tenements (a feat made possible by new flash technology). The book’s investment in 
representing urban space is also manifested in the many drawings and maps of tenement layouts. 
Photographs document tenement-dwellers in squalid conditions, taking part in domestic scenes 
of daily life. Within How the Other Half Lives two images stand out, appearing roughly two-
thirds of the way through the book, in a chapter on crime, with the caption “Typical Toughs 
(From the Rough’s Alley).”206 The subjects both appear to be organized askew within their 
frames; both wear jackets and cravats; one wears a hat. Most distinctively, while both men face 
the camera in the manner of a criminal mug shot, the eyes of neither man open fully enough to 
see the whites of their eyes, or to have a focused gaze. Instead, we see slivers of black. One 
mouth hangs open and the other smirks subtly. They do not look altogether tough, but nor do 
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they appear altogether sound. These two images stand out among the other illustrations in the 
book for being portraits, or more specifically, photographic types. Unlike other photographs of 
people placed within the city’s public or domestic settings, which are the book’s main focus, 
these faces are themselves illustrations of the book’s story of urban poverty and its ills. While 
they are not characteristic of Riis’s photographs, images of “types” are thus incorporated into the 
prominent work and are included in the repertoire of what urban photography can be. 
Scholars have linked the rise of racial typology and physiognomy to geographic and 
historical shifts including the rise of empire, and urbanization. In particular, photography has 
held a distinct role in theorizing and capturing interactions in urban environments. As historian 
Deborah Dash Moore describes, modern New York School photographs (from the 1930s-40s) of 
strangers in urban spaces are characteristically images of “looks and looking, being looked at, of 
being looked down upon.”207 Some “manifest the evanescent, dancing matrix of sightlines and 
body language that organize social awareness of city streets.”208 The photographs at the center of 
this chapter do not share the same methods or agenda, and in fact can be put into productive 
contrast with the later, modern documentary photography of the 1930s. Photographic types can 
similarly be understood as a response to the “evanescent, dancing matrix of sightlines” in urban 
contexts. However, rather than documenting these complex and shifting dynamics, typological 
photography attempts to order the disorderly dance of sightlines (it is no coincidence, as Pearl 
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argues, that the rise of physiognomy in Victorian culture coincides with urbanization).209 Jewish 
photographic types and the dynamic process of typological looking can be understood as a 
scientifically sanctioned, systematized form of visuality that contains and reforms chaotic urban 
sightlines. 
The type as a bulwark against modern experience of urbanization and disorder comes into 
play in the literary imagination as well. The impulse to organize faces typologically counters the 
overwhelming experience of encountering the faces and bodies of strangers in an urban 
landscape, and the need to read them. Typology served as a scientized, biological solution to a 
key experience of urban modernity. For instance, in Fishberg’s study, The Jews, he takes pains to 
delve into the “novelists’ conception of the Jewish type,” and criticizes the practice of portraying 
a single, indelible Jewish type.210 But he approvingly highlights the British Jewish author Israel 
Zangwill. In the American context, Zangwill is perhaps best known for his pro-assimilation play 
The Melting Pot (1908), often credited with popularizing the very term. In one novel, Zangwill 
describes the physical variety of the Jewish leaders on display at an International Zionist 
Conference. Zangwill writes of “a strange phantasmagoria of faces” which ultimately leads him 
to ask rhetorically, “Who speaks of the Jewish type?”211 
Zangwill characterizes the stream of Jewish bodies as a “a strange phantasmagoria of 
faces,” which he places in opposition to a “Jewish type.” This imagery is striking for its dual 
resonance as both a dream and a visual technology: the fantasmagoria was the name of the 
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nineteenth-century magic lantern, distinctive for creating the illusion of moving images—a 
precursor to what we’d now call moving pictures, or film. Just as Robert Alter theorizes the 
emergent fictional “vision of the city as phantasmagoria” to mean, “a limited perception of 
transitory images, which are no more than shards of an ungraspable whole,”212 Zangwill here 
represents the blurring multitude of individuals without any discernable connection. For him, the 
Jewish phantasmagoria resists typological apprehension. Zangwill thus describes the imagined 
Jewish type an impossibility; all that is possible is limited perception of an ungraspable whole. 
And yet, of course, the experience of seeing others as phantasmagoria is the very thing that 
inspires the process of typological creation—with the final product being a photographic type 
that contains the layered, contracted and protracted temporality.  
Therefore, it serves us to not only see the practice of Jewish photographic types as a 
response to trends in scientific image making and biology; we can also see it responding to 
modern urban culture, imagined through biology, and enacted through photography. This claim 
puts into relief the aesthetic and rhetorical moves of the photographic projects discussed in the 
following section. Also working in the photographic medium, they maintain the language of 
“type,” yet imbue a sense of disorder, proliferation, and mutability. 
Photographic Counter-Discourses to Typology 
If visual technologies and visual culture were important grounds for establishing race 
science at the turn of the twentieth century, then they would also become the means for 
producing its counter-discourses and counter-archives. Perhaps the most famous of American 
photographic projects in the early twentieth century in conversation with, yet subverting, 
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common tropes of racial photographic types, was Du Bois’s collection, “Types of the American 
Negro” for the 1900 Paris exhibition.213 In his work, Du Bois collected hundreds of photographs 
of African Americans into three albums, including many portraits, which emphasized variation in 
hair, skin tone, and facial features, as well as photographs from various universities and schools, 
which displayed middle class respectability and affluence.214 As Shawn Michelle Smith has 
elaborated, Du Bois crucially used race science’s technology (the photograph) and vocabulary 
(the “type”) to challenge this essentializing science, and notes that “Galton’s fantasy of pure 
racial types must falter under the weight of Du Bois’s ‘white types with Negro blood.’”215 Du 
Bois’s project for the Paris Exhibition also highlights that photographic racial typology was a 
shared scientific practice between Europe and the United States, and that its attendant popular 
discourse circulated transnationally. 
His photographic project came in response to a longstanding history of anthropologists 
and biologists using photography as proof of historically constant, racial essence of African 
Americans. For instance, the now infamous collection of photographic “types” of enslaved 
African Americans, taken by Joseph T. Zealy, served Harvard scientist Louis Agassiz’s project 
of proving that humans of European and African descent were created separately and constituted 
two separate species, thus shoring up the idea that racial distinctions were necessarily static—
ultimately, in defense of slavery.216 Du Bois then harnessed the form of the photographic type 
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and practices of typological looking, in order to challenge many of these assumptions of 
uniformity and stasis. As Shawn Michelle Smith argues,  
“…while the first images in Du Bois’s 1900 Paris Exposition albums formally recall the 
photographs that eugenicists and biological racialists used to codify bodies in racial terms, Du 
Bois’s albums as a whole dismantle the physical coherence of the imagined racial type, 
disengaging the images of African American men and women from the circumspection of a 
sliding evolutionary scale. For what is the ‘Negro type’ as represented in Du Bois’s photograph 
albums? First, it is plural—“types”—a diverse array of individuals not bound by physical 
appearance…”217  
 
Thus, in labeling these images, “types” (plural), DuBois utilizes the visual technology of 
photography and undermines the racial-biological category of the “type.” The synchronous 
plurality of these types particularly helps to contradict a “sliding evolutionary scale”—the 
presumed historical permanence made known in racial types. DuBois’s work thus contributes to 
what Britt Rusert has called a counter-archive to the long nineteenth century’s racial science.218  
DuBois subverts these associations in his Paris Exhibition project, using the conventions 
of photographic types, as well as other photographic modes to demonstrate the dignity and 
diversity of African American life. Smith has suggested that by activating both the photographic 
forms of the criminal mugshot and the sentimental, middle-class family album, DuBois directly 
challenges the racist association of African American criminality.219 Imbedded in this collection 
of images is not only a nod to these aesthetic forms, but also an acknowledgement of particular 
social formations (such as the family) and biological categories (such as evolution and typology). 
And as such, the features of these photo albums, including sentimentality, style, and self-
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fashioning—which we might usually think of as aesthetic or artistic—can be understood as 
powerful tools of biological imagination, because of their displayed ability to either facilitate or 
frustrate the scientific, racializing gaze.   
Du Bois uses the tools of photography and typological discourse to obscure race’s 
legibility—to manipulate the known system of looking at African Americans. Later in his life, 
Du Bois recalled the significance of his time in Europe for understanding the cultural specificity 
of these discourses and practices that make race visible. He wrote in his autobiography that while 
studying in Germany from 1892-4, he was mistaken for a Jew in Europe on more than one 
occasion.220 Reflecting in 1952 on his time spent in Germany, he recalls not merely a visual 
conflation of his blackness with Jewishness, but also people’s disinterest in his racial identity and 
relatively greater dislike for Jews, which “astonished” him, because, “It had never occurred to 
me until then that any exhibition of race prejudice could be anything but color prejudice.”221 Here 
too, Du Bois reminds us that not only “race prejudice,” but the ability to see race is itself a 
malleable and learned process: the ability to see Jews (or understand how he could himself be 
seen as a Jew) in Europe was not entirely legible to him. Likewise, in the collection, he tried to 
obscure the legibility of these photographs, these “Types of the American Negro” as biological, 
racial types. 
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DuBois serves as a fascinating and rather explicit example of manipulating the 
established formal and discursive features of racial photography in order to challenge the 
essentialist claims of racial typology. I argue that we can identify a similar endeavor (even if not 
the same theoretical underpinnings) in a recurrent feature in the Forverts (Jewish Daily 
Forward), the socialist paper founded by Cahan, and New York’s most significant Yiddish daily 
newspaper. Throughout the mid-1920s and 1930s, the Forverts ran a feature in the Sunday Arts 
section that published portraits of Jewish women. The Sunday Arts section—rather unique for its 
moment—was published bilingually, with headlines in both English and Yiddish. The headlines 
in each language were not quite “literal” translations of each other. The feature’s title in English 
was consistently “Portrait Studies of Jewish Women;” yet in Yiddish, it varied between “Tipn 
fun ydishe froyen,” (“Types of Jewish Women”) and “Tipn fun yiddishe sheynhaytn,” (“Types of 
Jewish Beauties”).222 In one spread from July 1926, you can find one woman who sports a sleek 
bob and wears a cap and gown.223 Another peers out through her short finger waves; the portrait 
captures her formal sleeveless dress ornamented with a large flower pinned to the shoulder. Yet 
another woman stands in front of a photographer’s backdrop, wearing a small turban, a vest, a 
blouse, and a long skirt, and carries a pitcher as a prop. The women in the photographs are self-
styled, and express some combination of pride, modernity, glamour, and respectability. Rather 
than the Forverts creating these images, readers sent them into the paper for publication, from 
around the United States and from as far away as Warsaw and Berlin. The very fact that the 
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Forverts called them tipn, places the photographs into a typological discourse and initiates the 
typological process of looking. 
 
Figure 5 “Portrait Studies of Jewish Women,” New York City, July 4, 1926 (Center for Jewish History Archive) 
Riv-Ellen Prell has suggested that this weekly feature stood as an attempt to frame 
communal attitudes regarding young Jewish women in the period. “With these photographs,” she 
writes, “The Forward [Forverts] proclaimed that young Jewish womanhood—modern, 
American, and desirable—was worthy of display for others to see.”224 The portraits featured in 
the Forverts, Prell argues, counteract the stereotype, which prevailed in New York City at the 
time, of young working Jewish women as vulgar, overly desirous “ghetto girls.”225 Therefore, for 
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Prell, these photographs are an outward-facing statement of communal pride, or, are at least 
meant to instruct readers in the value of outward-facing pride. Yet we might attempt to further 
account for the complexity of the series’ Yiddish and English titles. Even if the newspaper 
published bilingually (giving us both “portraits” and “tipn”) we can safely presume that only 
Jews read the Forverts. It is possible that calling the images “types” in English would have 
seemed like a dangerous invitation of racialization, in case any non-Jew caught a glimpse of the 
paper, say across the aisle of a subway car. Regardless, calling these images tipn, only in Yiddish 
emphasizes the Jewish creation and audience of the photographs’ status as types. It seems to 
make a joke of biological, racial typology.226 
Much like DuBois’s images, the Forverts’s “types of Jewish women” represent variation, 
proliferation, and adaptation to modernity. The series itself even enacted a temporal unfolding as 
each new collection of photographs came to print. So too, even though these photographic 
“types” are dubiously scientific or biological, they rely on the visual codes and photographic 
vocabulary that served racial typology. If, as I have argued thus far in the chapter, labelling a 
photograph as a “Jewish type” performs significant work in framing how that image ought to be 
read, then these photographs, too, invoke and initiate that process of typological sight—even if 
the photographs themselves seem to resist such reading.  
Indeed, these images stand in juxtaposition to other photography series concurrently 
published in the Sunday Arts section. These included a collection called “Types of Jewish Life,” 
with ethnographic images of Jews on the Lower East Side, Jews in Palestine, and Jews in 
European shtetlakh (the section also published ethnographic images of non-Jews in far-flung 
places like Scandinavia). In the Jewish ethnographic series, images of “old time Jews” also 
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participate in the photographic typological discourse, and emphasize the relative modernity of 
the women in the Jewish women feature. The juxtaposition between these sets of images echoes 
the dichotomy of the “Modern Jew” versus “Ancient Jew,” which so fascinated Galton, Jacobs, 
and many other racial thinkers. As such, the “Tipn fun yidishe froyen” series asserts the women’s 
modernity, their individuality, and their variability, not only through irony—they also assert 
these things through a contrast to other Jewish typological images. The “types of Jewish women” 
spoof typological vocabulary and processes, yet do not seek to undermine them. The photo series 
exemplifies the paradoxes and challenges of attempting to bend racial typology through adopting 
typology’s own operations. 
Similar attempts extended beyond the photographic medium. Works across many forms 
can activate typological framing or visual operations, even in spite of stated intentions to 
dispense of types. Take for instance the book of drawings, etchings, and paintings by the artist 
Lionel Reiss, titled, My Models Were Jews (1938).227 So persistent was the question of a Jewish 
visual type, that the first section, which includes pictorial depictions of Jewish faces, is titled, “Is 
There a Jewish Type?” And, so closely was this question of Jewish visual distinctiveness 
associated with the science of race, that the section’s introduction is written by none other than 
Franz Boas (whose answer to the question of a Jewish type, is, in a word: no). Boas explains that 
“The term Jewish race is a misnomer,” and the brief introduction invites readers to compare the 
differences between the drawings that follow—the assimilated American Jew to the Bokharan 
Jewish workman, for instance—to see that there is no common Jewish type.228 Oddly enough, 
Boas’s invitation to assess and compare the different images of faces echoes the sort of 
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instructions that Jacobs provides for viewers to see the essential Jewish gaze in Jewish 
photographic types, and in fact facilitates a typological process of looking for replication or 
deviation of an ideal. Reiss’s medium was not photographic, but his project of traveling and 
recording Jewish subjects was evidently ethnographic. He set out in 1921 to make “a graphic 
history of the Jew, first in a series of portrait studies and second, in the recording of memorable 
landmarks both old and new.”229 These portraits were meant to show individuality and variety 
among Jews rather than a single type. For Reiss, these drawn images are also intended to serve as 
a “graphic history,” and he suggests that the collection of portraits drawn over roughly a decade 
could record “forty centuries of the Diaspora.”230 Even if these images are framed as a 
counterpoint to Jewish typicality, Reiss’s confidence that he could represent a vast historical 
scope in the drawings of several dozen Jewish faces suggests, albeit ironically, the influence of 
typology and the biological imagination.  
Such an irony is also shot through Fishberg’s 1911 scientific argument against “the 
Jewish type” with which I opened this chapter. Fishberg may deny a single, indelible Jewish 
type, yet he illustrates his argument using photographs of Jews labelled as “types.” In fact, 
Fishberg’s preliminary digest of sub-topics for his “Jewish Types” chapter reveals the particular 
manner in which he argues for the plurality of Jewish types, including, “The Sephardi type of 
Jews—The Ashkenazi type of Jews—The Slavonic type—The Turanian type—The Teutonic 
type—The Mongoloid type—The Negroid type—Other types of Jews.”231 Fishberg’s list of key 
terms presents the author’s concern over the multiplicity or uniformity of the Jewish type(s). He 
 
229 Reiss, My Models Were Jews, 13. 
230 Reiss, 13. 
231 Fishberg, The Jews, 90. 
 103 
casts his theory of acquired, and therefore inconstant, Jewish physical types through what he sees 
as stable types (for instance, he sometimes describes representations of Jewish lips as “negroid”). 
He does not make his argument over and against typological knowledge; he instead carries out 
his argument against the Jewish type through typological knowledge. Describing the Sephardic 
type, Ashkenazi type, as well as Mongoloid type, Teutonic type, and Negroid type, Fishberg 
wishes to disabuse us of the notion that there exists a uniform, static Jewish type, yet not so 
much to free us of the framework of types or typology.232  
Looking to Fictional Types, Looking Ahead 
In the next chapter, I will examine how the concept of racial type is expressed in Yiddish 
and Jewish American fiction in the 1940s. The leap in time marks a shift in attitudes about the 
science of race and the racial aspect of Jewishness in American culture. Between the 1910s when 
Cahan’s fictional character showed, “by concrete example, the minute workings of that 
wonderful machine, the Jewish brain,”233 and the 1940s when the novels The Family Carnovsky 
(1940-1/1943), Focus (1945), and Gentleman’s Agreement (1947) dramatized and critiqued the 
idea of a Jewish type, a counter-discourse spearheaded by Boas attempted to challenge the 
essentializing race science of the late nineteenth century, and began to label race science more 
broadly as pseudoscience. Nonetheless, the scientifically invested novels of the 1940s that I 
explore in the following chapter attest to the looming remains of race science within these 
authors’ biological imaginations. That these authors all address American antisemitism through 
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the concept of racial type—in a manner, I will argue, that is informed by visuality—is a reaction 
to race science’s deadly implementation under the Nazi regime.   
Yet scientific Jewish racialization had material and political stakes in the United States as 
well. American eugenics’ influence—whether overt or spectral—did not diminish entirely in 
these intervening decades. In 1918, when Boas was elected president of American 
Anthropological Association, the eugenicist Madison Grant and other proponents of racial 
anthropology formed an alternative association, the Galton Society of America, which would be 
free of what they dubbed “Jewish science.”234 It is no coincidence that Jewish scientists (like 
Boas and Fishberg, who were themselves immigrants from Europe) were so tightly associated 
with the challenge to American race science. After all, eugenicists often took Jewish immigrants 
as their target.235 The United States’ Immigration Act of 1924, which restricted immigration from 
all Asian countries entirely, and limited immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe 
(effectively ending the era of mass Jewish immigration to the United States) is one monumental 
testament to the place of eugenics in American society. And, it should be noted, Grant’s The 
Passing of the Great Race (1916), which synthesized and promoted American race science, was 
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the intellectual backbone of that legislation, and was invoked often in the drafting and debating 
of the 1924 law.236  
Jewish American literary production in that same decade—and around the same time that 
the Forverts photo series was published—re-worked the concept of the “type” in fiction as well. 
Perhaps most notably, in the 1920s, Anzia Yezierska challenged the essentializing, social 
scientific gaze in her melodramatic, often ironic, works about the lives of Russian Jewish 
immigrants in New York City.237 Many of her short stories represent the demeaning and 
demoralizing interactions between Jewish immigrants and the aid workers at various charitable 
institutions that functioned in their neighborhoods. Often in her fiction, romances between 
uptown patrician men and the poor Jewish women of the Lower East Side are complicated by the 
men merely seeing the women as racial or scientific “types.”238  
As we saw previously in Fishberg’s citation and discussion of Zangwill, the concept of 
the Jewish type in both scientific and literary discourse is mutually constitutive and mutually 
significant. In other words, we can understand the “Jewish type” as a site of exchange (rather 
than one-way influence) between scientific and literary discourses. Perhaps most significantly, 
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because the typological discourse outlined in this chapter is invested in temporality—a process 
of seeing through time, which takes place in time—it is well suited to narrative treatment. The 
focus on temporality and historical representation appears in the Zangwill passage as well, as he 
writes of the Jewish faces, “One can only say negatively that these faces are not Christian. Is it 
the stamp of a longer, more complex heredity? Is it the brand of suffering?”239 This question 
about the relationship between a non-Christian (i.e. Jewish) history stamped on individuals’ faces 
is, according to Fishberg, “asked justly.” When they suggest that the toll of Jewish history can be 
read on the faces of Jewish people, they—again, however ironically—produce a rather 
paradigmatic example of Jewish typological discourse. As the next chapter illustrates, many 
fictional portrayals of Jewish typology render similarly vexed critiques of typology, which stand 
as especially ambivalent expressions of biological imagination within postwar American culture.
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Chapter 4 “Mestn mit durkhdringlekhe oygn”/Measuring with Penetrating Eyes: 
Contesting Typological Sight in 1940s Jewish American Fiction 
 
In July 1945, the Baltimore Sun reported a story called, “Nuremberg Code Unearthed: 
Jewish Yank Discovers Law Aimed at His Race.”240 The article tells of a Jewish G.I. from 
Baltimore named Martin E. Dannenberg, Jr., who along with another American soldier 
discovered the signed document of the Nuremberg Laws, hidden in a bank vault in the German 
town of Eichstatt. This other G.I., Fritz (Frank) L. Perls was German-born, from a family of 
prominent art dealers, and served as an interpreter for the U.S. army. Perls is, according to most 
accounts, a German Jew, but he was also baptized as a Protestant; nonetheless, under the 
Nuremberg Laws, he and his family were classified as Jews by blood, and he eventually fled to 
the United States.241 The infamous 1935 laws, also known as “The Law for the Safeguarding of 
German Blood and Honor,” stripped German Jews of civic rights and established legal 
definitions of Jewish and German blood. The law accordingly prevented Jewish households from 
hiring German domestic workers, and restricted marriage between individuals based on their 
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degree of Jewish descent (meaning, number of Jewish grandparents), effectively codifying into 
law Jews’ racial status. 
What was novel about this news story was not so much the American discovery of the 
law’s contents—that was already well known and reported on in the American press. Rather, 
there is a great deal of symbolic weight placed on the individuals who recovered the physical 
document, because it contained “a Nazi race law responsible for the death or exile of hundreds of 
thousands of German Jews.”242 Dannenberg, the Baltimorean Jewish G.I. is reported saying, 
“Ironical that I and a guy named Perls should be the ones to discover it.” Dannenberg assigns 
meaning to his fellow G.I.’s name as a sign that readers of the Sun are assumed to understand: “a 
guy named Perls” meant a Jew, someone who also would be—and in fact was—impacted by this 
“Law Aimed at His Race.” The article reminds readers that in Germany, this code would render 
them both second-class citizens, or worse, but in America, they are lauded as army heroes. 
This is a story whose own telling brandishes not only historical irony, but also American 
moral triumph in the act of excavation.243 The American victors’ seeking out and unearthing the 
German race code implicitly underscores the United States’ official opposition to Germany’s 
legalistic, scientific racism.244 (At the same time, as historians have suggested, the relation 
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between American and German racial-civic projects were closely intertwined; the Germans 
learned from, and even saw fit to tamper down, American race policies, especially those aimed at 
Black Americans, when they crafted the Nuremberg Laws.245)  
While this Baltimore Sun story sets out to distinguish the United States from Nazi 
Germany, stories of unearthing and exposing antisemitism within the United States would 
become a significant narrative model in 1940s American culture. Novels following this mold 
dared American readers to see the similarities between their own beliefs and those attributed to 
the Nazis. To do so, American novels suggested that scientific, racial antisemitism in the United 
States was present yet buried—and therefore must be uncovered. As Laura Z. Hobson writes in 
Gentleman’s Agreement (1947), to discuss or deal with American antisemitism was to “get at 
something arcane and buried.”246 That novel’s larger aim of exposure hinged on illuminating the 
relationship between anti-Semitic prejudice and newly discredited race science. Such a strategy 
was possible because in the 1940s, “The residual scheme of distinct ‘white races’ still had 
significant purchase on popular ideology and perception,” as Matthew Frye Jacobson writes.247 
Thus, the notion of a Jewish race was treated as something that could be dug up from the 
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Hobson was writing in the 1940s, the residual scheme of distinct ‘white races’ still had significant purchase on 
popular ideology and perception.” Jacobson, “Becoming Caucasian,” 96. 
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recesses of the reader’s mind, pieced back together, and presented in narrative form. For many 
authors of anti-antisemitism novels, uncovering anti-Jewish prejudice and exposing the folly of 
race science amounted to one and the same goal. 
This chapter analyzes three American-penned novels of the 1940s, which engage with the 
biologically based antisemitism of the Holocaust in more or less explicit ways. These novels are 
Di mispokhe karnovski/The Family Carnovsky (1940-1) by Israel Joshua Singer, Focus (1945) by 
Arthur Miller, and Gentleman’s Agreement (1947) by Laura Z. Hobson.248 These works do not 
constitute what might usually be described as “Holocaust literature”—they include no references 
to concentration camps or the numbers murdered—but they are all reactions to the Holocaust and 
responses to Nazi racism. Each of these novels employ strikingly different literary techniques, 
suited to their respective audiences: Family Carnovsky is a panoramic family saga, notably in 
Yiddish; Focus is a short, raw, and surreal novel of moral transformation; and Gentleman’s 
Agreement is a social realist and sentimental “problem novel.” Among these, Focus and 
Gentleman’s Agreement have sometimes served as seemingly natural counterparts for critics, 
with Hobson’s bestselling, decidedly middlebrow novel often receiving unfavorable readings 
relative to Miller’s more experimental work.249 Despite thematic similarities, analyses of these 
novels hardly ever reference Singer’s Yiddish novel written only several years prior, because it 
only appeared in English translation in 1969. All of these novels, in one way or another, have 
 
248 There are a number of other literary constellations in which we could place these novels. For instance, a similarly 
surreal sense of unease courses through Saul Bellow’s The Victim (1947), which also takes place during the 
sweltering tension of a New York summer; Bernard Malamud’s The Assistant (1957), like Focus, closes with a 
conversion of sorts; both of these post-war novels also play with the complex phenomenon of Jewish identification, 
antisemitism, and suffering. And of course, these authors are perhaps more often seen as Miller’s contemporaries 
and peers. 
249 Rachel Gordan, “Laura Z. Hobson and the Making of Gentleman’s Agreement,” Studies in American Jewish 
Literature 34, no. 2 (2015): 242 Such unfavorable comparisons in no small part reflect that Hobson’s novel does not 
fit the masculine, highly intellectual image that tends to define midcentury Jewish American fiction. 
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fallen critically and popularly out of vogue, in accordance with changing cultural expectations of 
how anti-racist art should conceptualize Jewish or racial difference. However, they provide 
meaningful insight into the importance of biological inheritance and race science in literary 
critiques of Jewish racialization crafted in the midst of, or in the direct shadow of, the Holocaust. 
They all represent the possibility that fiction can portray—or even activate—the reforming of the 
biological imagination. 
Comparing English and Yiddish texts from this period comes with some critical baggage. 
The conclusion of World War II and the year 1945 is deeply ingrained as a watershed moment in 
cultural, historical, and literary accounts of the United States and modern Jewry both. However, 
this chapter does not accept a sharp “before/after” distinction in this year, especially with regards 
to the Yiddish language. I do not promote the idea that Yiddish “died” in the Holocaust. Nor do I 
wish to reproduce a mythical trajectory of English-language Jewish literature following, and then 
replacing, Yiddish literature in the postwar United States—even though the plot of the Yiddish 
novel I’ll be analyzing mostly unfolds in Europe before and during World War II, and the two 
English novels narrate stories either at the end of, or after, World War II.250 As scholars have 
shown, Yiddish authors especially were already reacting to the Holocaust (called der khurbn in 
Yiddish, or “the destruction”) well before the war’s end—even before it became known as “the 
Holocaust.”251 Yet Miller and Hobson, too, began writing their novels during World War II, 
 
250 In fact, that myth would likely posit Yiddish already irrelevant by 1940. For a full study on the overlapping, 
simultaneous, literary production in Yiddish and English that took place in the United States during the Holocaust, 
see Anita Norich, Discovering Exile. Norich contents that, “Yiddish and Anglo-Jewish culture are, indeed, often 
remarkably different but…they overlap more frequently and more significantly than is commonly supposed” (4). 
Anita Norich, Discovering Exile : Yiddish and Jewish American Culture during the Holocaust, Stanford Studies in 
Jewish History and Culture (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
251 David G. Roskies, Against the Apocalypse: Responses to Catastrophe in Modern Jewish Culture (Syracuse 
University Press, 1999); Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The Holocaust and the Historians (Harvard University Press, 1981); 
Deborah E. Lipstadt, Holocaust: An American Understanding (Rutgers University Press, 2016). 
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suggesting an overlapping, if not entirely simultaneous response on behalf of the authors. Indeed, 
the comparison of these three novels can even blur what is sometimes seen as an overly precise 
shift between pre- and post-war historical moments. While the novels might each respond to 
similar historical and cultural contexts differently, in no small part reflecting unique audiences 
and reader cultures, I position these three texts as relative contemporaries. 
Significant narrative strategies and critical stances bind the novels together. In order to 
challenge a scientific basis for antisemitism, each novel contests the authority of racial visuality. 
This chapter builds upon the previous chapter’s analysis of the practices around creating 
photographic Jewish types. While the scientific study of racial types decreased in prominence by 
the 1940s, traces of the vocabulary, the assumptions, and the visual processes of looking at 
people as types remained in use, enough to be dramatized and manipulated in these literary 
works. In these novels of the 1940s, the ambiguous visible distinctiveness of Jewish bodies was 
explicitly articulated and imagined through the theories, tropes, and images of biological 
inheritance. Therefore, this chapter illustrates how—and to what effect—each novel takes up 
race science, and the idea of a visual “Jewish type” in particular, as central to their critiques of 
antisemitism on either side of this “1945 divide.” These novels all similarly critique racial 
typology by dramatizing the visual process that it engenders. To do so, they reproduce many of 
the central themes introduced in the discourse of Jewish photographic typology, such as the 
power of the Jewish gaze, the evidence of an inherited Jewish history in the Jewish face, and the 
visual concealment, obfuscation, or ambiguity of Jewishness. Likewise, because the protagonists 
in Focus and Gentleman’s Agreement are in fact not Jewish, and because the Jewish- and 
German-descended Jegor in Family Carnovsky is of an ambiguous “type,” these novels highlight 
the ability of typology to produce Jewish types, rather than apprehend them. 
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While all of these novels present Jewish typology and racial antisemitism as ultimately 
worthy of rebuke, their particular contexts precipitated vastly different approaches to the idea 
that scientifically based antisemitism might be “buried” and in need of “unearthing.” So too, the 
fact of whether an author published for an exclusively Jewish, transnational audience in Yiddish 
as the war unfolded (Singer), or for an American audience in English after the war’s end (Miller 
and Hobson) can begin to account for each author’s willingness to inhabit a typological mode, or 
to dramatize typology’s processes. These historical and audience contexts also help to make 
sense of the specific narrative tenor in which each novel presents its dismantling of race 
science—whether as tragedy or triumph—and what new form of biological imagination it offers 
up instead.  
The Yiddish-language Family Carnovsky (serialized beginning in 1940) is deeply imbued 
with biological and medical knowledge, and typological description. Its critique of race science 
coincides with crisis, or at the very least, a sense of loss. The notion of a bodily, inherent, 
inherited Jewishness might seem appealing or fitting for Singer’s secular Jewish cultural project 
in Yiddish; yet Singer’s literary and political sensibilities reject any sort of ideological, 
intellectual, or political salvation. By contrast, no loss is associated with the demise of a 
biologically heritable Jewishness in the works of assimilated, second-generation Jewish 
American authors like Miller and Hobson, writing for a broad American audience. And yet, in 
the English-language Focus, Miller, like Singer, ventriloquizes scientifically articulated 
antisemitism and dramatizes the typological process that “produces” Jews, before the central 
anti-Semitic character undergoes a transcendent change of heart and rejects all distinctions based 
on origin or descent. Gentleman’s Agreement attempts to display and dismantle antisemitism and 
explicitly invokes science in order to deny a Jewish racial type. Hobson’s novel, then, is more 
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invested in dramatizing the process of un-learning typology than dramatizing its enactment. Yet 
Hobson’s protagonist, too, like those in Family Carnovsky, continues to re-imagine Jewish 
inheritance or the Jewish body through biology. Each of the three novels narrates the re-
disciplining of characters’ own biological imagination. Not merely responding to cultural or 
scientific changes, these works of fiction instead enact a cultural shift in the understanding of 
Jews’ biological racialization. 
America’s Penetrating Gaze  
All three of the novels narrate a well-recorded historical phenomenon, which is not 
always described as expressly rooted in biology or race science: anti-Jewish hiring 
discrimination. And more specifically, the practice of facial and name scrutiny within it. The 
occasion of an interviewer scrutinizing a Jewish job seeker’s face and name is a key trope of 
early twentieth-century American antisemitism—both historically and in the literary 
imagination—wherein “the nose” and “the name” would be treated as the two main loci of 
Jewish identification.252 Name changing surfaces in each of the novels discussed in this chapter: 
in Family Carnovsky, Joachim Georg (Jegor)  Holbeck Carnovsky eventually abandons the 
Jewish-sounding, “Carnovsky” and uses only the Germanic “Holbeck;” in Focus there is great 
turmoil caused in the protagonist’s office when a woman named Miss Kapp is hired and the boss 
suspects that she was born with a name like “Kapinsky or something;” and in Gentleman’s 
Agreement, the protagonist is shocked to learn that his secretary Elaine Wales was rejected from 
the post she currently holds when she initially applied to work in the company under her given 
 
252 Unlike passing, where an individual hides their true identity and claims another, the act of covering manages an 
identity to make it less obtrusive without denying it. For Irving Goffman, both “change in name and change in nose 
shape” served as the two examples of “covering.” Goffman, qtd. in Kirsten Fermaglich, A Rosenberg by Any Other 
Name: A History of Jewish Name Changing in America (NYU Press, 2018), 86–87. 
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name, Estelle Walovsky.253 I am by no means the first to observe this widespread literary 
representation of name changing, yet I wish to emphasize this phenomenon’s relationship to 
scientized facial scrutiny. Specifically, in all of the aforementioned fictional examples, name- 
and face-scrutiny is dramatized through a process identifiable with racial typology.  
In these stories, the changed Jewish name obfuscates Jewishness through language. It 
then becomes the onlooker’s mandate to enact a process of typological looking. The very notion 
that the changed name should be able to mask Jewishness clashes with a presumption of 
immediately visible physical distinctiveness. We find this dynamic most prominently in Focus, 
where the protagonist’s vocation is hiring, and his work amounts to discerning Jew from gentile. 
So too, Family Carnovsky presents a brief yet revealing scene in an American employment office 
once the main cast of German Jewish characters lands in the United States. The character Jegor 
observes the following: 
“He knew from the people in line that they were strict about names and faith in employment 
offices, even though no one said this. He saw it both in the glances from the blonde women who 
measured everyone up with penetrating eyes, and from the embarrassed glances of the black-
eyed and black-haired job seekers, who uttered their Jewish names reluctantly, knowing ahead of 
time that nothing would come of this.” (amended translation)254 
 
 
253 Furthermore, as part of the novel’s journalistic investigation, Phil and his secretary, Elaine Wales, send out 
applications for jobs and inquiries to stay at hotels. They are hardly surprised to find that “Green” is welcomed more 
kindly than “Greenberg.” This has clear biographical resonance for Hobson, who never published under her family 
name, Zametkin. Even before marrying publisher Francis Thayer Hobson, she published under the last name, 
“Mount,” which belonged to a boyfriend of hers. Gordan, “Laura Z. Hobson and the Making of Gentleman’s 
Agreement,” 244. 
254 “Er hot shoyn gevust fun di mentshn in der rey, az men iz shtark medakdek vegn nemen un gloybn in di arbet-
biyuroen, khotsh men zogt es nisht. er hot es gezen say in di blikn fun di blonde meydelekh, velkhe mestn yedn op 
mit durkhdringlekhe oygn, say fun di farshemte blikn fun di shvartsoygike un shvartzhorike arbets-zukher, vos zogn 
aroys zeyer yidishe nemen mit halb moyl, visndik foroys, az es vet gornit aroyskumen derfun.” Israel Joshua Singer, 
Di Mishpohe Karnovski: Roman (New York: Matones, 1943), 485; The English translation by Joseph Singer reads 
that Jegor notices, “how important last names and religion were in seeking work. He saw it in the eyes of the girls 
who closely studied the applicants and from the embarrassed glances of the dark-haired Jews who spoke their names 
quietly and reluctantly, as if afraid to offend” Israel Joshua Singer, The Family Carnovsky, trans. Joseph Singer 
(New York: Vanguard Press, 1969), 383 For the rest of the chapter, I will reference J. Singer’s translation, unless 
noted as my own, “amended translation.” 
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On the one hand, this scene illustrates the tactics of identifying Jews through typology in the 
United States, which differs little from what the characters faced in Germany in the late 1930s. 
On the other hand, it also demonstrates the contrasting mores around articulating such 
discernments within each national culture. Americans might attest opposition to outright 
antisemitism, such as when Jegor’s school principal tells him that anti-Semitic race theories 
“have no place in an American school.”255 Unlike German antisemitism, which explicitly names 
the Jewish race as an enemy of the nation, Jegor witnesses in the employment office what 
historians of the period have described as a “genteel,” or “social” (as opposed to legal) 
antisemitism—a “gentleman’s agreement” that excludes those that the law will not. Nonetheless, 
this scene highlights a visual practice in the penetrating, measuring eyes of the employment 
officers and in the embarrassed glances of the Jewish job seekers. The very language used to 
describe the women’s eyes, which all at once “glance,” “penetrate,” and “measure” is 
reminiscent of Allan Sekula’s theorization of Francis Galton’s composite photographic types, 
which he argues combine the “desire to look” with the “desire to measure” Jewish faces.256 The 
scene highlights not only the physical differences between the employment officers and the job 
seekers, but also the silent typological process of visual scrutiny enacted between them. Singer’s 
novel portrays American antisemitism as unspoken, yet manifest—and facilitated by the 
typological process of looking.  
I will repeatedly return to this trope throughout the chapter, because in both Focus and 
Gentleman’s Agreement face- and name-scrutiny come to be of great consequence for the 
novels’ plots. The scenes that engage this trope in each novel also dramatize key elements of 
 
255 Singer, The Family Carnovsky, 338. 
256 Sekula, “The Body and The Archive,” 367. 
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typology. In my reading, these scenes, which present the United States’ mythically benign or 
buried anti-Semitic practices, are in fact moments of biological imagination as well; they are 
moments that display the imbrication of the scientific and the social or cultural. These 
interactions, like the photographic encounters of the previous chapter, constitute the creation of 
Jewish types, based in visuality, and based in purported scientific knowledge. 
The Family Saga, with a Difference 
I. J. Singer’s novel Di mishpokhe karnovski/The Family Carnovsky stands as one of 
twentieth-century Jewish literature’s most scathing critiques of antisemitism in Europe. The 
multi-generational saga follows the Carnovsky family over the course of three generations, from 
Poland to Germany and eventually to the United States, as the Nazis rise to power. In the first 
generation, David Carnovsky is a maskil (adherent of the Jewish enlightenment, the haskalah) 
and is devoted to shedding his “Eastern” Jewish, Yiddish background upon moving to Berlin. He 
is dedicated to a German brand of Judaism and Jewishness that is both decorous and scholarly. 
The novel is propelled into motion when David flees to Berlin in search of what he imagines to 
be more enlightened minds and for a chance to fully realize Y.L. Gordon’s axiom, to live as a 
“Jew in the home and a man on the street.” Yet the novel continuously complicates this idea. As 
one character puts it, “The fact is we have been gentiles in the house and Jews in the street.” 257  
The implication here is that they will be “Jews in the street” so long as others in society label 
them and treat them as “Jews.” This line anticipates Sartre’s thesis (published in 1946) that the 
anti-Semite makes the Jew, as well as the novel’s scenes of producing Jews through types (these 
 
257 Singer, The Family Carnovsky, 160. 
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scenes are key to the novel’s thesis about the ultimate failure of the haskalah’s promise for Jews 
in Europe). 
In the second generation of the novel, David’s son Georg fights in World War I and 
becomes a well-regarded physician. Yet he cuts ties with his father when he marries a Christian 
German woman, Teresa Holbeck. The third generation is Georg’s son, Joachim Georg (Jegor) 
Holbeck Carnovsky, who is a grotesque embodiment of Jewish self-hatred: the character 
becomes obsessed with German racial fantasies espoused by his Christian German uncle and the 
“New Order.” The novel thus presents generation after generation of Carnovsky men turning 
away from their families and Jewish tradition culminating in a virulent anti-Semite. In the end, 
the entire Carnovsky family flees Germany for the United States after the rise of the Third Reich. 
The novel closes with Jegor violently killing a Nazi operative in New York and then shooting 
himself just outside of his parents’ apartment.258 As the novel closes, Georg attends to his son’s 
wounds, unsure if he will survive.  
Singer wrote The Family Carnovsky in the United States, and began publishing it serially 
in the Forverts from 1940-1, in the midst of the catastrophes enveloping European Jewry.259 The 
history of the novel’s composition and publication is reflected in the three sections, which are 
altogether uneven in length, tone, and theme. Singer’s multigenerational saga can be understood 
as a composite representation of its own sort (described by Elvira Grözinger as a “triptych”).260 In 
 
258 This is possibly a figuration inspired by Otto Weinniger, the influential author who pathologized Jewishness and 
Jewish self-hatred. Sander L. Gilman, Jewish Self-Hatred : Antisemitism and the Hidden Language of the Jews 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 293–94. 
259 The novel was published in book form in 1943. 
260 Elvira Grözinger, “Between Literature and History : Israel Joshua Singer’s Berlin Novel The Family Carnovsky 
as a Cul-de-Sac of the German-Jewish ‘Symbiosis,’” in Yiddish in Weimar Berlin: At the Crossroads of Diaspora 
Politics and Culture, ed. Gennady Estraikh and Mikhail Krutikov (Routledge, 2017), 224, 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351193672-13; See also: Malka Magenta-Shaked, “Singer and the Family Saga Novel 
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the style and scope of Russian realist novels, Family Carnovsky presents a panoramic view of 
Jews’ varying degrees of assimilation and alienation in Berlin in the early twentieth century. It 
also inhabits and dramatizes the various ideologies that governed their world as the third-person 
omniscient narration shifts focalization among an assortment of characters.261 In a novel noted by 
many scholars to be highly schematic, many characters take on allegorical or archetypal roles, 
fully embodying a single ideology. Indeed, in reviews of Singer’s work, the extent to which 
Singer was a realist (he rejected the hegemony of social realism in European Yiddish literature) 
or a modernist was much contested, and this question circled around his presentation of 
characters. As Norich has noted, Yiddish critics tended to see Singer as a modernist because of 
his representation of psychological depth, whereas reviewers of his books in English translation 
tended to view the characters as shallow, and instead valued the author’s fictional representations 
of a lost world.262 The characters in Family Carnovsky, while allowed varied motivations and 
deep internality, hardly ever surprise.263 Therefore, while Singer uses many of the tools of 
realism, the allegorical nature of the text seems instead rather opposed to it.  
The novel’s nearly allegorical construction and its use of “character types” is complicated 
by the fact that the vocabulary of German race science courses throughout the text as well. The 
text repeatedly exhibits the German construction of, “the ‘Jewish body’ as a cultural and 
 
in Jewish Literature,” Prooftexts 9, no. 1 (1989): 27–42 Magenta-Shaked notes that a spate of Jewish family sagas 
were published in response to the Holocaust. 
261 The novel’s composition resembles yet does not quite fulfill the ideal of “heteroglossia” as delineated by Mikhail 
Bakhtin. (Bakhtin’s idea of heteroglossia is meant to explain a novel free of ideological pull.) Nevertheless, this 
terminology remains useful. M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays (University of Texas Press, 
2010), 262–63. 
262 Norich, The Homeless Imagination in the Fiction of Israel Joshua Singer, 5–6. 
263 E.M. Forster describes the difference between a “round” character and a “flat” character as the ability to surprise. 
He gives the Russian novel, War and Peace as an example of a work inhabited by all round characters. E. M. 
Forster, Aspects of the Novel (Rosetta Books, 2010). 
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scientific idea,” which as John M. Efron has described it, became a site for the German public to 
construct an idea of their own—of course healthy—national body by contrast.264 The novel’s 
anti-Semitic German characters pathologize Jewishness, describing the “Baccilus Judaeus,” 
whose mission is to “ravage the healthy German body.”265 Yet their anti-Semitic scientific 
language incorporates typology as well, such as the idea of a “Negroid-Semitic type” (negrish-
semetisher tip), which stands in opposition to the “Nordic type” (norrdisher tip).266 Even as the 
novel critiques the political instrumentalization of race science, its Jewish characters are also 
deeply invested in race science and the biological study of inheritance. This is especially true of 
the physician Georg, who often associates gentile paleness with sickliness, even extending this 
notion to his own son’s “shtark hele [very pale]” complexion: “He found people of this type not 
only sickly and of poor recuperative powers, but oddly prone to fantasy, superstition, and 
romanticism.”267 Significantly, while I am arguing that this passage (in which Georg considers 
“people of this [pale] type”) fits within a typological logic, the very word “type” only appears in  
the English version. In the Yiddish original they are merely referred to repeatedly as “zey,” 
meaning “they” or “them.” Therefore, “zey,” functions as a subject and as an object, both 
grammatically and conceptually. This dual subject-object “zey” allows for the othering—literally 
objectifying—work of designating a type. 
 
264 Efron writes, “One feature of such was the manner by which the construction of the pathological Jewish body 
became a site of political, national, and cultural contestation. For the Germans used elaborate descriptions of the 
Jewish body (by definition, it was defective) to describe their own physical state.” John M. Efron, Medicine and the 
German Jews: A History, viii, 343 p. (New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press, 2001), 4–5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/. 
265 Singer, The Family Carnovsky, 194. 
266 Singer, Di Mishpohe Karnovski: Roman, 287–88. 
267 Singer, The Family Carnovsky, 186. 
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Race science and racial typology structure the novel’s characterizations in its third-person 
narration as well. From the very outset, the novel incorporates the logic and language of 
typologies. For instance, the novel opens with a description of the typical Carnovsky face: “high 
scholarly foreheads,” “deep-set and restless black eyes,” and “powerful, oversized noses that 
jutted from their lean, bony faces.”268 From the outset, we are supposed to see these physical 
traits as evidence of their character: “Their genius was reflected” in their foreheads, and 
“stubbornness and contrariness exuded from their noses.” Not only is this a text deeply attentive 
to the bodies of its characters, but it is especially invested in the physiognomic coordination of 
face and character, or the idea of a visible inheritance.  
The novel’s (admittedly indelicate) typological descriptions of characters reflect the 
equivalently indelicate and blunt racialized view that others in the story-world hold of them. 
Georg is always described as “dark,” “black,” and “swarthy” by characters and the narrator alike. 
The narrator calls his young classmates, “hel-bakike” (literally, pale cheeked) and Georg, 
“broyn-bakike” (literally, brown cheeked);269 the children note this distinction as well, calling 
him animal names, shouting “black raven!” and “black ape!”270 However, it is the omniscient 
narrator who, through access to the internal and external world of the novel’s characters, 
authoritatively verifies that there is indeed a connection between his internal and external type. 
While the narrator ironizes the children’s taunts to emphasize their cruelty, it also often describes 
him as an animalistic and crude stereotype.271 Later, when Georg first meets his mother-in-law, 
 
268 Singer, 3. 
269 Singer, Di Mishpohe Karnovski: Roman, 26. 
270 Singer, 27. 
271 As the novel describes the physical embodiment of Georg’s fierce character, it limns a crude racist stereotype of a 
harsh, animalistic brute. His face is described as, “With flaming black eyes spitting fire, with blushing brown cheeks 
and with large teeth—a bit too large and not straight, but very white and strong—which looked out from his quite 
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she immediately identifies his “sharp darkness [sharfe tunklekeit],” and feels shame at his 
medical gaze upon her; she recalls an optician she once knew in whom, “She had seen his entire 
race: black, talkative, clever, smart, sly…” (amended translation). 272 Her view of the medical 
gaze is typically Jewish.273 The novel thus offers no respite from racist determinations or 
typological sight. Instead, it models typological thinking. 
Narrating the Typological Process 
The Family Carnovsky presents its most striking critique of German race science when it 
narrates characters engaging in the typological process of looking. In fact, this process comes to 
shape the two most significant scenes in the novel (arguably the climaxes of Books 2 and 3). In 
these scenes, characters perform the visual operations of typology, reminiscent of the strategies 
employed in the photographic types discussed in the previous chapter: they come to see elements 
of Jewish history and racial essence, visible in the Jewish face; they also employ typology 
precisely because of the ambiguity or obfuscation of Jewish physical distinctiveness. 
Jegor, the subject of the family saga’s third generation, presents a crisis of typology for 
its characters. Georg and Teresa’s son Jegor is described as a “mixture of his two strains” (in 
Yiddish, it is tszvey tsdodim, or two sides): physically carrying the dark hair of the Jewish 
 
red and quite full lips…” (amended translation). “Mit tseflamte shvarts oygn, vos shitn fayer, mit ongeroytlte broyne 
bakn un mit groyse tseyn, abisl tsu groyse un nisht glaykhe, ober zeyer vayse un shtarke, vos kukn aroys durkh hipsh 
royte un hipsh fule lipn…” (Israel Joshua Singer 29). Georg’s large, strong, crooked teeth which gape out of his full 
lips seem even more sinister in contrast to the blond boys whom he bosses around and the “…girls with stiff braids 
and freckled, tender necks” (amended translation). “…meydlekh mit shtayfe tseplekh un bashpreklte veykhe 
heldzlekh” (29). 
272 Singer, Di Mishpohe Karnovski: Roman, 171. 
273 Gilman, The Jew’s Body, Gilman points out the complexity of the Jewish medical gaze: “How can the image of 
the healer be the same as the image of the patient? How can the gaze which is pathological also be the gaze which 
helps diagnose in order to cure?” The Jewish medical gaze is thus not only paradigmatic, but also paradoxical: an 
objective scientific gaze that is also pathological. 
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Carnovskys and the blue eyes of the pale, German Holbecks.274 He presents a typological 
mystery for his family, challenging their presumptions about the typological relationship 
between facial phenotype and inherited essence. The repeated attempts to determine Jegor’s type 
come to a head when his biology teacher and headmaster, Dr. Kirchenmeier brings the teenaged 
Jegor to the front of a school assembly in order to demonstrate Nazi race theories on him as a 
live subject. (This climactic scene of typological construction becomes a turning point in Jegor’s 
life and causes the Carnovsky family to flee Germany.) Dr. Kirchenmeier has Jegor stand in 
front of a large audience of students, government officials, and journalists, as an example of a 
“mongrel,” whose physical characteristics exhibit the way that the “Negroid-Semitic type” 
(negrish-semetisher tip) can overpower the “Nordic type” (norrdisher tip).275  
Kirchenmeier’s typological treatment of Jegor suggests that one’s first glance is not 
sufficient: rather than an immediate relationship between seeing and knowing, he instructs the 
students in an extended process of looking. He begins the lecture by measuring Jegor’s skull, the 
area between his eyes and his ears, and compares his skull type to that of an ape. Kirchenmeier 
tells the large audience, “It may occur at first glance that the subject resembles the Nordic type, 
but this impression is strictly illusory.”276 Through a series of logical manipulations, 
Kirchenmeier constructs a specific paradigm for the Jewish type or Jewish strain within the body 
of an individual with mixed inheritance. His theory of the Jewish strain within Jegor’s body 
mirrors the aforementioned theorization of the harmful role of Jewish subjects within the 
German body politic: the purported invisibility and “insidiousness” of the Jewish racial type 
 
274 Singer, Di Mishpohe Karnovski: Roman, 164, 194. 
275 Singer, 287–88. 
276 Singer, The Family Carnovsky, 238. 
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reflects the anti-Semitic rhetoric of invisible, insidious, Jewish influence. So too, Jewish 
insidiousness bears out in the problem of a changed Jewish name, which serves as a linguistic 
obfuscation, and likewise mandates typology. Kirchenmeier continues to explain, 
“From the anthropological viewpoint one soon realizes that the Negroid-Semitic strain, which is 
always predominant in cases of mongrelization, has very subtly allowed the Nordic strain to 
dominate the external appearances in order to mask its own insidious influences. But this can be 
ascertained from the subject’s eyes, which, although they may appear blue, lack the purity and 
clarity of classic Nordic eyes and are full of the negrification and obfuscation of the African 
jungle and the Asiatic desert. You will also note that the hair, which may seem straight, contains 
Negro blackness and a hint of inherent woolliness. The prominence of the ears, nose, and lips 
clearly demonstrates the inferior racial strain.”277 
 
Using the authority of scientific language and figures and theorems drawn on the board 
behind him, Kirchenmeier teaches the audience how to look at Jegor and how to see him as a 
Jewish type. The teacher’s description of racial dominance within “mongrelization” reflects what 
Joseph Jacobs and Maurice Fishberg called the “prepotency of Jewish blood,” or a hypodescent 
paradigm.278 Hypodescent is typically understood by scholars as a way to describe social 
classification when the descendant of a mixed union is assigned the identity of the subordinate, 
rather than the social dominant, group. While one might associate a “prepotent” racial Jewish 
type with visible distinctiveness, Kirchenmeier instead claims the opposite: The dominant Jewish 
type allows the Nordic type to prevail visibly, as a mask. In other words, it is precisely because 
of the Jewish type’s power that it is obfuscated, and precisely because of this obfuscation that 
one must enact the typological process in order to expose it. 
 
277 Singer, 238. 
278 This idea was also expressed as a scientific fact by Madison Grant in The Passing of the Great Race, “Whether 
we like to admit it or not, the result of the mixture of two races, in the long run, gives us a race reverting to the more 
ancient, generalized and lower type. The cross between a white man and an Indian is an Indian; the cross between a 
white man and a negro is a negro; the cross between a white man and a Hindu is a Hindu; and the cross between any 
of the three European races and a Jew is a Jew.” Grant, The Passing of the Great Race, 15–16. 
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Kirchenmeier’s lecture makes Jewishness evident through the re-interpretation of visible 
markers. For instance, one sign of Jegor’s “mongrelization” is that the “African jungle” and 
“Asiatic desert” have darkened the child’s blue eyes. The word translated as “obfuscation” in the 
English version is “tribkayt” in the Yiddish version, which can mean gloominess or muddiness, 
in contrast to the “purity” (“reynkayt”) of eyes in the Nordic type. Kirchenmeier emphasizes the 
literal mud of these seemingly wild environments on geographically distant continents, implying 
Jegor’s inherent foreignness due to an inherited history. This history materially manifests in—
and in fact mars—the marked Jewish body. Altogether, the Jewish type in Jegor’s body has an 
ambivalent relationship to the category of the visible. By enacting the typological process, the 
teacher and his audience can identify the “hidden traces” of a distant, non-European history in 
Jegor’s face, which are regarded as more significant than any consistently “typical” physical 
traits. Indeed, this scene dramatizes not only the manner in which Jewish physical ambiguity (or 
invisibility or obfuscation) mandates typology, but also the manner in which types are created to 
render an inherited history visible in a subject’s face. 
Kirchenmeier’s typology scene is mirrored in the novel’s final climax, when Jegor exacts 
his violent revenge on the German racial order that has both influenced and rejected him. Once 
the Carnovsky family emigrates to the United States, Jegor falls prey to Dr. Zerbe, an agent of 
the Third Reich who recruits him to spy on Jewish anti-fascists in the United States. The 
relationship between Dr. Zerbe and Jegor is fraught with sexual and racial objectification and 
violence. Zerbe forcibly kisses and attempts to kiss Jegor multiple times. In the novel’s 
penultimate scene, this sends the young man into a murderous trance. He grabs a statue of an 
African goddess and bashes in Zerbe’s skull. This act of violence accomplishes evident symbolic 
work: in the novel’s homoerotic and homophobic turn, Zerbe interpelates Jegor as the feminized 
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Jewish man; as Sander Gilman has argued, in this scene Jegor reclaims his masculinity through a 
grotesque fetish symbol of Black sexuality.279 This supposed reclamation of masculinity 
triangulated through Blackness is perhaps the most troubling aspect of the scene and certainly 
deserving of critique. The thematic similarities between this scene and the Kirchemeier scene 
emphasize the scenes as foils. 
Namely, this closing encounter with Zerbe rehearses and rearranges key aspects of the 
earlier scene with Kirchenmeier, specifically with regards to typology. In this scene, Jegor turns 
the typological gaze upon Zerbe. The narrative emphasizes Zerbe’s skull—both before and after 
Jegor strikes it. Jegor, after having his own skull measured and pathologized according to a 
German racial typology, destroys the German’s skull. The narration in the moments preceding 
the attack are laden with the motifs of visuality and the typological process of seeing—by Jegor. 
After Zerbe’s kiss, “Jegor’s eyes opened wider and wider and suddenly saw double—two faces 
[geshtaltn] at once. One moment it was Dr. Zerbe’s; the next, Dr. Kirchenmeier’s. The wrinkles, 
the murky eyes and naked skulls, even the rasping voices seemed one and the same.”280 It is 
perhaps no surprise that Zerbe is quite literally cast as Kirchenmeier’s double: both men carry 
the authority of the German state and wield scientific discourse to control and objectify Jegor’s 
body. In this doubled vision, Jegor projects a composite image of the two men’s faces—they are 
 
279 Sander L. Gilman, “Madness and Racial Theory in I. J. Singer’s ‘The Family Carnovsky,’” ed. I. J. Singer, 
Modern Judaism 1, no. 1 (1981): 95. 
280 Singer, The Family Carnovsky, 401. In Yiddish the passage reads: “yegors farnepelte oygn zaynen gevorn 
breyter, bloyer un gezen toplt, tsvey geshtaltn, mit amol—a vayl iz es geven dr. tserbe, bald iz es geven dr. 
kirkhenmayer der direktor fun gete-gimnazium, vos hot im derniderikt, bavayzn im in zayn shand far alemen. Nisht 
nor iz do altkayt un broyn-un-bloykayt un farlofnkayt fun di oygn un di nakete sharbns geven di eygene, nor oykh 
dos tribe kol” (Israel Joshua Singer 513). “Jegor’s foggy eyes grew wider, bluer, and saw double, two figures 
(geshtalts) at once—for a moment it was Dr. Zerbe, then immediately it was Dr. Kirchenmeier the principal of the 
Gete-Gimnasium, who had humiliated him, shown him before everyone in his shame (nakedness). It was not only 
the agedness and the brown-blue filmy eyes and the bare skulls that were the same, it was also the gloomy (muddy) 
voice.” (amended translation). 
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both “double” and “one and the same”—much like in Galton’s ghostly composite photographic 
types. Therefore, Jegor’s moment of reckoning is achieved through the creation of a type—he 
sees how Zerbe’s head conforms to and deviates from that other.  
This scene serves as a foil to the initial scene of Jegor’s typological objectification, in 
both symbolic imagery and in its processes of sight. This move leaves readers with a question of 
what is made or unmade in the reprise. While it seems on some level that this scene amounts to a 
toppling of a symbolic order, it cannot be denied that it is also a perpetuation of some of racial 
typology’s characteristic associations and processes. Moreover, Jegor’s violence against Zerbe is 
quickly turned into violence toward himself; Jegor is so deeply invested in race science that he 
cannot destroy it without destroying himself. This moment is the crux of Family Carnovsky’s 
critique of race science and typology, yet it also highlights why this critique is so challenging for 
the text to produce coherently. If the novel consistently uses typology to generate meaning, then 
the climactic moment creates a vacuum of meaning for the novel. Family Carnovsky may invest 
in racial typology so as to eventually dispense of it, but this removal, this dissolution of meaning, 
is not represented as a moment of triumph. It is instead designed to be a crisis in meaning for the 
text as a whole, as much as it is experienced as a crisis in meaning for the characters. The fact 
that this final scene takes place in the American section of the text reminds readers that there is 
no redemption, no “solace of the chance of a better life in America.”281 
The Crisis of Typology and Biology 
The Family Carnovsky’s ambivalence about smashing the typological order arises from 
its investment in biological thinking and the idea of a bodily, heritable Jewishness. The novel 
 
281 Grözinger, “Between Literature and History : Israel Joshua Singer’s Berlin Novel The Family Carnovsky as a 
Cul-de-Sac of the German-Jewish ‘Symbiosis,’” 226. 
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comes to challenge biological knowledge more generally through the un-typable visible body. 
This crisis is introduced most articulately through Georg, the physician, who puzzles over his un-
typable son Jegor, and for whom this challenge is narrated as an emotionally charged loss. In an 
extended internal monologue, Georg rifles through his medical knowledge in the hopes of 
understanding his son: 
“As a surgeon, Georg knew every tissue and cell of the human brain. But what was it actually, 
that small pile of matter, blood, and veins? Why did it differ so radically from person to person, 
encompassing every degree of brilliance and stupidity, coarseness and spirituality? Why did it 
bring joy and fulfillment to one, fear and torment to another? There lay his son, his own flesh 
and blood. Although he was a mere baby he was already burdened with dark thoughts and 
morbid fears. Whose blood called out within him in the night? Whose torment disturbed his 
sleep? Maybe it was some distant ancestor of the Holbecks…Or perhaps it all came from his 
side, the Carnovskys?...heredity was a mighty force, Georg knew. Often traits cropped up many 
generations apart. Sometimes they even stemmed from a distant branch of the family—a brother 
or sister of a great-great-grandparent. Man’s semen was full of hidden forces—good and evil, 
wisdom and stupidity, cruelty and mercy, health and sickness, joy and sorrow, genius and 
insanity, ugliness and beauty—all borne along in a tiny drop of liquid propelled by some 
mysterious force.”282 
 
His medical knowledge of inheritance and the material body proves incommensurate with the 
broad sweep of human experience. He is trapped between competing epistemologies of the body: 
the biological and material, versus the ethical and the spiritual. Georg moves between the literal 
and metaphorical body: the brain, made up of “matter, blood, and veins”;283 and his son as “his 
own flesh and blood.” Of course, typology—the idea that one can find racial essence materially 
manifest, or that one could reveal “hidden forces” in physical phenotype—intentionally blend 
these competing systems of understanding the body. Yet, for Georg, these systems cease to line 
up. 
 
282 Singer, The Family Carnovsky, 186. 
283 An alternate translation would be as “a bit of matter made of blood, veins, and tissue.” Singer, Di Mishpohe 
Karnovski: Roman, 222. 
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Georg continues to consider “atavizm, yerushe [atavism, inheritance],” which proposes an 
alternative to typology (amended translation). 284 Atavism can mean either the return of cultural 
tendencies that had been suppressed or the appearance of physical traits that had apparently 
disappeared.285 Yet both cultural and biological meanings indicate a particular model of 
inheritance that is non-linear, inconsistent, mysterious, and points both backward and forward in 
time. One might expect that Georg, the German assimilated physician, would use language 
deriving from German in this internal monologue about the application of scientific theories in 
his own life. Instead, the Yiddish word for inheritance used here, and elsewhere in the 
monologue, is “yerushe,” which derives from Hebrew (or the loshn-koydesh element of Yiddish), 
intensifying the Jewish aspect of the scene. Georg considers yerushe again when he thinks, “The 
heritage of generations trailed behind one like rags one could not cast off. A father could not be 
the master of his own child…”286 Figured as such, inheritance is a choiceless burden, fixed 
behind him, out of sight; it is a force felt yet not visible. Unlike the typological idea of a static 
 
284 The idea of atavism, or of an ancestor “whose blood called out within him in the night,” is, like typology, 
invested in an inherited history. However, this history is various and non-linear: meaning that it is capable of 
skipping indirectly over and across generations (what Naomi Seidman has called “diagonal” or “avuncular” kinship). 
In Seidman’s description of queer forms of Yiddish inheritance, she provides the avuncular as a model. 
Significantly, for Seidman, the avuncular is specifically non-biological, because it is not passed from parent to 
biological child or the direct result of sexual reproduction. Yet as this example shows, the biological imagination in 
Yiddish prose can in fact pave the way for imagining avuncular inheritance. Naomi Seidman, The Marriage Plot: Or 
How Jews Fell in Love with Love, and with Literature, Stanford Studies in Jewish History and Culture x, 354 pages 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/; Significantly, through Georg’s 
meditation, the novel introduces a new, biologically informed conception of inheritance that accounts for variation. 
As such, the novel introduces a challenge to the typological notion of intergenerational consistency. Furthermore, on 
the level of genre, the non-linear, mysterious, avuncular model of inheritance complicates the intergenerational 
family saga’s model of generational progress—attempted by both David and Georg, to better the family in each 
generation—or conversely, of progressive degeneracy, an idea that could describe the generic-generational model in 
Family Carnovsky. Gilman, “Madness and Racial Theory in I. J. Singer’s ‘The Family Carnovsky’”; Singer, Di 
Mishpohe Karnovski: Roman, 222. 
285 Freud’s idea of the uncanny (unheimlich) relies on the idea of generationally suppressed superstitions in 
particular. “The uncanny” is a name for our feeling the presence of these supposedly past, supposedly overcome 
superstitions or irrational beliefs. The uncanny is the emotional manifestation of atavism. 
286 Singer, The Family Carnovsky, 185. 
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racial essence, this specifically Jewish inheritance, this trail of rags, is mysterious, temporally 
complex, and inconsistently visible.  
The scene ultimately fractures Georg’s faith in biology. He turns to a book by Gregor 
Mendel, often called the father of genetics; Mendel provides him with impressive figures, yet no 
answers.287 Earlier in the scene, Georg had recalled the words, “It is nature, blood, inheritance, 
the eternal law of continuity” offered by colleagues, “with whom he’d once spoken about this. 
But what is nature and what is blood and what is inheritance?” (amended translation).288 This 
question evinces Georg’s emotional response to scientific knowledge. Yet, again, it suggests 
biology’s insufficiency in answering his questions. After all, what can we purport to know of 
nature, of blood, of inheritance? If this scene ultimately challenges the primacy of biological 
theories of inheritance, then this is a challenge precipitated by the appearance of a body, 
seemingly impervious to typology. This loss is, indeed, characteristic of Singer. As Norich has 
argued, Singer’s narratives “reject all the avenues of escape available in his culture,” be they 
social movements, revolution, individualism, or religion; his fiction suggests that belief in such 
redemption, “arises from the misunderstanding of history and a kind of magical thinking that 
cannot be sustained.”289 In Family Carnovsky, the biological imagination amounts to one such 
 
287 “He wondered at the monk who had so precisely classified all of the inherited traits, and had traced out each 
branch with lines and figures. But nothing became clearer from this” (amended translation). “Er bavundert dem 
monakh vos hot azoy genoy klasifisirt ot di yerushe-zakhn, ongetseykhnt yeder tsvayg mit linies un tsipern. Ober 
klorer ver gor nisht fun im.” Singer, Di Mishpohe Karnovski: Roman, 223; Joseph Singer’s translation reads, “The 
monk’s brilliant interpretations, accompanied by accurate proofs, fascinated Georg but did not explain the basic 
riddle.” Singer, The Family Carnovsky, 186. 
288 “Dos iz natur, blut, yerushe, dos eybike gezets fun der derhaltung, zogn im doktoyrim kolegn, mit velkhe er redt a 
mol vegn dem. Ober vos iz natur un vos iz blut un vos iz yerushe?” Singer, Di Mishpohe Karnovski: Roman, 223; In 
Joseph Singer’s translation, the passage is somewhat shortened as, “This was nature, his colleagues explained, but 
what did it actually mean, this word?” Singer, The Family Carnovsky, 186. 
289 Norich, The Homeless Imagination in the Fiction of Israel Joshua Singer, 11. 
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form of magical thinking.290 Georg does not abandon the practice of medicine that night, but re-
directs his seeking from the father of genetics, to a philosophical text. In so doing, he attempts to 
re-discipline himself and his relation to biological knowledge. Biology can provide him with 
impressive proofs and figures, but not the solace of eternal laws, and certainly not redemption. 
Focus and America’s Jewish Typology 
Arthur Miller’s 1945 novel, Focus, has been described as the first post-war Jewish 
American novel and as the first American novel in response to the Holocaust. Despite such 
distinctions, it is no longer widely read, studied, or taught—likely because the experimental work 
is focalized through a racist and anti-Semitic man, and propagates a great deal of his hateful 
thoughts in its prose. The novel’s action—all taking place during one sweltering New York City 
summer—is limited and brief, and the tone is raw, gritty, and surreal. Set during the end of the 
United States’ participation in World War II, the novel, according to Miller, was inspired by 
antisemitism he witnessed during the war. Decades later he’d write in a foreword to the novel, 
“As far as I knew at the time, antisemitism in America was a closed if not forbidden topic for 
fiction—certainly no novel had taken it as a main theme.”291 For Miller, the writing and 
publishing of Focus constituted breaking an American taboo (although, looking at Yiddish 
 
290 This, of course, is not the novel’s end, but a moment of intellectual change for one character. As Norich has 
found through the correspondence between Singer and Abraham Cahan, the editor of the Forverts, Singer struggled 
to end the novel, to find a fate for these characters amid the history that continued to unfold (when he initially sent 
the text to be published in the Forverts, he had only composed the first two—out of three—books). Norich, 54–55. 
291 Arthur Miller, “Introduction,” in Focus (New York: Arbor House, 1984), viii; In a 2001 piece published in the 
New York Times, Miller states that he felt freed to publish Focus once Gentleman’s Agreement came out: “If there 
was no explosion once it appeared, I thought it was quite possibly because ‘Gentleman’s Agreement’ had beat it out 
by a month or two and helped break the ice.” This is curious, because Focus was published first. It is possible that 
Miller’s memory was somewhat blurred, but it is significant that he, himself, links these two novels and their social 
impact. Miller published this reflection on Focus in coordination with the release of the film adaptation of the novel. 
Arthur Miller, “WRITERS ON WRITING; Shattering The Silence, Illuminating The Hatred,” The New York Times, 
October 22, 2001, sec. Arts, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/22/arts/writers-on-writing-shattering-the-silence-
illuminating-the-hatred.html. 
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novels written in the United States might challenge the idea that Focus was the “first” to do so). 
Miller has described this novel as “shattering a silence,” in spite of his and others’ fear that 
bringing attention to the central themes would lead to “an outbreak of open antisemitism in 
America.”292 Miller frames Focus as a novel of critique through exposure; it articulates a form of 
antisemitism that is seemingly benign and undergirded by science and visuality.293 As the title 
might suggest, Focus is concerned with seeing and being seen, the power of sight, and 
technologies of vision. Moreover, the elaboration in Focus of racial typology and the production 
of “Jewish types” echoes the processes for creating types found in racial photography, and in 
Family Carnovsky as well. 
The main character in Focus is Lawrence Newman, a deeply racist and anti-Semitic 
gentile, whose work at a large Manhattan company as a personnel manager mainly entails hiring 
and overseeing secretaries. At work and on the street, he compulsively identifies Jews by reading 
faces for “the Hebrew dip to the nose” or “the sad-eyed gloom over the upper face.”294 The 
previously described practice of face- and name-scrutiny in the job market informs his daily 
interactions. Newman first finds trouble in the novel when his poor vision causes him to 
accidentally hire a presumably Jewish woman, Miss Kapp, as a new secretary at his firm. 
Newman’s boss reprimands him seeing as, “Miss Kapp is obviously not our type of person,” and 
 
292 Specifically in response to the ship, St. Louis, which was filled with Jewish refugees and was turned away from 
the United States and sent back to Nazi Europe, Miller writes, “Along with a lot of others, what I made of the silence 
was that everybody, not excluding myself, was afraid of an outbreak of open antisemitism in America should that 
shipload of refugees be allowed to disembark.” Miller, “WRITERS ON WRITING; Shattering The Silence, 
Illuminating The Hatred.” 
293 Miller also wrote around the release of the film adaptation that with the novel he had, “wanted to expose to the 
light what [he] intimately knew about a topic that was largely unreported.” Arthur Miller, “His Jewish Question,” 
Vanity Fair, accessed June 18, 2019, https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2001/10/arthur-miller-200110. 
294 Arthur Miller, Focus, Arbor House Library of Contemporary Americana. (New York: Arbor House, 1984), 34. 
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insists that Newman get glasses.295But when he finally gets glasses, it only makes the matter 
worse, because he starts to be mistaken for a Jew himself. This development leads to his 
dismissal from his job, trouble finding new work, and organized violence in his neighborhood 
from the Christian Front. The novel closes with Newman reformed after he is targeted by an anti-
Semitic attack: he longs for “a charge of lightning that would with a fiery stroke break away the 
categories of people and change them so that it would not be important to them what tribe they 
sprang from. It must not be important anymore, he swore, even though in his life it had been of 
the highest importance.”296 Because of this revelation, the erstwhile anti-Semite does not correct 
the police officers investigating the attack when they presume that he is Jewish. This closing 
wish and admission to Jewishness seems to support the idea of race, ethnicity, and national 
origins as surface-level—and therefore trivial—distinctions. While Newman’s transformation in 
the novel may ultimately have little impact on his surroundings, its ending bears the patent mark 
of Miller’s universalism as well as his “confidence in human rationality and progress,” as 
Ladislaub Löb has suggested.297 
In Focus, the typological process of looking—of not only discerning, but also producing, 
Jews—is unspoken. The very word “type” gains importance because of the way that it moves 
between signifying a visual classification of Jews and other racialized individuals, to a 
euphemistic term that circumvents explicit statements about these classifications. Therefore, the 
novel’s portrayal of typology is less overtly biological than what is expressed in segments of 
 
295 Miller, 17. 
296 Miller, 217. 
297 Ladislaus Löb, “‘Insanity in the Darkness’: Anti-Semitic Stereotypes and Jewish Identity in Max Frisch’s 
‘Andorra’ and Arthur Miller’s ‘Focus,’” The Modern Language Review 92, no. 3 (1997): 558, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3733383. 
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Family Carnovsky. Nonetheless, in Focus, the ability to quite literally produce Jews through 
looking contributes to what David R. Mesher has called, “Miller’s larger scheme to create 
allegory from a novel-of-the-absurd.”298 The novel repeatedly dramatizes the typological process 
in a manner that bears a marked resemblance to the biologically informed, typological mode of 
looking developed through race science. Indeed, the novel illustrates the practice of typological 
discernment, learned through the popular dissemination of scientific ideas.  
As in Family Carnovsky, the narration of Focus incorporates typology into the text’s 
descriptive fabric. The opening scene finds Newman on a train, mentally assigning racial types to 
his fellow passengers. He refers to one person as the “Hindenburg type of Jew” because of the 
large bags under the man’s eyes and thinks of him as, “a man whose type to him was like a rare 
clock to a collector.”299 Newman continues to describe the man through a catalogue of 
phenotypic evidence and an assumption of expert knowledge, 
“The man was staidly reading the Times, His skin was fair, the back of his neck flat and straight, 
his hair was probably blond beneath his new hat, and on squinting, Mr. Newman caught a 
glimpse of the Hindenburg bags under the subject’s eyes. The mouth he could not see clearly, so 
he supplied it—broad and full-lipped...probably he alone on this train knew that this gentleman 
with the square head and the fair skin was neither Swede, nor German, not Norwegian, but a 
Jew.”300 
 
Newman describes—and prescribes—the man’s features according to physiognomic 
measurements: from the shape and length of the neck to the pallor of the skin. First squinting and 
then guessing about the man’s hair color and mouth (both of which are out of view), Newman 
 
298 David R. Mesher, “Arthur Miller’s ‘Focus’: The First American Novel of the Holocaust?,” Judaism 29, no. 4 
(Fall 1980): 474. 
299 Miller, Focus, 9; Miller also invokes the German statesman Paul von Hindenburg in an autobiographical 
reference, “…my grandfather turned to me with his great bald head and the bags under his eyes like von 
Hindenburg’s…”Arthur Miller, “A Boy Grew In Brooklyn,” HOLIDAY, March 1955. 
300 Miller, Focus, 9. 
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develops the type through manipulated sight and pre-formed assumptions. Indeed, his confidence 
in “supplying” obscured features that his eyes have not seen evokes the operations of other racial 
types, such as Galton’s, which used composite printing technology to create images of “typical” 
Jewish features—features that did not necessarily exist on any single photographic subject’s 
face. Beyond Galton, photographic images of racial types in general claimed to render available 
and visible that which is otherwise invisible: histories that precede the photographic moment, or 
the individual’s racial essence.301 Here too, Newman champions his own powers of sight in order 
to gain access to that which is invisible.  
Newman fancies himself an expert in typologies, because his job of hiring consists of 
identifying—and weeding out—Jewish candidates. Throughout the novel, even though Black 
Americans, like Jews, are often the targets of his bigoted thoughts (and he repeatedly compares 
his resentment toward these two groups of people), he also differentiates between them—and 
between his knowledge of each. For instance, on the very same train ride in the opening scene, 
he ponders over a Black face without any purported expertise, deciding that, “Some day he must 
look into the various types of niggers. It was academic, he knew, for he did not need the 
information for his work, but still...”302 Implicit in Newman’s thought is the assumption that he 
would never accept any Black candidates, and that he feels confident identifying them without 
the help of thorough typological assessment. In this moment, he exhibits the possibility of a 
racialized gaze through operations other than the systematized, scientized typology he uses on 
Jews. The above passage puts into relief two significant and interconnected points about 
 
301 This is supported by my study of types in racial photography in the previous chapter of the dissertation. “Through 
photography,” as Edwards argues, “the ‘type,’ the abstract essence of human variation, was perceived to be an 
observable reality.” qtd Smith, Photography on the Color Line, 47. 
302 Miller, Focus, 9. 
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Newman’s American brand of typological knowledge. First, the Jewish type is not triangulated 
discursively through a notion of Blackness, as it is represented in Family Carnovsky; rather, 
these are posed as two separate (albeit fantastical) forms of racial knowledge. Second, the novel 
distinguishes here between the social realities of anti-Black discrimination and anti-Semitic 
discrimination.  
Not only does the novel portray Jews as having a degree of access to middle class jobs 
for which Black candidates would never be considered, but it also suggests that Jewish typology 
is utilized because of an understanding of Jews as less immediately discernible as Jews. This idea 
that typology is necessary because of visual ambiguity or obfuscation echoes the fictional claim 
in the case of Jegor Carnovsky’s “mongrelization,” that the Jewish strain, or the “Negroid-
Semitic type” insidiously masks itself behind a “Nordic type.” In Singer’s novel, the anti-Semitic 
character instructs an audience in performing a scientific, typological process of looking in order 
to make this “Negroid-Semitic type” visible in Jegor’s inscrutable, Jewish-descended body. Yet 
in Focus, Newman and his colleagues more often presume that Jewish individuals conceal their 
identities behind the mask of changed names. Newman enacts typological work upon Jews 
because of their seemingly dangerous proximity to the category of whiteness. Thus, the changed 
Jewish name serves as a screen obfuscating Jewishness, and consequently as the mandate for the 
interviewer to enact a process of typological discernment.  
Furthermore, Focus presents the extent to which face and name scrutiny are mutually 
dependent. Articulating the suspicion of a changed Jewish name can kick off the process of face 
scrutiny, or reveal that it has already occurred. After Newman hires Miss Kapp, his boss yells at 
him, “Miss Kapp is obviously not our type of person, Newman. I mean, she’s obvious. Her name 
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must be Kapinsky or something.”303 Although Miss Kapp’s identity technically remains unknown 
in the novel, by observing the “obviousness” of her visual type, the boss, Mr. Gargan, claims he 
is able to discern her Jewishness. He then articulates this through the verbal code of Jewish 
names. Like the unseen mouth of the man on the train, which Newman confidently supplies 
himself, Mr. Gargan is able to supply the supposedly erased Jewish suffix to complete his verbal 
image of the Jew. Both summon invisible elements and label their productions as exposure. Yet 
this process also allows for certain silences: Newman’s boss later tells him of Miss Kapp, “We 
just aren’t set up to take that kind of person.”304 That “kind” of person, he means, is Jewish. Yet 
the very word, kind just like type, stands in for Jew: a word never uttered aloud. Nearly identical 
language appears in Hobson’s Gentleman’s Agreement, when characters refer to not wanting 
“practically any type” to apply to work at their company, or explain that they seek out “the type 
that fits in.”305 Ironically, using the multivalent word, “type” allows the employer to verbally 
obfuscate—in this case, discrimination—as well. Much like Focus, Gentleman’s Agreement 
toggles between using the word “type” to definitively identify Jewish racial difference and using 
the same word to avoid articulating it. 
Nevertheless, the novel continues to present visual, racial typology as a technique 
mobilized in the face of ambiguous Jewish physical distinctiveness. After Miss Kapp is 
dismissed, and Newman begins wearing glasses, he is determined once again to apply his 
 
303 Miller, 17. 
304 Miller, 17. 
305 This language appears in Gentleman’s Agreement, when Miss Wales is less than pleased to learn that her story of 
name changing causes the magazine to publish a job posting inviting candidates of any religion to apply. She asks 
her boss, Phil in disbelief, “You mean practically inviting any type to apply?” Hobson, Gentleman’s Agreement, 154 
Her reaction echoes the words of the Smith’s hiring manager Jordan in defense of his own practice—“If a girl’s 
personality is the type that fits in, I’d never ask” (Hobson 142). 
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typological skills and find the perfect-looking woman to fill the newly vacated role. The 
Episcopalian Gertrude Hart, who eventually becomes Newman’s girlfriend, comes in for an 
interview. Newman is beguiled by her appearance and self-presentation. He becomes determined 
to discern whether or not she is Jewish based on her facial features, voice, and clothing, even 
though her résumé claims that she was born Episcopalian. He assesses her as Jewish and 
dismisses her. However, speaking within the elliptical discourse of “kinds” and “types,” he does 
not tell her that this suspicion is the reason why he will not hire her. Instead, he tells her only that 
she lacks experience using the electric typing machines that the company will acquire in great 
number after the war. (In this pun, the issue is not her type but her ability to type.)  
Through Miss Hart, Miller’s novel highlights the significance of the Jewish gaze for 
creating Jewish types. When they meet, Newman’s desire for Miss Hart mixes with his attempt 
to type her as they establish an ambiguous form of intimacy through a cycle of mutual looking. 
When he dismisses her, he stokes her ire, causing her to look at him in such a way that suggests 
to him that she believes him to be Jewish. This look contributes to his growing paranoia that he 
might appear Jewish in his new glasses. He thinks,  
“There was something in her eyes...in the way she sat so angrily confident waiting for him to 
reply. She was not moving, glaring at him...The intimacy...that’s what frightened him...yes, the 
intimacy was new. Her malevolence was intimate. She sat there as though she knew everything 
about him, as though...She was taking him for a Jew.”306 
 
Overcome by this realization, Newman thinks, “She must not do that with her eyes!” Later, he 
recalls that, “for in this moment her eyes made a Jew of him.”307 Curiously—circularly—
 
306 Miller, Focus, 32. 
307 Miller, 34 Newman’s feeling that others’ gazes and actions toward him have “made a Jew of him,” can admittedly 
be read as anticipating Jean-Paul Sartre’s conception of antisemitism articulated in Anti-Semite and Jew (1946): that 
the anti-Semite creates the Jew. I’d suggest that we can achieve a more nuanced reading of Focus by not chalking 
the novel up to this thesis. For an example of a novel that more clearly takes up Sartre’s idea as one of its 
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according to Newman, her gaze upon him establishes him as a Jew as much as it establishes her 
as one: for this intimate knowledge that he locates in her gaze would only be possible if she were 
a Jew herself. Newman’s investment in the power of the Jew’s gaze echoes the biological 
discourse elaborated by scientists such as Francis Galton, Joseph Jacobs, and Maurice Fishberg, 
discussed in the previous chapter. Like these scientists, Newman suggests that it is not only the 
typological process of looking, but also the gaze of the typological subject (the Jew) that has the 
power to create a Jewish type. In this fictional scene, Newman believes that Gertrude’s eyes have 
the power to simultaneously “make a Jew of him,” and reveal the Jew in her. The scene of a 
circular, joint typology dramatizes the bidirectional power of the gaze in Jewish typological 
discourse. 
Eventually, when Newman looks at her face and no longer sees in it the Jewish type, he 
reflects that, “It was like seeing a face in a movie change and dissolve, taking on a new 
character, and yet remaining the same face.”308 The interaction thus reflects visual technology’s 
ability to manipulate or call into question the stability of sight and perception, much like the 
description of Jegor in Family Carnovsky, who sees two shifting faces, doubled and 
simultaneous, when he looks at the face of the Nazi Dr. Zerbe. Miller’s novel concerns not only 
discernment of facial features, but visual technology as well, echoing the previous chapter’s 
discussion of photography’s role in cultivating Jewish typological discourse. Focus, in its title, 
refers to the near-magical effect that glasses have upon the appearance of Newman’s face—or in 
other words, his face through a lens. As Miller explains of the novel, “Its central image is the 
 
foundational ideas, see Howard Jacobson’s more recent, Booker-Prize winning, comic British novel, The Finkler 
Question (2010). 
308 Miller, 82. 
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turning lens of the mind of an anti-Semitic man forced by his circumstances to see anew his own 
relationships to the Jew.”309 
The novel highlights various visual technologies, including photography. For instance, 
Newman creates a quasi camera obscura in the scene in which he first sees his own image in his 
glasses. The scene consists of a gradual process of repeated looking at himself in his bathroom 
mirror. Newman focuses his newly bespectacled eyes like the lens of a camera: at first, “the 
mercurial blur swirled before his eyes,” but eventually “the whole frame of the mirror became 
astonishingly clear.”310 He looks at his various features in the mirror before he concludes that, 
“He was looking at what might very well be described as the face of a Jew. A Jew, in effect, had 
gotten into his bathroom…”311 And this alchemical effect as a whole leads to a moment of near 
transcendence as Newman, “felt as though rising off the floor.”312 He attempts to smile in the 
mirror, but it is “the smile of one who is forced to pose before the camera.”313 Newman becomes 
at once the awestruck photographer and the coerced photographic subject in his own bathroom-
turned-camera-obscura where he creates his own Jewish type. In this key scene, it is not only the 
typological process of looking, but the mimicked conditions of visual technology, which allow 
Newman to become a Jewish type. 
Newman’s self-assessment in this scene includes repeated attempts at phenotypic 
description through catalogues of his facial features, which bear a circular relationship to his 
understanding of the “Jew, in effect” or as a whole. The question of the whole versus the parts 
 
309 Miller, “Introduction,” x. 
310 Miller, Focus, 25. 
311 Miller, 24. 
312 Miller, 24. 
313 Miller, 25. 
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replays the paradox of Jewish types as outlined by Fishberg. Newman teases out this tension: “A 
long time he stood staring at himself, at his forehead, his chin, his nose. It took many moments of 
detailed inspection of his parts before he could see himself whole.”314 Switching between looking 
in the mirror with and without the clarity of his glasses, he sees the distortion of his pre-formed 
mental self-image, which had made him believe that these glasses would make him appear like a, 
“Hindenburg type of Jew,” because of his “flat vertical cheeks and a squarish head and very fair 
skin, and—most telling—suggestions of bags under his eyes, the stern Hindenburg pouches.”315 
In this list, he uses similar phenotypic criteria to those used for the Jewish typology created on 
the train. However, with his glasses on—both as instruments of clearer vision and as a prosthetic 
facial feature—all of his facial elements seem to be drawn forward. His facial expression (that 
awkward smile for the camera) comes to appear insincere and cunning, because of “the Semitic 
prominence of his nose, the bulging set of his eyes, the listening posture of his ears.”316 In 
Newman’s repeated looking and reading of his face, he oscillates between interpreting the whole 
in light of the parts, and the parts in light of the whole. His cycles of looking and discerning 
dramatize the very circularity of the typological process: a process of discursive circling around 
an ambiguous central object. As we have seen, this very discourse produces the type. 
Even earlier in the novel, Newman acknowledges the extent to which the practice of 
reading another’s face for racial essence or spiritual characteristics is an act of projection. He 
feels guilty that, “The evil nature of the Jews and their numberless deceits, especially their 
sensuous lust for women—of which fact he had seen daily proof in the dark folds of their eyes 
 
314 Miller, 24. 
315 Miller, 25. 
316 Miller, 25. 
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and their swarthy skin—all were the reflections of his own desires with which he had invested 
them.”317 In other words, he maintains that he has seen their internal characteristics expressed in 
external traits (their “evil nature” in the “dark folds of their eyes and their swarthy skin”). 
However, he only sees them because he puts them there. With this admission, the novel starts to 
contest the authority of visual perception itself.  
Upon his own typological transformation, Newman comes to reject typology, which is 
narrated as a surreal triumph. In his eventual rejection of typology, he explicitly refutes 
typological knowledge as it was constructed by race scientists beginning in the 19th century. 
Newman insists to himself that the glasses have created a false type, that he is not in fact a Jew, 
even though as we have seen, Newman repeatedly creates types (including his own). Once turned 
upon himself, these visual operations come into question. He at one point ponders, “Was it 
possible…that [an employer] looked at me and thought me untrustworthy, or grasping, or loud 
because of my face?”318 He also eventually negates racial typology’s promise to draw history 
visibly on the face, as he thinks, “He was him, a human being with a certain definite history, and 
he was not this face which looked like it had grown out of another alien and dirty history.”319 
This negation—“he was not this face”—attempts to decouple the coordination drawn between 
“him, a human being,” and a particular facial type within physiognomy and racial typology. With 
his new, bespectacled face, Newman does not merely come to understand the sting of anti-
Semitic hatred, he also comes to re-assess typology’s intellectual hold on him. In this novel’s 
central transformation, Newman must reform his biological imagination. 
 
317 Miller, 34. 
318 Miller, 67. 
319 Miller, 67. 
 143 
In moments such as these, the fictional elaboration and undermining of the typological 
process provides the force of Miller’s particular critique-through-exposure of American 
antisemitism. The repeated scenes of typological production in this novel (so similar to what we 
might find in Family Carnovsky’s German scenes) suggest that American antisemitism is also 
deeply rooted in visuality and is only unique in its insistence on being unspoken or verbally 
obfuscated. In both contexts, antisemitism is tied to the process of visible discernment and the 
reliance on scientifically originated forms of knowledge.320 Through its dramatization of 
typology, Focus undermines the assumption that America’s social antisemitism is a unique 
phenomenon, separable from more explicitly racialized forms of antisemitism in Europe, or 
independent of biological imagination.  
The very emphasis on visuality and Jewish physical distinctiveness might also be key to 
the novel’s relative critical forgetting. As Mesher pointed out in 1980 about the novel’s reception 
up to that point, “Liberal critics, many themselves Jews, who would normally be in sympathy 
with the novel’s aims, had long ago rejected the racist notion that people ‘looked Jewish’ and, 
therefore, discounted the novel’s credibility.”321 Therefore, the novel’s reach may have been 
limited by the very grounds upon which it attempts to critique antisemitism. Ironically, because 
of the success of Focus and texts like it in establishing a new standard of acceptable discourse 
about Jewish visible or physical distinctiveness, this narrative of re-forming of biological 
 
320 This comparison is mostly implicit. The novel explicitly references European antisemitism several times, but as 
stories (or films) witnessed by the characters. Miller would later come to dramatize the Holocaust more explicitly in 
several plays, including After the Fall (1964) and Playing for Time, Incident at Vichy (1964). For more on Miller’s 
work dealing with the Holocaust see Janet N Balakian, “The Holocaust, the Depression, and McCarthyism: Miller in 
the Sixties,” in The Cambridge Companion to Arthur Miller, ed. Christopher Bigsby, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 118–40. 
321 Mesher, “Arthur Miller’s ‘Focus,’” 474. 
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imagination seems to have lost its legitimacy or political “relevance” in the culture it helped 
initiate. 
Making a Gentleman’s Agreement 
Laura Z. Hobson’s novel Gentleman’s Agreement (1947) likely has had the greatest 
cultural footprint of any of the novels explored in this chapter. Its closely followed film 
adaptation (also 1947) starring Dorothy McGuire and Gregory Peck, won three Academy 
Awards, including the award for Best Picture. The novel tells the story of Phil Green, a gentile 
journalist in New York City who decides to pose as Jewish in order to experience and expose 
antisemitism for a liberal magazine, Smith’s (a name that is markedly not Jewish, and might as 
well be, “Everyman Weekly”). Modeling his journalistic technique after previous assignments 
where he imbedded himself with migrant farm workers and miners, Phil decides to move through 
the world as a Jew (meaning, to tell people that he is Jewish) and to write a story titled, “I was 
Jewish for three months.” The novel is also in some ways a conventional love story, between the 
journalist Phil and the socialite Kathy Lacey, a relative of the magazine’s editor who both 
avowedly “hates” antisemitism (she even came up with the idea for the exposé) and quite 
apparently harbors anti-Jewish biases (or at least tacitly supports Jewish exclusion in upscale 
resorts and suburbs). The romantic relationship with Kathy is the greatest cause of the tension 
during Phil’s journalistic “experiment.”  
Phil’s piece, like the novel itself, has two significantly interlocking theses. First, the goal 
of his article is to expose antisemitism by making both himself and his readers attuned to the 
indignities large and small, which come with being Jewish in 1940s America, or as he puts it, 
“every day the thump of insult, the assault on your dignity,” and “day by day the tapping on the 
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nerves, the delicate assault on the proud stuff of a man’s identity.”322 Second, the feat of his 
experiment is also to show how little it would take for a gentile to pass as a Jew, and to debunk 
the idea of a Jewish look or physical type. Therefore, the novel presents as interdependent the 
dismantling of antisemitism and the disavowal of a visible Jewish type. A larger aim is to protect 
America from communism: Phil believes that eliminating bias is necessary if American 
liberalism is going to be as appealing to the downtrodden as communism might be. Yet of 
course, this view of social inclusion and equality is limited in so far as it is predicated on 
physical likeness and interchangeability. 
Re-framing Jewish Difference 
Gentleman’s Agreement as a whole is fixated on the question of Jewish difference: it asks 
whether such difference exists at all, and if so, how to categorize it. The very story presents what 
Benjamin Schreier has called “a shift in the significance and functionality of Jewish 
categoricalness,” broadly speaking, from a construction of Jewish difference as a matter of race 
to a matter of religion in the postwar period.323 In the novel, Phil—who is unequivocally 
presented as a moral guide for characters and for readers alike—often thinks about his childhood 
friend Dave who was, “like him in every essential…Dave as a man, and not Dave as a Jew. Dave 
as a citizen, as American, and not Dave as a religious being. That, Phil was sure of. And that was 
good.”324 Valuing essential likeness as such, the novel often pursues sameness because it equates 
 
322 Hobson, Gentleman’s Agreement, 118, 97. 
323 Benjamin Schreier, “Filming Identity in the Jewish American Postwar; or, on the Uses and Abuses of 
Periodization for Jewish Studies,” Shofar, 34, no. 3 (Spring 2016): 83–84 For more on the active framing of Jews as 
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any suggestion of difference with hierarchy—Jewish difference cannot be difference without 
Christian superiority.325 Any idea of Jewish culture is also disregarded, except for one humorous 
moment in which Phil’s magazine editor—in response to an off-handed comment about “Jewish 
publishing houses”—claims to know nothing of the many publishing houses owned and operated 
by Jews in America, and states that the only publishing house that one could conceivably label 
“Jewish” would be the publisher of the Yiddish Forward.326 The novel presents little other 
possibility of secular Jewish culture or experience outside of internalized antisemitism. 
Gentleman’s Agreement debunks external difference as well. Within this project, the 
novel aims to remove Jews from racial discourse, not by critiquing the field of knowledge writ 
large, but by using scientific racial discourse. This tack echoes the 1911 argument that Maurice 
Fishberg mounted against the Jewish type without challenging racial typology as a whole, and 
constitutes what Matthew Frye Jacobson has labeled the novel’s, “ideological move toward re-
racialization.”327 Phil repeatedly lectures other characters about the myth of the Jewish race, 
which modern science has disproven. Phil even shows Kathy a pamphlet written by leading 
anthropologists (citing Margaret Mead, Franz Boas, and the like) titled, “There is No Jewish 
‘Race,” but which still supports the schema that “the three great divisions of mankind were the 
Caucasian Race, the Mongoloid, the Negroid.”328 These scientific citations further crystalize the 
novel’s larger, limited perspective on race and racism. As Jacobson rightly argues, “Wholely 
 
325 The novel’s perspective on religious pluralism is delivered by Phil in a lecture to his son about different kinds of 
churches and anticipates the thesis of Will Herberg’s Protestant, Catholic, Jew (1955). 
326 Hobson, Gentleman’s Agreement, 254; This is perhaps the only moment in the entire novel when Hobson points 
up Jewish culture, or hints that she is imbedded in a Jewish cultural or literary world. In fact, her parents were both 
involved in Yiddish journalism: her mother wrote for the newspaper Der tog, and her father was a founder of the 
Forverts. Gordan, “Laura Z. Hobson and the Making of Gentleman’s Agreement,” 236–37. 
327 Jacobson, “Becoming Caucasian,” 93. 
328 Hobson, Gentleman’s Agreement, 197. 
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[sic] outside the novel’s moral compass are cases where questions of ‘difference’ and justice 
cannot be resolved by an argument of ‘sameness’ indicated by literal interchangability [sic].”329 
Characters believe that “beating” antisemitism is a “much easier” stepping stone to “getting 
decent with” Black Americans, who at the time faced far greater legal discrimination and 
segregation than Jewish Americans, not only in the Jim Crow South, but also in Northern cities 
such as New York.330 However, the novel’s characters believe in this stepping stone, in part, 
because they also support that race is substantively real and that (Ashkenazi) Jews belong in the 
“Caucasian Race.” 
While the novel is full of references to what it might mean to “look Jewish,” it also 
implies that merely knowing or expecting that someone is Jewish is enough to initiate a process 
of typological sight, and thus establish them as visibly Jewish. This is the conceit of Phil’s 
experiment: “He’d be the same guy, the same face, the same voice, manner, tweed suit, same 
eyes, nose, body,” yet all it should take is telling people that he’s Jewish for him to appear 
Jewish.331 Some colleagues even note, “There’s that Jewish something when he smiles, around 
the mouth,” once the rumor of his Jewishness spreads.332 Phil also thinks often about Dave’s 
appearance, and as he studies Dave’s face one evening, he ponders, “Where was it, this 
Jewishness?” Unable to land on any specific feature, he nonetheless decides, “If you thought, 
you’d know this man was Jewish. It was there somewhere. In the indented arcs of the nostrils? In 
the turn of his lips? In the quiet eyes?”333 This continues the “paradox of Jewish types.” The 
 
329 Jacobson, “Becoming Caucasian,” 96. 
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inability to determine a particular facial trait as Jewish will not shake his confidence that he can 
visually determine an entire face as Jewish. Likewise, perhaps as a foreshadow, the novel’s 
Jewish character who passes as a gentile, Miss Wales (née Walovsky), initiates typological 
assessment. Phil wonders about her, “Her high cheekbones made her seem Scandinavian, Slavic, 
something foreign and interesting.”334 However, acknowledging that his thought process had 
been racial, Phil quickly pauses and mocks himself, “the Nordic type; the Aryan type”; he then 
determines to seek out an article that, “Life ran a couple of years ago by Hooton of Harvard 
about the balderdash of race and types” for research.335 Balderdash it may be, but Phil is 
practiced in this form of seeing, which as late as 1939 circulated in popular publications such as 
Life. Gentleman’s Agreement, like the other novels discussed in this chapter, narrates the familiar 
pattern of typological sight and racial determination, which was mediated by the popular 
circulation of scientific knowledge. 
Other instances suggest that “looking Jewish” is not a matter of phenotype but is the 
product of a vulgar brand of self-presentation, particular to Jewish women. There persisted a 
common perception from as early as the 1920s, that Jewish women were excessively made-up, 
 
334 Hobson, 99. 
335 Hobson, 101–2; The physical anthropologist Earnest Hooton did not actually write an article in Life magazine, 
but this moment is likely referring to a real profile that the photojournalistic weekly on August 7th, 1939 about 
Hooton and his work. While nothing is written of a Jewish type at all in the article or in the graphs, there is one 
separate graphic, which is the only of its kind in the piece. The image breaks down the origins of the “Jewish Face,” 
and its caption explains that the, “Jewish face is derived from a mixture of other strains as this drawing by Hooton 
shows. Jews owe their intellectual superiority, Hooton thinks, to the fact that persecution has eliminated their 
morons. Urging intermarriage as a solution to the problem, he says, ‘a little [Jewish blood] would have improved the 
shape of my nose’” (65). This caption is admittedly perplexing. What exactly is the problem to be solved? What can 
be seen from these drawings about the problem or the solution posed by the Jewish face? And yet, this very graphic 
and caption, in their precise lack of context exemplifies that even in one of the most widely circulated publications 
in the United States, one could find such eugenic material and such notions of a Jewish race and a Jewish face. 
Walter Stockley, “Hooton of Harvard,” Life (Meredith Corporation, August 7, 1939). 
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loud, and gaudy “ghetto girls,” as described by Riv-Ellen Prell.336 In the novel Kathy, the novel’s 
proxy for the White Anglo Saxon Protestant upper class, uses self-presentation markers to 
visually identify Jewish women while out skiing. Perhaps she identifies them aurally: she first 
hears two women’s accented speech, one of which speaks in a “strident voice.” They are also 
coming from a beginner’s ski slope, suggesting new access to wealth and leisure activities. Even 
more troubling for Kathy, they wear shiny costume jewelry and thick makeup that “cracks” and 
“congeals,” and freezes in beads—ill-suited for the outdoor sport. Kathy thinks, “Why do they 
do it? she thought miserably. Why do they make themselves so noticeable? It’s awful. It’s just 
awful…All Jews aren’t vulgar and overdressed.” She regrets the “injustice that taxed a whole 
group for the offense of two ill-bred girls,” and lauds herself for this enlightened view.337 Even 
though the narrative circuits through her internal monologue, it never states her conclusion 
explicitly that she has detected or read these women as Jewish—but, of course, this is what has 
happened. The interaction later causes her to look around the tastefully presented patrons at her 
genteel ski resort and note regretfully that “There was not one face that was obviously 
‘Jewish.’”338 It would have been suitable to Kathy to find “obviously ‘Jewish’” faces, so long as 
their makeup and clothing were more tasteful.  
The relationship is not so clear-cut between manners and self-presentation and 
racialization in the novel. As Gordan has noted, “appearance and manners” loom large “in 
Hobson’s solution to the problem of antisemitism.”339 Even the Jewish Miss Wales describes 
 
336 Prell, Fighting to Become Americans, 22. 
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Jewish women who are “loud” and “wear too much rouge” as “the kikey ones,” for whom more 
palatable Jews like herself and Phil Green must “be the fall.”340 In response to her comment, Phil, 
enraged at her distinction among Jews, says “You mean because we don’t look especially 
Jewish,” and then thinks to himself that it is because the two of them are “‘white’ Jews.”341 The 
characters closely link “whiteness” with the absence of Jewish vulgarity. So too, in Kathy’s trip 
to the ski lodge, we can infer a racialized gaze: an implicit visual process that allows her to 
identify faces as either “obviously ‘Jewish’” or not. The novel clearly favors a change in visual 
practice over Kathy’s project of respectability. While Kathy hopes for a change in others’ self-
presentation in order to make themselves racially un-marked, Phil hopes to change his own 
processes of perception. 
Re-Disciplining the Biological Imagination 
In large part, the novel’s critique of the visible Jewish type functions not so much by 
denying the “Jewish type” or Jewish visual distinctiveness, but by narrating the process of un-
learning these ideas. Whereas Kathy could not help but see the strident-voiced, gloopy-eyed 
women on the ski slopes and identify them as Jews (even if she believed them not to be 
representative), the novel demonstrates how Phil makes use of and rejects racial typology. Facial 
characteristics are not invisible to him, nor to the novel. It witnesses them, reproduces them, and 
then claims that they are of no importance. One Jewish character, Dr. Lieberman is described as 
short and stout, “with the face of a Jew in a Nazi cartoon, the beaked nose, the blue jowls, and 
the curling black hair. Phil saw all of it, and the fine candid eyes.”342 Detail by phenotypic detail, 
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the novel corroborates the “Nazi” caricature’s depiction through realist description (although the 
association between Jews and hooked noses was by no means a Nazi invention343). The novel 
narrates Phil’s experience of seeing through the lens of a racist caricature (“Phil saw all of it”). 
He, however, is able to see the individual (his “fine and candid eyes”), despite the conditioning 
of the propaganda image. Phil enacts, but resists, the typological process of seeing. In other 
words, he is un-learning typology. If, as Jacobson notes, Hobson’s “novel is…intricately laced 
through with the twin themes of ‘looking Jewish’ and ‘seeing Jews,’” then it also repeatedly 
shows how its characters contest the construction of these very themes.344 
At the same time as the novel proposes Phil’s experiment to unearth antisemitism and 
disprove the “Jewish type,” Dr. Lieberman engages in a converse “research project,” which also 
attempts to re-discipline typological sight. Their two experiments, which they discuss “as though 
they were colleagues in a laboratory,” highlight the ambivalent attitude of the novel about Jewish 
visual distinctiveness.345 While Phil, a non-Jew, convinces people that he is Jewish with 
considerable ease, Dr. Lieberman, a Jew, can only convince people that he is not Jewish with 
 
343 The Jewish nose is one of the best trodden features of Jewish physical distinctiveness. The drawing of a hooked 
nose would reasonably be associated with the Nazis in the context of this American, postwar novel, yet the image far 
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published alongside a now famous, often reproduced image of three noses labeled scientifically as “Figures” one 
through three. The image is reproduced, for instance, in the entry in the Jewish Encyclopedia under “Jewish nose,” 
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occur in higher frequency among Jews. Joseph Jacobs and Maurice Fishberg, “Nose,” in The Jewish Encyclopedia 
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by Ernst Hiemer, published by Der Sturmer publisher Julius Striecher. . 
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considerable difficulty. Describing his crusade, Dr. Lieberman says, “I will go forth and state 
flatly, ‘I am not a Jew.’…With this face that becomes not an evasion but a new principle. A 
scientific principle.”346 Dr. Lieberman implies that it would be impossible for him to attempt to 
“pass” as a non-Jew, because of the obviousness of his facial appearance. Instead, his statement 
is designed to challenge people to see “a Jew” as a religious, rather than scientific or racial 
categorization. After all, he states, 
“I have no religion, so I am not Jewish by religion. Further, I am a scientist, so I must rely on 
science which tells me I am not Jewish by race since there’s no such thing as a distinct Jewish 
race. As for ethnic group or Jewish type, we know I fit perfectly the Syrian or Turkish or 
Egyptian type—there’s no such thing, anthropologically, as the Jewish type.”347 
 
By discursively shifting the categorical status of “Jewish” from race to religion, Dr. Lieberman 
also attempts to disentangle Jewish physical distinctiveness from the scientific, visual process of 
typology. He thus challenges onlookers (and readers) to develop a new practice of non-
typological sight. 
Gentleman’s Agreement wields scientific authority in order to extract Jewishness from 
racial discourse—and from biological discourse more generally. For this reason, it seems utterly 
surprising that Phil simultaneously attempts to figure his experiment—both metaphorically and 
literally—through biological imagination. In particular, he uses biology to conceive of the 
relationship between his brief experiment and the experience of antisemitism over the entire 
course of Jewish history, and over the entire course of a life. At one point he says to Dave that 
experiencing a lifetime of antisemitism “must be worse on the organism…to drag it out year 
after year.”348 Phil frames his own experience as akin to recapitulation—the evolutionary theory 
 
346 Hobson, 212. 
347 Hobson, 212. 
348 Hobson, 183. 
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that a fetus in utero moves through each stage of its species’ development—the same theory that 
Mary Antin references when she suggests that the inner drama she experiences upon eating un-
kosher meat reenacts civilization’s development. Phil posits his rationale for “becoming” a Jew 
as, “Just as the embryo in the womb reproduced in nine months the whole evolutionary process 
of the race, maybe he could reproduce in himself in a short time the whole history of 
persecution.”349 Recapitulation thus serves as a model for his project of understanding Jewish 
subjectivity through a compressed reproduction of history.  
Phil imagines that he can reproduce a process of reproduction, doubling his biological 
metaphor. Phil becomes a Jew, as an embryo becomes an infant, as a tadpole becomes a human. 
In this conceptualization, Phil associates Jewish subjectivity with the “whole history of 
persecution.” Moreover, the desire to reproduce this history in a brief period of time echoes the 
typological impulse to look at a Jewish face and “traverse the aeons of time,” or to find, “the 
stamp of a longer, more complex heredity…the brand of suffering,” expressed by Joseph Jacobs 
and Israel Zangwill, respectively.350 Of course, for Phil this reproduction of a long history over a 
brief period of time would be strictly felt in his body, and not seen typologically in his face. 
Tracing this biological metaphor for Phil’s experiment across the novel, we witness again 
the re-disciplining of his own biological imagination. Phil eventually rejects his initial idea that 
one could come to understand discrimination over the same time period as human gestation. He 
fumes, “Maybe the slow embryo in the patient womb needed nine months to reproduce the 
sweep from tadpole to man, but no such time was needed to re-create the reaction to prejudice. 
He’d been a fool that night, a fancy maker of metaphor and simile. Whole history of persecution 
 
349 Hobson, 67. 
350 Jacobs, “The Jewish Type and Galton’s Composite Photographs,” 269; Zangwill, qtd. Fishberg, The Jews, 99. 
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indeed.”351 If much of the novel’s thesis is dedicated to undermining the scientific or empirical 
basis of Jewish visual distinctiveness, then this moment reflects an interest in debunking a notion 
of inherited biological difference more broadly. Phil continues, “He’d forgotten that the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics was a myth. The baby born in the ghetto was as free of the 
history of persecution as it was free of his father’s skill at making neckties or mathematical 
formulae. But these teachers were soon met, and they taught their devious lessons rapidly as 
well.”352 Jewish subjectivity, according to Phil’s two-week experiment, owes itself to the 
continued presence of discrimination, rather than an inherited history of persecution.353 Most 
significantly, this internal monologue narrates Phil revising a biological metaphor. Even though 
he knows them to be “myth,” the concepts of recapitulation and soft inheritance linger in his 
imagination. This is a moment of engaging, rupturing, and re-disciplining the biological 
imagination, in response to the cultural and historical moment. Gentleman’s Agreement, as a 
didactic “problem novel” that uses sentimentality to initiate social change, models this re-
disciplining so as to change the reader as well. 
Phil by no means rejects biological imagination writ large at that moment. He instead 
continues to frame his experience in terms of bodily, biological change. He describes that very 
change he registers within himself over the course of only two weeks as, “A mutation had been 
produced in the bunched nerves, in the eardrums that caught nuance, in the very corneas that 
gave him sight.”354 Although Phil curses himself for being “a fancy maker of metaphor and 
 
351 Hobson, Gentleman’s Agreement, 119. 
352 Hobson, 119. 
353 For more cultural and literary reactions to inheritance of acquired traits, or “soft inheritance,” in the form of 
epigenetics, see Chapter 4. 
354 Hobson, Gentleman’s Agreement, 119. 
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simile,” he takes issue, not with the biological framework itself, but its mere use as metaphor. 
Put another way, he emphasizes the production rather than simulated reproduction of bodily 
change: he had imagined that evolutionary change would be modeled, or reproduced during his 
experiment, but instead he found that a mutation has been produced. He, along with Dr. 
Lieberman, rejects Jewishness as a biological fact, but he comes to determine the Jewishness of 
his body biologically. Jewishness develops through his embodied experiences, divorced from the 
concept of inheritance.  
Phil’s now biologically Jewish body is established, not by what others can perceive about 
him, but by the ways that his body is able to perceive (his bunched nerves, his eardrums, his 
corneas). Ironically, this new biologically Jewish body—or body that now perceives 
“Jewishly”—resonates with prior, established motifs used to understand Jewish visual 
distinctiveness. Phil’s Jewish perception (or ability to perceive Jewishly) maps rather nicely onto 
the circular notion of a Jewish gaze perpetuated in typological racial photography. This is the 
very idea expressed in Miller’s Focus, when Newman imagines that the special gaze of the Jew 
can also “make a Jew of him.” Phil indeed revises that concept through the biological framework 
of “mutation.” In a sense, framing this new ability as a physical mutation doubles down on the 
scientific validity of a Jewish gaze or Jewish mode of perception. Despite the novel’s optimistic 
arc, showing that typology can be dismantled through the re-disciplining of the biological 
imagination, it seems that this new discipline may amount to little more than re-naming the 
assumptions and processes of typological sight that the characters had set out to debunk. 
The imagery in these fictional passages is strikingly similar to a moment in a 1944 letter 
to Hobson from her editor Lee Wright at Simon and Schuster (who was also Jewish). In the 
letter, Wright tries to discourage Hobson from writing the book about a gentile who passes as a 
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Jew, which would become Gentleman’s Agreement. She writes, “…But you who are writing this 
book, are a Jew. How can you put yourself in his place? There are generations of philosophic 
submission in your blood and bones. You were born with an instinctive acceptance of a special 
place in the world. He would be hurt more deeply and in a special way than a Jew would be hurt, 
because he would be both the victim and the persecutor.”355 Gordan has recently uncovered this 
letter as evidence of the resistance Hobson faced from professional and personal associates when 
she expressed her plan to write a novel about antisemitism in the early 1940s. For the purposes of 
this argument though, the letter carries significance as a critique for which Hobson’s passages 
about recapitulation and inherited traits may serve as preemptive rejoinders. These narrative 
moments are written over and against not only Hobson’s earlier exchange with Wright, but also 
an entire discourse about biological Jewish inheritance and racial types. Indeed, the bodily 
imagery and the biologically imagined inheritance of Jewish suffering, or “philosophic 
submission,” is at the heart of what Hobson is attempting to reframe for her readers when she 
models the dispensing of typological sight. 
Conclusion  
This chapter has illustrated that for Jewish American authors writing in the 1940s, a key 
strategy for critiquing antisemitism at home and abroad was to dramatize the extent to which 
American anti-Semitic practices are performed visually and rooted in biological knowledge. In 
re-enacting the American myth that all differences are only “skin-deep,” these authors present 
narratives in which characters reform their biological imaginations. This study has expanded 
upon the previous chapter, which argued that the photographic practice of producing Jewish 
 
355 Wright, qtd. Gordan, “Laura Z. Hobson and the Making of Gentleman’s Agreement,” 247–48. 
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types was also informed by biology and circulated through American and Jewish American 
popular media. Fiction, too, attests to the popular application of these visual, scientific 
practices—or perhaps more precisely, practices which were culturally based and justified 
through scientific systematization. Such interplay in the cultural and literary lives of scientific 
ideas is precisely what I describe as the biological imagination. These novels, in English and 
Yiddish, written both before and after 1945, illustrate that authors were by no means squeamish 
about introducing the idea of biological Jewish inheritance or scientifically defined, Jewish 
physical distinctiveness into their literary works: on the contrary, scientific knowledge was 
central to critiquing antisemitism. In each of these works, the logical conclusion of such 
exposure would be the reforming—not the rejection—of the biological imagination.  
While each novel employs these common themes of typology and race science, Singer’s 
Yiddish novel—the only one completed before the full horror of the Holocaust unfolded—stands 
out for its relatively bleaker outlook. In Family Carnovsky, the dissolution of race science and a 
biological Jewishness is narrated in the mode of tragedy rather than triumph. By contrast, the 
English-language novels (especially Gentleman’s Agreement and to a lesser extent, Focus) 
mount relatively hopeful arguments for Jewish inclusion in an American—notably, white—
society, through warning calls that unearth the dangers of anti-Semitic race science and typology. 
The texts analyzed in this chapter all critique a form of biological race science that is now 
deemed “pseudoscience.” Indeed, these novels of the 1940s do not merely reflect that paradigm 
shift, but imaginatively will it. 
The sources and ideas of these two chapters have also caused me to reconsider a personal 
story of my own. I hope readers will indulge me this foray into a piece of family lore, tantamount 
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to legend, about my now deceased great uncle, Samuel Ritvo. What follows is the transcription 
from an oral history interview I conducted with him when I was in the tenth grade: 
“It’s quite interesting, when I graduated from medical school, you had to go in to the 
dean’s office to get your diploma because they didn’t hand them out at the graduation 
ceremony…so when I went in to get my diploma, the registrar, a very nice, elderly woman, Ms. 
Dacey was her name, she ran the dean’s office, she was the first one to call me ‘Dr. Ritvo,’ 
congratulated me, and she said—strangely—she said, ‘I remember the day your application came 
into this office.’ So I looked at her, I wondered why it was so memorable, and she went to the 
filing cabinet, took out my application, and tore off the photograph attached to it, and handed it 
to me, and said, ‘I looked at the photo, and thought, he doesn’t look like the ordinary kind of 
Jewish boy who wants to be a doctor, so I put it on the pile to call for interviews.’  
“So that was a pretty stunning thing to hear. But what she didn’t know, you see, is that 
when I was applying, I knew I had to have a photograph, at those days, you could go to a 
machine, and for twenty-five cents, could get a cheap photograph, I thought, ‘well I’d better not 
do that, this was too important to risk on a poor photograph.’ So I took my last two or three 
dollars, and went to the most expensive photographer on Harvard Square…he had photos of the 
baseball team, and the football team, and socialites in his window. And I went in and I told him 
what I needed, and I said to him, ‘I know it isn’t easy, but you have to do the best you can for 
me.’ So he sat me down, looked at me from different angles, and he said, ‘I could make you look 
like a left tackle,’ and he did, so that’s the photo that got me into medical school.” 
 
Before the interview I had already known about this photograph that had gotten Sam into 
Yale’s medical school in the late 1930s. Copies of the photograph hang in his daughter’s dining 
room and in a conference room dedicated to him at that same institution, where he worked for 
many decades. Sam, the American-born son of Jewish immigrants from Lithuania, related the 
story with good humor and laughed during our interview. And my family—his own children, 
sister, nephews—always seemed amused by the story and took pleasure in its punch lines, 
delivered both by the photographer and by the medical school registrar. “I could make you look 
like a left tackle.” “He doesn’t look like the ordinary kind of Jewish boy who wants to be a 
doctor.” Yet this story has always unsettled me: not only is this a reminder that institutions such 
as Yale tried to keep Jews out of its ranks (as is now a well-recorded pattern in elite institutions 
of American higher education in the early twentieth century), but also, barely beneath the surface 
of the story is an assumption that one can discern the ordinary kind of Jewish boy from looking 
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at a photograph. It would not be an exaggeration to state that Sam’s success and the fate of his 
family depended on that image. And this to me, even when I lacked the language to articulate it, 
seemed frighteningly precarious. How could so much depend on one person’s interpretation of 
your photograph? 
I now believe that this story poignantly illustrates biological imagination, expressed 
through the framework of typological sight. The story of the registrar looking at Sam’s 
photograph exemplifies the typological process of looking, as when the fictional Newman reads 
his own quasi-photographic image in the bathroom mirror—or when Joseph Jacobs interpreted 
Francis Galton’s composite photographs, or when readers would have seen the photographic 
types published in McClure’s within the article, “The Jewish Invasion of America.” If these two 
chapters have demonstrated how Jewish types were created, conceived, and circulated, then this 
personal story suggests the implications of these visual practices for an individual’s lived 
experience. Sam’s is a story of photographic artifice and manipulation at the same time as it is a 
story about investments in photographic authority. Sam, attuned to the significance of 
photographic, facial scrutiny within the admissions process, invests his money in the photograph. 
So too, the registrar invests faith in Sam as a deserving prospective student because she is so 
confident in her reading of the photograph, and even recollects enacting this process of 
discernment, three years—and presumably hundreds of applicants—later. In fact, while the 
story’s pleasure might derive from the irony of making Sam (a person who dealt his entire life 
with a physical disability) into the image of a football player, its complexity lies in the 
withholding of a reveal. The story as I have always heard it never suggests whether the registrar 
thought better of her initial reading of Sam’s photograph upon meeting him in the flesh. 
Somehow, there existed an idea of a “Jewish type” captured, created, or denied by the camera 
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lens, as well as the process of discernment enacted by the registrar, which carried a unique 
authority.  
I mention this story, in part because it thematically links the analysis of Jewish 
photographic types in the previous chapter to the narratives of name- and face-scrutiny in job 
applications in this one. It also illustrates personal investments in stories about the Jewish type, 
and even biology more generally. It suggests how people can enact or invoke biologically rooted 
processes, even if they do not intentionally hold them as “scientific fact” (much in the manner of 
Phil Green, who metaphorizes, then ultimately rejects, the concepts of recapitulation and soft 
inheritance). The next chapter will explore this phenomenon further, as it exists in the postwar 
and contemporary periods. In particular, I will investigate a not-often acknowledged 
ambivalence around the idea of an inherited Yiddish language, both for those who speak Yiddish 
and for those who do not. Perhaps it should go without saying that the idea that one can 
biologically inherit a language is magical thinking. And yet, as I will show, within the critical-
artistic field of Queer Yiddish, political and emotional stances toward this very idea—and toward 
“biology” itself—are often at odds in complex and even fruitful ways.  
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Chapter 5 “Strange Creatures Who Must Grow Gills:” Between Queer and Heritable 
Models of Contemporary Yiddish Language and Culture” 
 
 
In 1997, the Berkeley, California-based, radical queer Jewish journal, Davka published a 
then nearly decade-old poem by the bilingual Yiddish-English poet Irena Klepfisz, “Etleche 
Verter Oyf Mame Loshn/A Few Words in the Mother Tongue.”356 The poem has often been 
understood as not only bilingual and self-translating, but also as a teacher of Yiddish (a language 
also known as “mame loshn,” or in English, “mother tongue”). The poem, originally published in 
1988, opens with what seems like a glossary, listing the Yiddish names for archetypes of Jewish 
womanhood and their English translations: 
lemoshl: for example 
 
di kurve   the whore 
a woman who acknowledges her passions 
 
di yidene   the Jewess   the Jewish woman 
ignorant   overbearing 
let’s face it: every woman is one 
 
di yente   the gossip   the busybody 
who knows what’s what 
and is never caught off guard 
 




356 In Davka, the accompanying illustration comprises of a single woman’s photograph reproduced and distorted in 
multiple ways: one is pixelated, one is fuzzy and out of focus, another is made to look heat-scanned. The slightly 
different images of the same woman are labeled as different types: yente, kurve, yidene, and lezbianke (busybody, 
whore, Jewish woman, and lesbian)—suggesting the external imposition of these archetypal labels. These different 
female archetypes, which are the central “few words in the mother tongue” from Klepfisz’s poem present a rather 
eerie echo to the Forverts’s “Tipn fun yidishe froyen.” Irena Klepfisz, “Etlekhe Verter Oyf Mame Loshn/A Few 
Words in the Mother Tongue,” Davka: A Jewish Cultural Revolution, Winter 1997. 
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dos vaybl   the wife 
or the little woman357 
 
Figure 6 Graphic from Davka publication of Klepfisz's poem, 1997. (University of Michigan Library Special Collections) 
In this publication, “Etleche verter” served as an exemplar of what the magazine was celebrating 
as Queer Yiddishkeit. Two neighboring essays in that issue coined the concept: one by journalist 
Alisa Solomon, titled “Notes on Klez/Kamp,” which scholars have attributed as the first use of 
the phrase; and another by performance artist Sara Felder, titled “Moving Toward the Punchline 
(Or, How I learned to Stop Worrying and Discovered Queer Yiddishkeit).” Felder’s piece also 
includes an English poem translated into Yiddish by Klepfisz. If this issue of Davka can be 
considered an inceptive moment for a movement known as Queer Yiddishkeit, then “Etleche 
verter” and Klepfisz’s bilingual poetry served as a linchpin within the movement. 
 
357 Klepfisz, 38. 
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Figure 7 Cover of Davka, Winter 1997. (University of Michigan Library Special Collections) 
Since that moment, Queer Yiddishkeit has come to describe a cluster of artistic 
production and a critical rubric, both of which draw a symbolic, political connection between 
queer culture and Yiddish culture. Queer Yiddish theorists ask how queer theory can illuminate 
the study of Yiddish language and culture, and Solomon, in the aforementioned article proclaims 
that “queer Yiddishkeit is Queer Theory in action.”358 Most significantly for this dissertation, 
Queer Yiddishkeit and Queer Yiddish critique borrow from queer theory the mandate to reject 
biology (biological reproduction in particular), and to seek alternative, specifically non-
 
358 Alisa Solomon, “Notes on Klez/Kamp,” Davka: A Jewish Cultural Revolution, Winter 1997, 28. 
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biological models of inheritance and cultural reproduction for Yiddish language and culture.359 
Accordingly, Queer Yiddish critique is full of calls to eschew the biological. For example, 
Yiddish scholar, Jeffrey Shandler argues that Queer Yiddishkeit challenges the “biological model 
of intergenerational cultural transmission.”360 Cultural reproduction “without DNA” is precisely 
how Jonathan Freedman has described Queer Diasporism (his preferred term, which he 
understands as analogous to Queer Yiddishkeit).361 For Freedman, this model of reproduction is 
both “anti-normative” and “anti-genetic.”362  
I do not approach the critical project of Queer Yiddishkeit itself with particular 
skepticism, but considering the critical field, I find it necessary to ask what is meant by 
biological or genetic (or anti-genetic, for that matter). From context, it can be gathered that in 
instances such as these, the term “biological” often serves as a metonym for heteronormativity, 
conservatism, or overly linear conceptions of history and temporality—things well worth 
contesting.363 However, as this chapter will argue, a number of prominent works of Queer 
Yiddish (including the above poem by Klepfisz) demonstrate the unique possibilities of the 
biological imagination in the very project of challenging linear conceptions of Yiddish and 
Jewish culture. I see this examination of the meaning of “biology” for Queer Yiddish as aligned 
with the critical project, and even sharpening its own definition. I not only remove “biology” or 
 
359 Jeffrey Shandler, “Queer Yiddishkeit: Practice and Theory,” Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish 
Studies 25, no. 1 (September 20, 2006): 110, https://doi.org/10.1353/sho.2006.0140. 
360 Jeffrey Shandler, Adventures in Yiddishland: Postvernacular Language & Culture, 263 p. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2005), 189, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/. 
361 Freedman, Klezmer America, 91. 
362 Freedman, 93. 
363 Weiman-Kelman, Queer Expectations, xxiv. 
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“biological” from the category against which Queer Yiddishkeit defines itself, I propose that we 
understand the biological imagination as integral to Queer Yiddish writing and thought.  
Biology—as I discuss it in this dissertation—is a form of knowledge, which has been 
used in Jewish American cultural and literary production in order to highlight the possibility of a 
material, organic embodiment of Jewish inheritance or Jewish history. In the preceding chapters, 
“biology” sometimes refers to evolutionary theory, sometimes to race or typology. That is to say, 
it encompasses far more than processes of sexual reproduction. This more copious understanding 
of biology helps us see that biology itself is not necessarily Queer Yiddishkeit’s diametric, 
categorical opposite. By using “biological” as a placeholder for heteronormative reproduction, 
we lose out on the (sometimes complex, sometimes uneasy) artistic and intellectual affordances 
of the biological imagination in Queer Yiddish works. In particular, there are two biological 
concepts often at play in Queer Yiddishkeit. The first is the notion of Yiddish’s “extinction,” 
which links the language and its “survival” to the organic bodies of its “native speakers.” The 
second is the notion of Yiddish as an “inheritance,” which can be transmitted through the body, 
even for those who do not speak or know the language. While these two ideas might appear at 
cross purposes, they feed into one another. This chapter traces the interplay of desires for 
Yiddish and its survival, through the conflicting uses of these two ways of imagining the 
biological transmission of the language.  
Queer Yiddishkeit’s prominent (though certainly not exclusive) investment in the 
question of transmission makes it an especially rich site for considering the biological 
imagination in contemporary Jewish culture. I wish to explicitly draw out what is for Queer 
Yiddishkeit an implicit understanding: biological thinking and biologically informed notions of 
Jewish cultural transmissions are active in post-45 Jewish culture, specifically through a not-
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often articulated idea of Yiddish as biologically heritable. Queer Yiddish critics have begun to 
identify for us a conception of linguistic and cultural transmission, which I term here “Heritable 
Yiddish.” The concept of Heritable Yiddish expresses a desire for Yiddish’s continuation in the 
face of its ostensible (or ostensibly imminent) “extinction.” While the concept of a biologically 
heritable Yiddish has been forcefully excoriated by Queer Yiddish critics, Queer Yiddish art also 
often proposes that Yiddish can be carried in the body or can serve as an embodied form of 
knowledge. This chapter, in addition to proposing that we can read Queer Yiddish works—such 
as the poetry of Irena Kelpfisz—as expressions of the biological imagination, will provide a 
genealogy of the concept of a “Heritable Yiddish.” In naming this concept, I aim to articulate 
possibilities that have always been implicit in Queer Yiddish critique. I also propose that this is 
an occasion in which the field’s relationship to Heritable Yiddish, and the biological 
imagination, ought to be re-considered.  
Queer Yiddish: Defining a Field 
Queer Yiddishkeit exists in both artistic and critical iterations, with significant 
connections and divergences between the two. In the 1997 essay, “Notes on Klez/Kamp,” Alisa 
Solomon used the term Queer Yiddishkeit in order to name the preponderance of queer 
involvement in secular Yiddish institutions and spaces. Solomon records what a friend told her 
about an annual Yiddish cultural retreat: “You shoulda been there!...It was crawling with 
queers!…It was always a bunch of [alte] kakers and a bunch of queers, all singing, talking, 
dancing, partying together. It was fabulous.”364 It matters less whether the claim of queer “over-
representation” in the Yiddish world is accurate, than it does that for Solomon and her cohort of 
 
364 Solomon, “Notes on Klez/Kamp,” 28. 
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queer Jews, Yiddish cultural spaces provided space for queer visibility in the Jewish world. Put 
another way, Yiddish culture offered an avenue to be both Jewish and queer, without any felt 
contradiction. As queer Jews have become involved in Klezmer revival bands, theater, literature, 
and performance art, they have incorporated queer and Yiddish sensibilities into their artwork, 
drawing a symbolic, political connection between queer culture and Yiddish culture. 
Significantly, within Queer Yiddishkeit, Yiddish functions largely as just that: a sensibility.  
Yiddish functioning as a sensibility (rather than, say, as a language of expression) in 
Queer Yiddishkeit (or as Solomon calls it, “Jewish Camp”365) falls into a broader post-World 
War II phenomenon, described as “postvernacular” Yiddish.366 According to Shandler, the 
postwar period witnessed a simultaneous decline of the Yiddish language as a vernacular, and 
proliferation of ways that people encounter and use the language. Just as the use of Yiddish’s 
primary semantic level (of communication and expression) has shrunk, the meta-level of its use 
has expanded. A single Yiddish phrase or word could be invested with a great deal of symbolism 
and affect, usually independent of that word’s primary semantic meaning. 367 The language 
becomes a symbol and an aesthetic form in itself. Therefore, in the case of Queer Yiddish art, 
Shandler argues, Yiddish “becomes meaningful in Queer Yiddishkeit as a result of its 
provocative juxtaposition against queerness.”368 Through this symbolic juxtaposition, the 
minoritarian status of Yiddish becomes especially pronounced;  in the words of Solomon, 
 
365 Solomon, 29. 
366 “Postvernacularity” was first coined by Cecile Kuznitz and is the key term through which Jeffrey Shandler 
describes the status of Yiddish in the latter half of the twentieth century. Cecile Kuznitz, “Yiddish Studies,” in 
Oxford Handbook of Jewish Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 549. 
367 Shandler, Adventures in Yiddishland, 3. 
368 Shandler, 188. 
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“queer” and “Yiddish” take shape as “parallel systems of alterity” (a notably different image than 
that of intersecting or “interlocking identities,” often described in Queer of Color critique). 369 As 
Naomi Seidman has pointed out, this foregrounding of minoritarian status, which “tends to 
privilege the transgressive or subversive aspects of culture-as-subculture,” dovetails with the 
general impetus of avant-garde or radical art, yet perhaps does not fully recognize that within 
Jewish culture, Jewishness was in its own way hegemonic and majoritarian.370 On the symbolic 
level, within the art of Queer Yiddishkeit, “queer” sometimes is a stand-in for alterity, and 
“Yiddishkeit” a stand-in for “Jewishness,” with or without the Yiddish language.  
Theorizations of Queer Yiddishkeit often link the phenomenon to questions of genealogy, 
continuity, and futurity. And the stakes of these questions are often articulated through the 
language of “biology.” This is an idea promoted not only by academics, but also by artists such 
as Solomon, who writes that Yiddish feels to her like an avenue for queer Jews to contribute to 
“Jewish continuity,” and to reproduce non-biologically.371 Whereas Solomon reflects the 
possibility that Yiddish culture could provide an alternative mode of reproduction for Queer 
 
369 Muñoz, Disidentifications, 8. 
370 Seidman, The Marriage Plot, 300 Despite such ideas of “parallel” or “analogous” forms of alterity, Seidman also 
points to how Jewish difference in Europe was indeed for a long time articulated as sexual difference, or sexual 
deviance. Often, to the European Christian gaze, the Jewish man was deemed insufficiently masculine and the 
Jewish woman insufficiently feminine. Such depictions often focused on the Jewish man, who was sometimes said 
to menstruate, and sometimes said to be a sexual predator; and, it doesn’t take a Freudian analyst to see that the 
European Christian obsession with Jewish circumcision was quite evidently laden with fear of castration. In such 
ways, Jewish difference has often been constructed through an articulation of sexual difference. Rather than parallel 
systems of alterity, in the Western imagination, Jewishness and queerness have in fact been co-constituted systems. 
Of course, in this historical context, a combined Jewish-sexual alterity was not a form of self-identification, but was 
rather the (sometimes fantastical) estimation of the majoritarian outsider, who deems the Jew different. 
371 Solomon writes, “Retrieving Yiddishkeit also allows us to participate in reproducing Jewish culture, a task queer 
Jews are often accused of neglecting as we don’t fall into heterosexual nuclear families as Jews have assimilated into 
America, that family structure has become the primary site of reproducing; but Queer Yiddishkeit insists that 
making Jewish babies is not the only way to sustain Jewish life. Rather, like artisans who restore faded frescoes, we 
contribute to Jewish continuity by revivifying—but also reshaping—a colorful legacy, all the while raising the 
question that institutional Judaism leaves off the table: not only how to keep Jews Jewish—but why.” Solomon, 
“Notes on Klez/Kamp,” 30. 
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Jews who wouldn’t be engaged in sexual reproduction, Queer Yiddish scholars respond to 
another kind of impasse presented to the Yiddish language itself: the “death,” or the “extinction,” 
of Yiddish. Since the second half of the twentieth century, Yiddish is no longer the de facto 
language of, and marker of, Ashkenazi Jews; these scholars are responding to the way that 
Yiddish itself has its own “transmission” and “reproduction” problem. In the face of this 
supposed impasse, Queer Yiddish critique takes the same terms as Queer Yiddish art and 
reverses the order in its fundamental question. Queer Yiddish critique asks not, “How can 
Yiddish help queer Jews reproduce Jewishness?” It asks instead, “How can queerness or queer 
theory be useful in understanding Yiddish culture and its reproduction in the twentieth century?” 
In other words, if in Queer Yiddish art, Yiddish provides a solution to a “Queer-Jewish” impasse, 
in Queer Yiddish critique, queer theory provides a resolution to what might be called a “Jewish-
Yiddish” impasse. If there had been a “heritable model,” or a genealogical model of Yiddish 
reproduction, Queer Yiddish critics suggest, then perhaps queer theory can provide an 
alternative. 
Thus, Queer Yiddish critique asks what elements of queer theory can be illuminating for 
Yiddish studies. Shandler writes that, “The most provocative implications for modern Yiddish 
culture posed by queer theory are the alternatives it proposes to a biological model of 
intergenerational cultural transmission.”372 Yiddish culture can look like queer culture in its un-
reliance on heterosexual reproduction and heteronormative family structures to sustain itself 
from generation to generation. Shandler builds off the work of Jack Halberstam, who theorizes 
queer time and queer intergenerationality through the study of queer subcultures.373 Shandler 
 
372 Shandler, Adventures in Yiddishland, 89. 
373 Judith Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives, Sexual Cultures viii, 213 
p. (New York: New York University Press, 2005), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/. 
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takes inspiration from queer theory’s example of a peer-cohort model of genealogy as a positive, 
energizing, and historically pervasive form of cultural production. He concludes, “Although 
Yiddish is often vaunted as a ‘golden chain’ forged by an unbroken succession of biological 
generations, it might be better understood in the modern era as proceeding through cohort 
generations, manifest in youth movements, political parties, trade unions, literary circles, 
educational institutions, various immigrant, refugee, and survivor associations, and so on.”374 
Shandler poses the question: What if the queer model of intergenerational continuity was already 
present in Yiddish culture?  
If so, then queer theory can help us understand the last century and a half of Yiddish 
culture writ large. Shandler notes figures such as Yiddish linguist and YIVO founder, Max 
Weinreich, who only learned Yiddish later in life, and the canonical authors, S.Y. Abramovitch, 
I.L. Peretz, and Sholem Aleichem—known as di klassiker, or “the classics”—none of whom 
spoke Yiddish at home with their children. In some ways, the fabricated genealogy of di 
klassiker as the grandfather and grandson of Yiddish literature overcompensates for their 
individual lack of traditionally conceived “Yiddish continuity,” even as it mythologizes and 
champions biological genealogy. (As Norich and Seidman have noted, the fact that Peretz and 
Sholem Aleichem were essentially peers further reveals the artifice of this structure.375) The 
discourse that modern Yiddish figures created around genealogy and intergenerationality do not 
necessarily reflect historical or cultural realities. By abstracting queer theory in order to see a 
“continuity of discontinuity” in modern Yiddish culture, Queer Yiddish critique therefore is 
 
374 Shandler, Adventures in Yiddishland, 190. 
375 Anita Norich, “A Response from Anita Norich,” Prooftexts 20, no. 1–2 (2000): 213–18; Seidman, The Marriage 
Plot. 
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more concerned with queer reproduction (meaning, alternative and anti-normative models of 
intergenerationality) than queer sexuality or gender per se.  
Time and again, Queer Yiddish critique declares its project as seeking alternative, 
specifically non-biological models of inheritance and cultural reproduction for Yiddish language 
and culture.376 The imperative to imagine alternate modes of kinship and (re)production builds on 
the work of queer theorists such as Halberstam and Lee Edelman, both of whom also define the 
sought-after alternative against the biological. There is good reason for this: As Edelman has 
most famously articulated, the hegemonic imperative to procreate, to value the symbolic “Child” 
above all else, has been and remains grounds for oppressing, excluding, and denying the rights of 
queer people (or, to put it concisely, “Fuck Orphan Annie”).377 Edelman rebukes the practice of 
investing more in the future than in the present, while at the same time exclusively imagining a 
future that is merely a version of the present. Halberstam as well seeks to assuage the challenge 
of queer time and re-generation, calling for “intergenerational dialogue without mandatory 
continuity.”378 Accordingly, Halberstam’s project seeks a way of organizing time, not around 
biological reproduction or “reproductive time,” known to some as “the biological clock.”379 For 
these theorists, the problem is that intergenerationality must come with continuity—that futurity 
must mean sameness. And such theorization has shaped the figure of “biology” in Queer Yiddish 
critique: mandatory, conservative, heterosexual, reproductive. 
 
376 Shandler, “Queer Yiddishkeit,” 110. 
377 Edelman writes, “Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we’re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; 
fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and small; fuck 
the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop.” Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer 
Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 29. 
378 Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Place, 185. 
379 Halberstam, 5. 
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This is evident in Freedman’s formulation of Queer Diasporism, a term he uses to 
theorize a radical form of Jewish culture more broadly, and which he considers analogous to the 
theorization of Queer Yiddishkeit.380 Freedman uses the term “queer” to describe a particular 
relationship to roots.381 Queer Diasporism is a sort of diasporism that does require a return to 
roots, or a return to a center.382 In the disavowal of the organic imagery of “roots,” Freedman 
turns to the disavowal of biological reproduction, writing, 
“In the countervision that lies at the heart of the radical Jewish cultural project stands a vision of 
culture as a nongenetic, non-normative form of genesis, making itself by shaping prior and 
contemporary cultural forms into new patterns of mixing and matching—a recombinant form of 
reproduction mysteriously undertaken without any DNA.”383  
 
Exhibited here, Queer Diasporism is a model of cultural production, defined as a “countervision” 
against the biological. This sense of radical Jewish culture aligns the genetic with the normative. 
Biological reproduction is figured once again as conservation, re-producing what is and that 
which already has been. In this respect, a rejection of biology is a rejection of stasis or return. 
Carving out an alternative to a biological model is to seek a model that can account for change. 
 
380 Queer diasporism gains its name from the concept of “queer diaspora,” which has circulated in American ethnic 
studies since the early 2000s. Like Queer Yiddishkeit, it has been defined against the biological. Queer diaspora, as 
delineated by David Eng constitutes, “reconceptualizing diaspora not in conventional terms of ethnic dispersion, 
filiation, and biological traceability, but rather in terms of queerness, affiliation, and social contingency,” with the 
goal of “reorganizing national and transnational communities based not on origin, filiation, and genetics, but on 
destination, affiliation, and the assumption of a common set of social practices or political commitments.” A queer 
diaspora is made through affiliation not filiation, social contingency not biological traceability, and political 
commitments not genetics. The queerness of this diaspora arises through connection, community, and kinship forged 
through consent rather than descent. And this eschewed descent is figured as biology and genetics. David L. Eng, 
“Transnational Adoption and Queer Diasporas,” Social Text 21, no. 3 76 (September 1, 2003): 5, 
https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-21-3_76-1. 
381 Freedman, Klezmer America, 80. 
382 Freedman here adds to an extant discourse on Jewish diaspora. See for instance, Daniel Boyarin and Jonathan 
Boyarin, “Diaspora: Generation and the Ground of Jewish Identity,” Critical Inquiry 19, no. 4 (July 1993): 693–725, 
https://doi.org/10.1086/448694. 
383 Freedman, Klezmer America, 91. 
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At stake for Queer Yiddish critique is not biology writ large, but particularly the 
championing of biological reproduction to the exclusion of all other forms of cultural 
transmission or relation. Queer Yiddish critics invite us to see beyond the model of Yiddish 
culture that insists on parent-to-child transmission. This insistence is only one part of a wider and 
more varied pattern toward which queer Yiddish critics—in fact, which most Yiddish critics—
are theoretically (and rightfully) skeptical. Yet this phenomenon, Heritable Yiddish, also 
pervades Queer Yiddishkeit.  
A Few Words on Biological Imagination in Queer Yiddish Art 
The poetry of Irena Klepfisz exemplifies Queer Yiddish art: It engages thematically with 
queerness and is composed bilingually, in Yiddish and English. Her work also happens to touch 
upon the very issues that Queer Yiddish critique theorizes: It is interested in heritage, language, 
and biology. Klepfisz’s poetry and essays activate Heritable Yiddish discourse, especially when 
her writing emphasizes an organic and biological relationship to language. Moreover, in 
Klepfisz’s poetry, biological themes stand as a way to negotiate questions of bodily inheritance, 
queerness, and the relation to Yiddish language and culture of the same. Acknowledging and 
exploring this can both enrich the interpretation of her work and aid in negotiating the 
relationship between Heritable Yiddish and Queer Yiddish. 
Klepfisz’s essayistic writing about her poetry makes it clear that she is invested in the 
organic basis of—and organic connection to—poetry and language. She has written that she 
includes Yiddish in her poetry so long as, “The Yiddish was an organic part of the emotions that 
drove the poem.”384 Writing in bilingual Yiddish-English is for Klepfisz an experiment, a 
 
384 Irena Klepfisz, “Yiddish: It’s Complicated,” in Languages of Modern Jewish Cultures: Comparative 
Perspectives, ed. Joshua L. Miller and Anita Norich (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016), 397. 
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striving, and an aim for “organic fusion.”385 Klepfisz describes her process of writing in nearly 
Romantic terms, stating that her poems begin “in the body” rather than “as an idea.”386 In this 
schema, “ideas” and cognition are separate from the bodily and the organic. Her Yiddish-English 
poems originate organically, through feeling in the body. Klepfisz thus distinguishes between 
knowledge that is known, and knowledge that exists outside of cognition, felt elsewhere in the 
self.  
As much as Klepfisz’s experiment is present- and future-oriented, she also writes that it is 
a way to access the past, or a “cultural yesrushe/legacy.”387 Klepfisz distinctly translates 
“yerushe” in her essay as “legacy,” choosing this meaning of “yerushe” over other uses of the 
word, including inheritance (often material or financial). According to Klepfisz, “The act of 
writing partly in Yiddish also allowed me to place myself somewhat closer to my Yiddish 
literary ancestors.”388 The poet’s understanding of her own project is that writing in Yiddish is a 
way to establish a literary lineage, reaching backwards. Her intentionally forged connection to 
the literary yerushe is a constructed form kinship, with echoes to the queer concept of the chosen 
family. As Zohar Weiman-Kelman has written of Klepfisz’s bilingual work, “Using Yiddish is a 
political—not a naturalized—means of cultural transmission.”389 At the same time, this chosen 
kinship is accessed through Yiddish words which are figured as an organic, bodily resource. In 
this intentional, queer, literary kinship, Yiddish is simultaneously a choice and an inheritance, an 
 
385 Klepfisz, 401. 
386 Klepfisz, 400. 
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388 Ibid., 327 
389 Weiman-Kelman, Queer Expectations, 107. 
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agential expression and an awakening of what is otherwise latent in the body. This is an organic 
inheritance, even though it is not necessarily the result of direct parental lineage. 
In the collection of bilingual poems, “Etleche Verter Oyf Mame Loshn/A Few Words in 
the Mother Tongue,” Klepfisz’s poetry employs the concept of Heritable Yiddish as well.390 The 
collection’s title frames Yiddish (which, for most of her readers, is an unknown language) as a 
“mother tongue.” The titular moment of self-translation simultaneously thrones and dethrones 
Yiddish as “mother tongue.” The term, “mother tongue,” generally means the first language that 
a person learns, presumably from a mother, and the concept has a long history of connecting 
national identity to the organic body. However, in the Yiddish language, and in this poem, 
“mame loshn” refers specifically to Yiddish, rather than to the general concept. The title 
therefore causes a bit of dissonance: the Yiddish phrase suggests that Yiddish is the mother 
tongue, yet the phrase’s immediate translation out of Yiddish ironically reminds readers of 
Klepfisz’s poetry that Yiddish is not their mother tongue (why would I need someone to translate 
from my mother tongue so that I may understand it?). The self-translated title tells readers that 
Yiddish is both their mother tongue and a language that they do not yet know. 
The idea of “not yet” known knowledge is crucial to this poetic project, because 
Klepfisz’s bilingual poems have a teaching form and function. Throughout the cycle of bilingual 
poems, each Yiddish word is glossed and reiterated; the macaronic poetics performs didactic, 
rhythmic repetition, mimicking a vocabulary lesson or a dictionary. In the cycle, Yiddish might 
be the mother tongue, but it is a language that the readers still have to learn (through reading the 
poems). Klepfisz’s minimalist poetry juxtaposes the ultimate connection to language asserted in 
 
390 This collection of poems was named after Klepfisz’s first bilingual poem of the same name. They are published 
in a book of new and collected poems, also titled A Few Words in the Mother Tongue. Irena Klepfisz, A Few Words 
in the Mother Tongue: Poems Selected and New (1971-1990) (Eighth Mountain Press, 1990). 
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the label “mother tongue” with an implied paucity of knowledge of said language. With the 
status of mame loshn, Yiddish may hold a certain prominence for readers, but that does not 
consist of a typical kind of knowledge. As such, the poems highlight a not-yet-tapped internal 
resource, connection, or knowledge of language. Such a conception of Yiddish as heritable yet 
latent uses biology as a model —whether the model is Mendel’s concept of a recessive trait, or 
Darwinian reversion, or the fictional Dr. Carnovsky’s pondered atavism.  
The biological imagination is also at work in the way that “Etleche verter” engages and 
reverses the motif of Yiddish’s extinction. Seeing Yiddish as a dying or endangered language is 
not only a common trope: it is the dominant narrative of the language in popular Jewish culture. 
As Norich describes and challenges, a dominant narrative of Yiddish in the United States tells of 
its natural, unavoidable supplanting by English, or its “organic dilution.”391 This story is not 
entirely unique to Yiddish, or to Jewish American culture. Whenever people refer to languages’ 
endangerment, extinction, and survival, they are applying biological concepts (developed for the 
study of populations and species) to the study of interactions between languages and their 
speakers. These figurations invite us to imagine languages engaged in a Malthusian struggle for 
existence.392 Some of Klepfisz’s bilingual poems do indeed emphasize Yiddish as the language of 
ghosts and of extinction, while others explicitly work against the grain of this cultural narrative. 
Her Yiddish-and-English poetry consciously returns Yiddish into the contemporary sphere and 
reverses the supposed extinction through translation and through asserting the Yiddish 
language’s intimate, primary, biological status as “mame loshn.”  
 
391 Norich, Discovering Exile, 4. 
392 Emily Apter, The Translation Zone: A New Comparative Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2011), 4. 
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Some poems in the “etlekhe verter” cycle emphasize language loss as a bodily 
phenomenon. The poem, “Di tsung/The Tongue” presents Yiddish as a physical lack, or 
something that exists only awkwardly in the body: 
Zi Shvaygt. 
 
Di verter feln ir 
she lacks the words 























  the tears.393 
 
Like many of the poems the cycle, this poem uses a bilingual, self-translating, “diptych” 
structure, which mimics a glossary. Each of these sounds is represented by a roman-character 
vowel, which is an imperfect index for the Yiddish sounds. For instance, “u” corresponds to “di 
tsung,” which could also be pronounced “di tsing” (and elsewhere in the cycle of poems is 
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transcribed as such). Moreover, readers might not know exactly how to voice, how to embody 
each sound (long “a”? short “a”?). Each word that lies beneath the surface of the sounds, the 
“unformed sounds,” in the left column has to do with language. The words tsung, loshn, and 
trern (tongue, language/tongue, and tears) all have to do with the body (loshn comes from the 
loshn koydesh or Hebrew-Aramaic component of Yiddish, meaning “tongue” as well). 
The subject of this poem, “she” struggles because residual bits of language, the 
knowledge of how to create and voice the words, remain in her body, even if she lacks the words 
that we see beneath the sounds, or beneath the surface. Readers might have the opposite problem 
though—they see the words, “trern,” “shvaygt,” “loshn,” but do not know how to translate them 
from page to body. As much as these bilingual poems have a learning function, this poem 
emphasizes the challenge that the body presents for learning or remembering a language. This 
poem acknowledges that the body matters, that the body might carry a linguistic memory or 
linguistic lack. These “unformed sounds,” and these words that might be unutterable for a reader 
at once propose and challenge the idea of language housed in the body. 
More explicitly biological themes organize other poems in the cycle. The introductory 
poem enacts a creative form of evolution, framing the poems that follow with an expression of 
biological imagination. This poem, titled, “I Cannot Swim,” is composed entirely in English, 
which sets it apart from the mostly bilingual cycle. In “I Cannot Swim” we find a hopeful 
invocation of bodily change and evolution from the perspective of a young girl at sea with her 
parents, presumably because of a forced migration. She tries to assuage the confusion of being 
landless by leaping into the sea. Submerging herself into the sea reverses the typical evolutionary 
narrative in which life forms emerged from the sea to live on land; this foreshadows the 
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evolutionary-poetic reversal found in the English-Yiddish translations that follow. The speaker 
tells us: 
And I said to my parents: 
there are no more lands 
and no more peoples. We are strange 
creatures and must grow gills.394  
 
And later the speaker continues, 
I said to my parents:    I will grow gills 
and tried to leap out    into the water. 
But my father held my wrists    his fingers 
iron nails piercing my bones.    And he said: 
you cannot swim.395  
 
The speaker’s reason for wanting to jump into the water and grow gills, “We are strange/ 
creatures” echoes earlier lines in the stanza, “we looked like a family but/ we were all 
strangers.”396 The repetition of “strangers” and “strange” evokes the biblical refrain that the 
Israelites were, “strangers in a strange land” (Ex. 2:22). This phrase also condenses the Jewish 
religious and cultural consciousness of being diasporic wanderers: outsiders who supposedly 
have no connection to any particular land. Enjambment in these lines allows for that meaning of 
“strange” (as in “stranger”) to settle and presents that strangeness as an extension of the problem 
that “there are no more lands” in which to wander or make a home. The following line completes 
the image of a “strange creature” and fuses the image of the wandering Jew with the image of 
non-human creatures. Her image returns biological literalness to the oft-evoked concept of 
minority, postcolonial, or bilingual hybridity. What the speaker wants to become—one who 
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396 Klepfisz, 214. 
 180 
breathes underwater through gills—is not just human, not just a fish, but is hybrid. The 
insistence, “I will grow gills” seeks a biological, evolutionary manifestation of her geographic 
and linguistic change. 
The image of growing gills is also a powerful introduction to a cycle of poems about 
language and speaking. Not only is speech closely tied to breath, but Ashkenazi bilingualism 
(constituting Hebrew and Yiddish) has often been likened to “breathing through both nostrils.”397 
This phrase conveys an ideology in favor of symbiosis between the languages, rather than 
inherent competition. The metaphor implies that it ought to be natural, immediate, and 
unthinking for multiple Jewish languages to coexist in Ashkenazi culture—even if the reality 
was not quite so peacefully balanced—and in the Jew’s body. However, in Klepfisz’s poem, gills 
allow for breath without the mouth or nose. A person who grows gills transfers the act of 
breathing to another part of the body. We might imagine the nose and mouth’s other functions 
(like forming language) being dispersed throughout the body as well. Later poems in the 
“Etleche verter” cycle emphasize the body’s—and particularly the mouth’s—role in creating, 
knowing, and learning a language, yet the idea of “growing gills” may symbolize an alternative 
way of carrying language in the body. 
At the end of the poem, the speaker’s father prevents her from growing gills and 
swimming. Schematically, evolution and generational continuity are pitted against one other. 
This moment casts a slight shadow over the subsequent bilingual poems about the extinction or 
survival of Yiddish. It is the father here who violently prevents the speaker from the attempt at 
evolving: Patriarchal protection apparently saves the speaker from drowning, but it also prevents 
 
397 Dan Miron, “Breathing Through Both Nostrils? Shalom Ya’akov Abramovitch Between Hebrew and Yiddish,” in 
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her from imagining new ways of adapting. The poem closes with a sense of danger—images of 
splintered wood, sharp shouts from the shore—and with the speaker’s head pressed to her 
mother’s breast. For a second time, the parental protection created in the family unit is offered 
through the body’s grip, which is not necessarily sufficient or beneficial. Even though the 
imagined evolution does not take place (she does not jump into the water and grow gills), the 
hope for transformation remains. In this instance, the biological imagination is a means to see 
beyond, or to resist, the clutches of heteronormative kinship.  
In these poems, Klepfisz writes imaginatively against the teleological notion of Yiddish’s 
decline or “extinction” over the course of generations. Simultaneously, the bilingual poetry 
presents Yiddish as atomized heritable material. The poems’ “few words in the mother tongue” 
stand for bits of knowledge that are embodied, rather than thought or known, even if they are not 
directly received from the parents. Whether imagining Yiddish as undergoing extinction or 
imagining the language as latent material that can re-emerge from dormancy, the poems often 
activate the Heritable Yiddish discourse, negotiated through biological imagination. And yet, 
what makes these poems so fascinating is that they enact Yiddish’s inheritance and reemergence 
specifically through Queer Yiddish avenues: through its “re-learning” outside of the 
heteronormative family structures, even within the poems themselves. 
This is especially true in “Etleche Verter Oyf Mame Loshn/A Few Words in the Mother 
Tongue.” The poem positions instruction as a means to Yiddish’s survival and evolution, rather 
than suggesting that Yiddish is becoming diluted. Once the poem introduces readers to “a few 
words” of Yiddish, it becomes increasingly dominated by Yiddish words. It transitions from a 
bilingual, self-translating composition (much like the cycle’s other poems), into stanzas that are 
composed solely in Yiddish. The final stanzas combine words glossed earlier in the poem, 
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including “kholmt” ([s/he] dreams), “di kartofl” (potatoes), and “di lange shvartse hor” (long 
black hair): 
a meydl kholmt 
a kurve kholmt 
a yidene kholmt 
a yente kholmt 
a lezbianke kholmt 
 






zi kholmt  
di hor 






After the Yiddish words appear with their English definitions, the English language recedes into 
the background, as though Yiddish has won the Malthusian struggle for existence. The poem 
thereby reverses the cultural narrative of Yiddish’s extinction at the hands of English. It enacts 
this reversal through teaching and translation, so that by the end, readers can read or hear the 
“un-diluted” Yiddish.  
Yiddish takes over the poem precisely in the repeated proclamation of women (a young 
woman, a whore, a Jewish woman, a busybody, a lesbian, a wife) dreaming. The payoff for 
learning the Yiddish words, then, is to be able to express women’s dreams, or the mere fact that 
women do dream. Yet the repeated invocation of dreaming highlights a particular ambiguity of 
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agency within the poem’s final stanzas. To dream, as in to imagine or to hope, is to will for 
something to happen. To dream in one’s sleep, though, is to have thoughts without will or 
intention, to produce images and words without any control over them. The dreams in these lines 
lack any prepositions—no dreaming “of” or “about.” There is no cause, effect, or relation 
presented between the women and the repeated nouns: the woman’s long black hair (before her 
wedding), the Sabbath bread, and the potatoes are simply there. They appear like Freudian 
condensations of images, language, and signification, which the poem does not unpack for us. In 
my reading, the patchwork of incomplete phrases suggests that the women’s dreams are sleeping 
dreams. This also creates a rather playful image: the women are “dreaming” in Yiddish, or 
“dreaming in Yiddish.” And a cultural cliché would tell us that to dream in Yiddish would mean 
fluency and knowledge of the language. Dreaming is essentially language that the body produces 
on its own, without the subject knowing or thinking it. The un-agential thoughts of a dream bear 
a close resemblance to the idea of Yiddish as an un-thinking, or embodied, organic knowledge. 
This returns us to the central tension of Yiddish-as-Mother-Tongue and Yiddish as mostly 
unknown to readers; Yiddish as an organic inheritance and Yiddish as a language chosen and 
learned. There is no clear resolution or synthesis between these forms of transmission or 
knowing, but the poem does not require resolution.  
To read this poem through the biological lens of “extinction” illustrates just how abstract 
the notion of Yiddish as an “extinct,” “endangered,” or “dead” language really is. We could 
understand the extinction as tied to “Yiddish speakers,” and assert that by the end of the poem, 
Klepfisz has made all of her readers into “Yiddish speakers.” We also could understand that the 
extinction or survival of Yiddish has to do with the presence of the language itself; that perhaps 
each poem, each word is a living unit of its own. If this is the case, then at the end of the poem, 
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which is populated by Yiddish words alone, then it matters which words remain. Many of these 
words are upsetting and commonplace to anyone familiar with Yiddish—dos vaybl, di yenta—
and seem to be unlikely candidates for heralding a grand victory or resurgence of Yiddish. But 
one, lezbianke, gains power as a new utterance. The gloss at the beginning of the poem describes 
the “lezbianke” as, “the one with/ the roommate though we never used/ the word.”399 Now, 
uttering the taboo, and restoring that which had been unspoken, becomes instrumental to the 
survival of Yiddish. “Lezbianke” is a lone word: an addition, a stretching of the language. 
Perhaps this poem performs its own form of cultural and linguistic production, if not 
reproduction. 
To classify this poem’s conception of cultural transmission as an alternative to the 
biological, or even as nonbiological obfuscates what is actually at play in Klepfisz’s work. What 
I see instead is a creative imagining of linguistic transmission and survival, articulated through 
biological concepts like evolution and extinction, and through considering the body’s role in 
housing language. Like many works of self-translation, Klepfisz’s poems are an experiment, in 
which Queer Yiddish imagination incorporates the ostensibly cast-off biological thinking.  
Heritable Yiddish: Just Relax 
The phenomenon that I call Heritable Yiddish has become visible through Queer Yiddish 
scholars’ forceful denunciation of it. Heritable Yiddish can perhaps best be summed up in the 
phrase: “Yiddish speakers are made in the bedroom, not in the classroom.”400 This cheeky 
aphorism is meant to delegitimize academic Yiddish, meaning those who teach or study Yiddish 
in universities and secular institutions (where most Yiddish speakers who are not Orthodox Jews 
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have come to learn or use Yiddish by the turn of the 21st century). As Shandler has noted, the 
“bedroom” model maps Yiddish cultural and linguistic continuity onto Jewish ethnoreligious 
continuity. And, I would add, it centers the body as the site of language transmission. The idea 
that Jewish ethnoracial continuity is key to ensuring the future of Yiddish culture is not quite the 
same as the cultural stasis and conservatism that Freedman refers to. The “bedroom” model does 
not invoke biological metaphors—“genes” or “DNA”—to refer to cultural production. It refers to 
the literal reproduction of a specific kind of person (called “Yiddish speakers”). It is true that 
what Shandler calls “the biological model of intergenerational cultural transmission” suggests a 
degree of cultural conservatism.401 However, it is “biological” in a far more material way. It does 
not only model cultural transmission after a model of biological reproduction, it attaches cultural 
transmission to biological reproduction, to the creation of specific bodies.  
A broad concept of a Heritable Yiddish did not surface ex nihilo in the 1980s and 90s. 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Yiddish has at times been imagined as a piece of 
cultural material that is transmittable through biological inheritance, rather than through 
instruction, by both Yiddish speakers and non-Yiddish speakers alike. The most famous 
formulation might be Kafka’s introductory speech delivered before a recitation of Yiddish 
poetry, in which he told an audience of Prague Jews that he would speak, “about how much more 
Yiddish you understand than you think.”402 While he mistakenly claims in this speech that 
Yiddish is only 400 years old and that it is impossible to write a Yiddish grammar, his main 
point is that German speakers should have an easy time understanding Yiddish. He also claims 
 
401 Shandler, 189. 
402 Franz Kafka, “An Introductory Talk on the Yiddish Language,” in Reading Kafka: Prague, Politics, and the Fin 
de Siècle, ed. Mark Anderson (Schocken Books, 1989), 263. 
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that beyond their knowledge of the German language, the Jews in the audience have a particular 
connection to Yiddish: 
“You begin to come quite close to Yiddish if you bear in mind that apart from what you know 
there are active in yourselves forces and associations with forces that enable you to understand 
Yiddish intuitively…But if you relax, you suddenly find yourselves in the midst of Yiddish…But 
once Yiddish has taken hold of you and moved you—and Yiddish is everything, the words, the 
Chasidic melody, and the essential character of this Eastern European Jewish actor himself—you 
will have forgotten your former reserve. Then you will come to feel the true unity of Yiddish, 
and so strongly that it will frighten you, yet it will no longer be fear of Yiddish but of 
yourselves.”403 
 
Kafka asserts Yiddish’s presence and activity in the Jewish individual, even for one who 
does not speak or know it (such as himself). Perhaps for this very reason, this quotation is often 
cited in studies of the author’s interest in Yiddish language and culture.404 According to Kafka, 
there are “forces” and “associations with forces,” which are “active within” the Jewish audience 
members. By relaxing, by not acting, the forces within them can act upon the individuals; when 
Yiddish is spoken around them, the forces within the people will make it possible to understand 
Yiddish intuitively. Significantly, these “forces and associations with forces” constitute an 
alternative kind of knowledge that is spatially removed—“apart from”—other kinds of 
knowledge that the individuals knowingly possess. If the end result is the realization that they are 
no longer afraid of Yiddish, but afraid of themselves, then in fact the true takeaway is that 
Yiddish was within them all along. By relaxing and listening, the Prague Jews will shift from 
seeing Yiddish as other, to seeing Yiddish as a force within their bodies. 
 
403 Kafka, 266. 
404 See for instance Dan Miron, “Contiguity: Franz Kafka’s Standing Within the Modern Jewish Literary Complex,” 
in From Continuity to Contiguity: Toward a New Jewish Literary Thinking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
n.d.), 303–50. 
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Kafka’s exclamation has been reproduced sometimes as, “Jews of Prague, you know 
more Yiddish than you think!”405 In this version especially, Yiddish is presented as a form of 
knowledge that is an unknown, or an “un-thought” known. For the mostly German-speaking 
Jews addressed, Yiddish is posited as latent knowledge that is outside of cognition. Kafka’s 
statement is a manifestation of Heritable Yiddish in that it emphasizes an intuitive 
comprehension and innate capacity for Yiddish, which is the result of a historical experience or 
knowledge received from one’s ancestors. These people have never learned Yiddish, yet Yiddish 
for them constitutes a kind of knowing that is “more than” what is thought or known. Yiddish is 
an internal resource that they can tap into—an ability as innate as breathing, of which they’d 
never been made aware, but with which they were all born. 
Even though this formulation is fantastical, it is, amazingly, often taken at face value. 
Contemporary scholars have perpetuated Kafka’s conception of unknown-known Yiddish in 
their writing on Yiddish and Kafka’s literary production. With the surge in scholarly interest in 
Kafka as a Jewish writer, it has become common to view “Kafka’s whole literary enterprise as a 
monument raised to the glory of Yiddish, the lost and forgotten language of Western Jews…”, as 
Pascale Cassanova has written, and to assert that his work is “entirely translated from a language 
that he could not write, Yiddish.”406 This sort of claim has been most prominently promulgated 
by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, who argue that Kafka’s writings in German are able to de-
territorialize and “Yiddish-ify” the German language.407 These sorts of statements do not provide 
 
405 Cynthia Ozick, “Envy, Or Yiddish in America,” Commentary, November 1969, 37. 
406 Pascale Casanova, The World Republic of Letters, trans. M.B. Debevoise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
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407 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: 
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formal or practical explanation as to how Yiddish might possibly be present in Kafka’s work.408 
Deleuze and Guatarri rely on what they understand to be the symbolic power of Yiddish to 
challenge literary German. Such claims, much like Kafka’s own claim about Prague Jews’ un-
thinking knowledge, suggest Yiddish as powerfully present even in its strict absence. These 
scholars, too, perpetuate the notion that Yiddish is an invisible, latent form of knowledge that 
Ashkenazi Jews contain by merely being Jews.  
Contrast Kafka’s description of a Heritable Yiddish with a far more recent example, in 
which the biological figure of DNA allows an individual to imagine a similar form of 
transmission of Yiddish. In the spring of 2017, the podcast “The Longest Shortest Time” 
broadcast an episode in which the host and her guests discussed the challenge of passing 
knowledge of non-English languages to their children, especially languages that they do not 
know very well themselves, including Yiddish, Spanish, or Korean. Hillary Frank, the host, 
admits that she wants her daughter to know Yiddish, despite not speaking it herself, and says, “I 
don’t know, maybe some of it’s just getting diluted.” To which her guest, Rebecca Lehrer 
responds: 
Lehrer:  “Yeah, I know. But maybe it’s just, we absorbed it, and it’s sort of like in 
our DNA now, and so your daughter—our daughters have to be that way.” 
Frank:  “I, yeah, I’m gonna choose to believe that.” 
Lehrer:  “Okay, me too.”409 
 
The notion that Yiddish might be “absorbed” and carried “in our DNA,” is an appealing image in 
the midst of American Jews’ perception that Yiddish is becoming extinct or, as Frank said, 
“diluted” over generations. It also fits into the popular narrative of Yiddish in the United States, 
 
408 For a proper takedown, see Chana Kronfeld, On the Margins of Modernism: Decentering Literary Dynamics 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). 
409 Frank, “When Mom Says Oy! And Dad Says ¡Ay!,” 20:16-21:05. 
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which Norich describes skeptically as, “a story of assimilation and of inevitable, organic 
dilution.”410 
It is rather easy to conceptualize Yiddish as heritable in this way if one does not speak or 
hear Yiddish regularly. A person can imagine that Yiddish is a heritable ability if for them 
Yiddish does not exist as a real, full language, with grammar, vocabulary, and the capacity to 
express ideas from the most basic to the most complex (recall that Kafka himself stated that 
writing a grammar of Yiddish was impossible). In this regard, the conception of Yiddish as 
innate, bodily knowledge is symptomatic of Yiddish’s absence. Yet Yiddish speakers themselves 
might subscribe to such conceptions as well. Shandler’ study of “postvernacularity” includes an 
anecdote about a friend who wrangled her aunt into giving her a Yiddish lesson. This lesson 
consisted of no more than the aunt telling the woman, “Sit up straight…Open your mouth, relax 
your jaw…All right…The Yiddish should start coming out very easily now.”411 
To make sense of these instructions, Shandler writes that for native Yiddish speakers who 
grew up in a generation surrounded by other native Yiddish speakers (and likely born before 
World War II), the idea that one could learn Yiddish later in life was preposterous. According to 
this reasoning, one does not merely pick up Yiddish as one might learn Italian or Mandarin as a 
student or while living abroad. I, too, do not read the aunt’s instructions as intentionally 
obstructive. There is something happening in her advice to relax the body, and merely let the 
language come out. Shandler points out, Yiddish is spoken of as a language that “redt zikh,” that 
speaks itself, or even in the words of a famous poem and song, “yiddish redt zikh azoy sheyn,” 
 
410 Norich, Discovering Exile, 4. 
411 Shandler, Adventures in Yiddishland, 59. 
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Yiddish is (/speaks itself) so beautiful(/ly).412 The aunt treats speaking Yiddish as though it were 
a breathing exercise: She tells her niece to sit up straight, relax her jaw, and that’s all. In this 
way, the aunt’s instructions for speaking Yiddish bear a striking resemblance to those that Kafka 
gave his audience for understanding Yiddish: both rely on relaxing the mind and body in order to 
activate something dormant within. 
Norich once told me of something that she witnessed when she used to teach Yiddish to 
people who grew up hearing the language from grandparents but did not speak fluently 
themselves. She said that it seemed as though some students expected her to touch them above 
lip, and then they would have full knowledge of the language. The idea of teaching by touching 
above the lip comes from a midrash, which tells that all humans, before they are born, learn 
everything that is known in the world. Then, before they are born, an angel touches them above 
their lip, creating the groove of the philtrum, and thus erasing all that had been learned before 
life began. Whatever a person learns in their lifetime, then, is merely a re-learning, a re-claiming, 
of that innate, original knowledge. In the case of Norich’s students, Yiddish was imagined as an 
internal resource that could be restored; something already inscribed on their bodies, and only 
erased on the surface of their lips; it was their grandparents’ forgotten knowledge, which still 
resided in their bodies.413 
In combination with this folkloric idea of forgotten, embodied knowledge, culturally 
resonant biological conceptions of inheritance—particularly through the embodied text of 
DNA—very well seem to undergird such ideas about inherited, unknown knowledge in the 
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contemporary period. The concept of an organic connection to language is a widespread 
phenomenon, which extends beyond the domain of Yiddish and precedes the genetic age. When 
the field of linguistics developed as a science in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, 
linguists viewed language almost entirely as history. For some nineteenth-century thinkers, 
“language” and “evolution” were nearly synonymous, or at the very least, went hand-in-hand. 
Today, the persisting modern concept of “mother tongue” arguably always binds an individual’s 
national, linguistic, and biological self into a seamless unity. This concept places a language as 
“property of a particular ethno-cultural group,” which, according to Yasemin Yildiz, means that 
it “can only be shared through biological inheritance, but not through appropriation.”414 
If, as Yildiz suggests, the modern concept of the mother tongue positions all languages as 
inheritance, then Heritable Yiddish can be extrapolated from a broader paradigm of normative, 
organic relations between ethno-racial or national groups and “their languages.” However, there 
is a key difference between the Mother Tongue paradigm, and the examples of Heritable Yiddish 
that I give here. Namely, in each of these examples of Heritable Yiddishkeit, the people who 
have ostensibly “inherited” Yiddish do not speak it. While Yildiz’s analysis of the monolingual 
paradigm as a “putative homology between native language and ethno-cultural identity,” is 
incredibly fruitful, I wish to expand on the organic relationship imaginatively forged between 
people and the “native” languages that they do not speak.415 
It is possible that the expectation of an innate, organic connection to the Yiddish 
language for legacy speakers might be baked into American academic Yiddish pedagogy. 
Consider the dedication to Uriel Weinreich’s famous 1949 Yiddish textbook, College Yiddish. 
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Weinreich writes that College Yiddish is, “a matone di ale, vos bay zeyere kinder in moyl vet 
yidish lebn,” “a gift to all those in whose children’s mouths Yiddish will live.”416 It is difficult 
not to read this dedication through the lens of the significant demographic changes that have 
taken place in the seventy years since the writing of these words. By the end of the twentieth 
century, most Ashkenazi Jews in the United States did not speak Yiddish or live in Yiddish-
speaking homes. However, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, this was not the case; 
nor did this outcome seem inevitable. The idea that more secular Yiddish speakers would come 
into contact with the language in the University than in the home (as happens today) would have 
seemed altogether foreign. 
Weinreich’s textbook remains a staple of Yiddish instruction in American universities, 
where it is sometimes valued as a historical object as much as a language primer. The text itself 
serves as a cultural touchstone in the circle of academic Yiddishists, with ironically iconic lines 
such as, “yidn redn yidish in ale lender” (Jews speak Yiddish in every country).417 The book’s 
composition and its author are iconic in themselves. Weinreich, born in 1926, composed the 
book in his early twenties; he earned a PhD from Columbia University and taught there until his 
death at the age of 40. He was the son of Max Weinreich, also a pioneer Yiddish linguist and one 
of the founders of YIVO, the Institute for Jewish Research in Vilna and then New York. Today, 
the summer Yiddish program at YIVO bears Uriel Weinreich’s name. His name and his work are 
emblems of academic Yiddish.  
Nonetheless, Weinreich’s dedication illuminates the fact that academic Yiddish has not 
always been diametrically opposed to the heritable model of Yiddish. College Yiddish is not 
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dedicated to each student who picks up the book, but specifically to those who will have 
Yiddish-speaking children. It is also not dedicated to the Yiddish-speaking children themselves, 
but to the individual who contains the potentiality of these children. It suggests that Yiddish will 
live on, not in this book, but in the bodies of future children. This is, of course, a hopeful 
injunction, but the construction of Weinreich’s wish elicits a sense of lack. The dedication 
suggests that the textbook alone, its students alone, and the college classroom alone are not 
enough to sustain the Yiddish language; yet it also suggests that their bodies are not sufficient to 
transmit Yiddish either. The textbook itself—and its explanation of itself in the dedication—
positions College Yiddish as a prosthetic to the bodies that would ultimately carry the language. 
Through the bodily prosthetic, the classroom holds the promise of intergenerational 
reproduction. The messy reality is that the model of transmission of Yiddish attached to 
biological generations—the concept of Heritable Yiddish—has historically been imbricated with 
the academic or what Shandler calls the “youth cohort model” of Yiddish: The two can no more 
easily be extricated than they can be placed in diametric opposition: seeing them in opposition is 
rather specific to the contemporary moment. 
 “The Most Jewish Show on Television” 
“Everyone understands Yiddish regardless of whether they speak it.”418 These were not 
the words of Kafka, but of television writer Micah Fitzerman-Blue in a 2016 interview with the 
online Yiddish studies journal, In Geveb. Fitzerman-Blue was a writer on Transparent, the 
Amazon comedy series that follows a Los Angeles family in the aftermath of the former 
patriarch coming out as a transgender woman. In addition to being one of the most critically 
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acclaimed shows at the time to showcase narratives about queer and trans characters, it was 
popularly hailed, “The most Jewish show on television;”419 “The most Jewish show on TV in a 
while;”420 “The Jewiest show ever;”421 and “The most profoundly Jewish show in TV history.”422 
With episode titles like “Kina Hora,” and storylines exploring Jewish rituals, holidays, history, 
and culture, it is not a surprise that the series was received as such.423 Transparent might also be 
the most prominent example of Queer Yiddishkeit in the twenty-first century, especially if we 
hold onto the definitions of “queer” and “Yiddish” as particular, overlapping sensibilities. 
This family comedy/drama follows the Pfefferman clan, made up of three adult children 
and two divorced parents. In season one, their parent Mort transitions to living as Maura. The 
show also follows the sexual explorations of the other family members. It is deeply engaged in 
questions of gender, sexuality, Jewishness, and family. In the second season, heritability also 
becomes a key point of exploration, as the episodes are sprinkled with flashbacks to an earlier 
generation of Pfeffermans in Weimar Berlin, where both their queerness and Jewishness are 
cause for precarity. All of these elements make the series a useful access point for thinking 
through heritability, queerness, and ultimately, Yiddish. 
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The show itself takes place in English, and its characters use a large dose of 
postvernacular Yiddish. In the interview in In Geveb, when Fitzerman-Blue proclaims that, 
“Everyone understands Yiddish regardless of whether they speak it,” the interviewers, Diana 
Clarke and Saul Noam Zarrit comment on this sentiment’s similarity to Kafka’s idea in an 
annotation to the interview. They write, “This echoes Franz Kafka’s words in the opening lines 
of his 1912 speech, ‘An Introductory Talk on the Yiddish Language:’ ‘I should like, ladies and 
gentlemen, just to say something about how much more Yiddish you understand than you 
think.’”424 The interview reveals that at one point in the production of the season, the scenes in 
Berlin were planned to be acted entirely in Yiddish and German, but the show runners chose to 
make the characters speak contemporary American English so that the actors could improvise, 
and so that the scenes of the past would seem more present, less in the past. With this, the 
Transparent writers present an ambivalent portrait of Yiddish as an unknown knowledge. 
The idea of an inherited, unknown knowledge pervades Season 2 of the series. This 
family inheritance is not the Yiddish language, but trauma, specifically inherited trauma from the 
Holocaust. The season’s flashbacks show Maura’s mother, Rose, as an adolescent in the 1930s. 
Since the first season, there have been references to a Tante (aunt) Gitl, who died in the 
Holocaust. In the flashbacks, we learn that Gitl was transgender. By the end of the season, we 
watch as Gitl is targeted by the Nazis, not only for being Jewish, but also for her involvement in 
a queer and gender-non-conforming community at the Magnus Hischfeld Institute for Sexual 
Research. In this respect, the series creates a narrative of the Pfefferman’s inherited trauma, in 
addition to the family’s inherited queerness.  
 
424 Clarke and Zaritt, “Yiddish on Transparent: A Talk with Jill Soloway and Micah Fitzerman-Blue.” 
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As an intergenerational family saga, the narrative structure of Transparent often invites 
moments of seeing historical and familial patterns. For instance, Maura’s coming-out is cause for 
daughters Sarah and Ali to re-visit their own sexualities and sexual identities, and the show 
presents this turn of events as matter of inheritance as well as inspiration. Moreover, the 
flashbacks to 1930s Berlin featuring Gitl provide a family history (perhaps too neat, too 
symmetrical) of queerness and trans identity. The juxtaposition of the two different time periods 
emphasizes that Maura’s identity is not new, but a recycling and re-appearance of familial 
history. It is ironic that Transparent, a queer family drama, actually represents queerness itself 
fitting into a heteronormative rubric of intergenerational inheritance. While the show does 
celebrate alternative modes of kinship and chosen families, it for the most part adheres closely to 
the structure of a traditional family drama. Moreover, Transparent represents queerness, not as a 
mode of inheritance that is alternative to the biological, but as trait to be inherited biologically. In 
this sense, the show represents a rather conservative view of transmission, of kinship, and even 
of queerness. Both queerness and trauma seem to be biologically predetermined for the 
Pfeffermans. 
Thus far, we have seen that the idea of a cultural inheritance figured biologically—
imagining that one can inherit Yiddish as though it were a gene—tends to be metaphorical, or a 
self-conscious act of magical thinking. Inherited trauma, however, does not always remain a 
metaphor in the same way. There have been numerous scientific studies into the psychological 
effects of Holocaust trauma on the children of survivors. And in recent years, these studies have 
looked to epigenetics and the methylation (or, essentially, the expression) of certain genes 
associated with stress in order to pinpoint a biological basis of “second generation” (or even third 
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generation) trauma.425 Within the realm of this research, the passing down of knowledge, or of an 
experience, is no longer a mere cultural metaphor; it is regarded as a material phenomenon 
within scientific discourse. As we will see shortly, the series engages with this very scientific 
discourse. It is not clear to me—nor is it within my academic wheelhouse to explain—whether or 
not this biological research holds water. Nevertheless, this scientific framing of inherited trauma 
comes to structure the narrative of Transparent. 
The series casts parallels between the present-day Pfeffermans in Los Angeles and the 
Pfeffermans in Berlin. The show also uses biological knowledge about inheritance in order to 
create a narrative linkage between the two storylines. In one scene in an episode called “Cherry 
Blossoms,” Maura’s daughter Ali invokes biological knowledge directly. In this sequence, Ali is 
seeking a research topic for her application to a gender studies graduate program, and she takes 
her best friend and sometimes lover, Syd to the Malibu public library. As they walk in, Syd asks 
Ali about where her family lived in Europe. The sequence then cuts to Ali reading a book, 
standing in the library stacks. Supple, extradiagetic, piano music carries over as the scene cuts 
from Ali in the library to a flashback in Berlin in 1933. In this flashback scene, we see Rose 
visiting Gitl at Magnus Hirschfeld’s Institute. Rose is there to ask for money for passage to 
America. The sequence then cuts back to Ali in present day, as she looks up from her reading to 
tell Syd about research that suggests that individuals can inherit trauma experienced by their 
ancestors: 
Ali:  “Oh my god, this shit is fascinating. Did you know there is such a thing as 
inherited trauma in your actual DNA?” 
Syd:  “No, I did not” 
 
425 Natan P.F. Kellermann, “Epigenetic Transmission of Holocaust Trauma: Can Nightmares Be Inherited?,” Israel 
Journal of Psychiatry and Related Sciences 50, no. 1 (2013): 33; Rachel Yehuda et al., “Holocaust Exposure 
Induced Intergenerational Effects on FKBP5 Methylation,” Biological Psychiatry 80, no. 5 (2015). 
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Ali:  “They did this study on bunnies, where they give them electric shocks where they 
were smelling cherry blossoms, and the bunnies’ babies, and their babies, the 
grandbabies, they were all afraid of cherry blossoms.” 426 
 
After a few more questions from Syd, Ali explains, “It’s called epigenetics.” The story of Rose 
and Gitl in Berlin is framed by a scene of Ali seeking details about her family’s history. 
Moreover, her reading is presented as the catalyst, leading to the intercut of the scene at the 
Institute for Sexual Research. And then, her explanation of inherited trauma and epigenetics 
invites the viewer to interpret the flashback scene of Rose and Gitl’s story—and all of the 
flashbacks to Berlin in the season—through the “epigenetic” lens. We, the viewers, are invited to 
consider: does this scene constitute inherited trauma? Is it encoded in Ali’s “actual DNA?” 
The relationship between the main Los Angeles narrative and the flashback scenes is 
ambiguous throughout the season. The series made extensive use of flashbacks in the first season 
as well. These scenes showed the main cast in the 1990s, and the relationship between these 
flashbacks and the present-day drama is quite clear: The scenes delve into these characters’ 
pasts, which they all remember with varying detail. Yet the Berlin flashbacks narrate the lives of 
entirely different characters, whose stories the present-day Pfeffermans may or may not be 
familiar with. These are not as clearly the characters’ own memories. We do not know whether 
the present-day Pfeffermans have been told these stories; we cannot as easily create a narrative 
of how the characters in the present have been shaped by these scenes of the past. 
This ambiguity is further complicated by one of the series’ most interesting formal 
elements: In all of the flashbacks to various historical moments—whether to 1930s Berlin, or 
1990s Los Angeles—a handful of actors always appear, portraying various characters involved, 
in the manner of a theatre troupe. This means that the actor who plays the young Grandma Rose 
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is the same actor who had played the young Ali in the previous season’s flashbacks. The 
identical appearance of the young Ali and the young Rose could represent the phenotypic 
resemblance between generations and the biological link between the grandmother and 
granddaughter. Such an interpretation would also suggest that the flashback scenes of Berlin are 
representations of actual events, and they are incorporated into the narrative in order to flesh out 
the family history. It is also possible to see the single actor’s portrayal of two separate 
individuals as fantastical, suggesting that the scene is concocted in Ali’s imagination. Perhaps 
what we are seeing is merely Ali’s imaginative projection, placing herself into the family history, 
and placing her family at the center of Jewish and queer history in Weimar Berlin.  
At tension between these two possible interpretations are: 1) the question of whether the 
scene constitutes reality or fantasy within the story-world of the show; and 2) the question of 
Ali’s awareness of said scene. We might likely presume that either the scene is accurate and 
therefore unknown to Ali, or else it is a fabrication that she is consciously forming and 
considering. Yet what if the scene is not a fabrication of Ali’s imagination, but still narratively 
conducted through her? Or, could the flashback be both imagined and true? As Marianne Hirsch 
has written about the distinction between memory and history, “Memory signals an affective link 
to the past, a sense precisely of an embodied ‘living connection.’”427 If we consider Ali one such 
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embodied, living, affective link to the past, then perhaps cognition has nothing to do with 
memory in the scene. We, the viewers, could see the story from the past as intimately connected 
to Ali, or even embodied in Ali, even if she does not know or understand it. This would mean 
that the piece of family memory is still generated in and through Ali, at least on the level of 
narrative construction, without her cognition.  
The humanistic concept of embodied memory, as theorized by Hirsch, is not the same as 
the scientific study of inherited trauma. While memory scholars often communicate mixed 
feelings regarding memory practices, we might still wonder at the attitudes (not necessarily 
“objective”) of scientific researchers’ who study inherited trauma. The notion that individuals 
can inherit trauma from their parents presents a fix for those studied: a biological 
predetermination of stress or worse. These findings coincide with Jewish communal investment 
in memory preservation and attempts to cultivate a “living connection” to the Holocaust. 
Whether these findings strike you as plausible or absurd, the inquiry itself seems to speak 
volumes about cultural desires and expectations. Embodiment, as Hirsch describes it, has to do 
with knowledge transmitted and received—whether learned, heard, or seen—sometimes with the 
aid of historical documents or photographs. Embodied knowledge, or memory, in this regard is 
specifically about awareness and cognition. We could say nearly the opposite about the 
biological understanding of inherited trauma or inherited memory, though: this sort of 
embodiment is outside of cognition. The “memory” represented in the library flashback would 
 
adopting and embodying certain kinds of knowledge and experience, which otherwise might not have been. 
Nonetheless, the notion of reembodying does perhaps suggest a sense that these memories originated within the 
body and were always already there, but needed the help of prosthetic objects such as the photograph to be 
embodied once again. 
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therefore be better described by the biological paradigm of inheritance than by the cultural 
paradigm of memory. 
I understand this biological quest into inherited trauma, or inherited history, as connected 
to the notion of the “unknown knowledge” of Yiddish. The library scene, in its adherence to the 
biological conception of “inherited memory” enacts a sort of biological magical realism. As 
Freedman has suggested about Transparent, “Historical experience is baked into the Pfeffermans 
without their knowing it, as a knowledge that they bear with them in every fiber of their being 
and which determines and indeed predetermines them.” He also distinguishes that for this 
onscreen family, “The memories of sadness, loss, and catastrophe that transcend the 
generations…are encoded narratively, in memory, as much as they are epigenetically.”428  Here, 
Freedman helps expand on the meaning of trauma in one’s “actual DNA.” I would add that both 
biological and cultural conceptions of “inherited trauma” inform this narrative, yet it is far more 
structured by the biological conception with its more tenuous awareness of the past. The 
dreamlike quality of some of the flashbacks in the season, and the effect of the cast of actors 
playing different roles throughout the series, reminds us that this work is not intended as realism, 
as a direct representation of life as it is lived. What we are seeing is indeed structured by 
biological imagination. By following a biological form in its narrative form, the series evades 
realism. 
Moreover, it shouldn’t come as a shock that the actual findings of the research that Ali 
cites are more complicated and more measured that what she reports to Syd.429 However, what 
 
428 Jonathan Freedman, “‘Transparent’: A Guide for the Perplexed,” Los Angeles Review of Books, April 10, 2016. 
429 It so happens that the researchers used rodents, not rabbits. Maya Barzilai pointed out to me that the history of 
linking Jews to rats was likely the writers’ reasoning for having Ali make the “mistake” of talking about bunnies 
instead of rats or mice. 
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matters less in this case is the accuracy with which Transparent relates biological findings, and 
what matters more is how characters use biological knowledge to create meaning in their lives 
and in the narrative as a whole. The series uses a biological idea as a model for the narrative 
structure. The popular understanding of DNA makes Ali’s slight misconception—epigenetics is 
not really about what’s written in one’s “actual DNA”—both possible and compelling. The 
genetic code has, after all, been called “the book of life.”430 In the popular imagination, many see 
the genome as an embodied text that is material, microscopic, and all-pervasive. We are able to 
imagine that in each cell, in each part of our body, exists a bit of our ancestors’ stories. This 
embodied text is a particular kind of memory: it is a form of knowing that takes place in the 
body.  
Transparent exemplifies a queer narrative framed by a biological idea of inherited, 
embodied knowledge. While this series is not about inherited language, its exploration of 
inherited, embodied knowledge exemplifies how biological imagination becomes an artistic 
mode of representing cultural inheritance. This is especially the case for knowledge that has for 
whatever reason not been transmitted through traditional means. The parallels between inherited 
memories and inherited Yiddish (as delineated earlier in this chapter) underline the extent to 
which notions of Heritable Yiddish play out as a form of biological imagination and are 
especially appealing in the genetic age.  
I must note that I do not mean, by placing a work about inherited trauma—or, 
specifically, about inherited memories of the Holocaust—in conversation with the idea of a 
Heritable Yiddish, to equate Yiddish and the Holocaust. The near conflation of Yiddish and 
 
430 Brigitte Nerlich, Robert Dingwall, and David D. Clarke, “The Book of Life: How the Completion of the Human 
Genome Project Was Revealed to the Public,” Health: An Interdisciplinary Journal for the Social Study of Health, 
Illness and Medicine 6, no. 4 (October 2002): 450, https://doi.org/10.1177/136345930200600403. 
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Jewishness is something we’ve already seen in this chapter—assigning a “knowledge” of 
Yiddish to any Ashkenazi Jew, viewing it as an innate resource, or a symbol of Jewishness, 
rather than an actual language one would in fact learn.431 By another turn, Holocaust 
remembrance has become a significant facet of American Jewish culture (and religion).  And to 
conflate Yiddish itself with the Holocaust is a rather common practice as well. Yiddish comes to 
stand for all that has been lost. In actuality, other historical forces—assimilation in the United 
States, Stalinism in the Soviet Union, the Hebrew language project in Israel—have also had a 
role in the decline of Yiddish in the twentieth century. However, when we discuss Yiddish and 
“the history of the twentieth century,” we are usually euphemistically referring to the Holocaust 
in particular.432 Still, in the midst of all of these associative slippages, the comparison—without 
collapse—between the representations of embodied, inherited language and embodied, inherited 
trauma can be mutually illuminating.  
Transparent, an avowedly queer and Jewish series, organizes itself around a form of 
embodied knowledge, such that the series aligns with a notion like, “Everyone understands 
Yiddish regardless of whether they speak it.” Whether focused on trauma, or queerness, or 
Yiddish itself, this series is created through an artistic impulse to imagine history as a gene that 
can be transmitted and housed in the body. As this chapter has shown, contemporary works of 
Queer Yiddish or Jewish art are neither immune nor antithetical to such imaginings, even if 
certain theorizations of Queer Yiddishkeit might suggest otherwise. Works of Queer Yiddish are 
an especially rich site to consider what biological thinking does in literary and artistic works, 
 
431 This is common in phrases like, “think Yiddish, dress British,” or “write Yiddish, cast British.” (Or, in the context 
of Transparent, Soloway stated in an interview she wanted instead to “write Yiddish, and cast Yiddish.” Clarke and 
Zaritt, “Yiddish on Transparent: A Talk with Jill Soloway and Micah Fitzerman-Blue.” 
432 Anita Norich, Writing in Tongues: Translating Yiddish in the Twentieth Century, Samuel and Althea Stroum 
Lectures in Jewish Studies (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013), 10–11. 
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especially for poetic or narrative construction. By the same token, Queer Yiddish critique can 
help us refine what terms like “biological,” or “nonbiological,” are actually accomplishing for us 
in our critical enterprises, precisely because of the field’s avowed disinterest in biology. At the 
very least, we need to be open to a messier, more copious, more embodied, and less rational 
understanding of biology. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion: “Stored in the Genetic Code:” Biological Imagination Today  
 
In 2018, upon receiving genetic ancestry test results from the company MyHeritageDNA, 
customers were able to view a personalized animation to see them revealed. At the time, a friend 
who knew of my academic interests in Jewish genetics sent me the link to one such animation, 
produced for her grandmother. This is what I saw: 
The screen is black, flecked with stars. Then words appear across the sky, “Barbara, ready 
to explore your ethnicity?” 
After this prompt, the user presses the “Let’s go” button. You move quickly through the 
starry sky until earth appears, radiant and spinning. Music begins to play—in this case, cymbals 
crash and an energetic klezmer song rolls in (the music serves as a hint about the culture or 
ethnicity that the company has attributed to Barbara’s genetic ancestry makeup). Earth appears, 
drawn not as a blue and green mass, but as a globe with the national borders of a political map. 
The globe spins until Europe comes into view. A translucent fuchsia oval hovers over a large 
central and eastern swath of the continent. The screen reads, “Barbara, you are…” Numbers 
begin to rack up in the corner of the screen until they read, “100% Ashkenazi Jewish!”  
The vantage from which this animation illustrates genetic ancestry is telling: the company 
invites their customers to gaze upon their genetic ancestry from space. While DNA resides 
hidden within our bodies’ cells, the company conveys that in order to envision the full meaning 
of an individual’s DNA, one need not look under the microscope, but instead must look at the 
entire globe. Personal genetic makeup is something of global significance. Or alternately, the 
animation suggests that when a person looks into their DNA, they can see a personalized map of 
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the world. One can see not only how they fit into the world, but how the world fits into them. 
Through genetic ancestry tests, consumers biologically imagine their own bodies’ geographies—
both internal and external. In this way, companies like MyHeritageDNA and the personal 
biological information they produce, can contribute to a genetic conception of diaspora. 
By the start of 2019, one report counted that at least 26 million people (not only in the 
United States) had purchased at-home genetic testing kits.433 This same report predicted that the 
number could grow to 100 million by the end of 2020. The widespread phenomenon of genetic 
ancestry testing contributes only the latest fold in a longer-standing discourse of Jewish genetics. 
The broader field of knowledge ranges from research into genetic diseases found at high rates in 
Jewish communities, to scientific inquiries into the origins of Ashkenazi Jews, to other forms of 
“genetic Jewish history.” As I have begun to show in previous published work, this 
personalization and commodification of genetic knowledge has significant implications for the 
ways that Jews and non-Jews conceive of Jewishness as biological in the twenty-first century. 
At once metaphorically rich and scientifically authoritative, DNA serves as a conduit to 
articulate knowledge about a Jewish past, not abstractly, but as it lives in people’s organic 
bodies. Jewish genetics signals how in the midst of crucial cultural, historical, and science-
historical developments in the second half of the twentieth century, there have emerged new 
ways to view the Jewish body as biologically distinct. Indeed, there remains a great deal of 
interest (even literal “buy-in”) in a discourse of a bodily, heritable Jewishness. These emerging 
practices of narrative-formation and reconciliation between history and self through genetic 
knowledge must be understood within a longer historical and cultural context. Particularly, this 
 
433 Antonio Regalado, “More than 26 Million People Have Taken an At-Home Ancestry Test,” MIT Technology 
Review, February 11, 2019, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017-was-the-year-consumer-dna-testing-
blew-up/. 
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cultural trend aided by the genetic revolution carries over many attitudes, practices, and forms of 
biological imagination from previous eras. In particular, genetic conceptions of Jewish 
inheritance are invested in temporality and history, much like earlier iterations of the biological 
imagination were. 
While I have charted multiple phenomena that reflect a similar impulse throughout the 
dissertation, genetic ancestry tests constitute an especially material turn in the biological 
imagination: the companies run their tests on your saliva, containing sloughed-off cells from the 
inside of your cheek. These tests are not only personal, but fleshy. The history that emerges from 
the tests seems to be particularly intimate as well, as though you’ve been carrying it in your 
mouth all along, waiting to utter it. Establishing incredibly intimate connections between this 
body and others is precisely how genetic history, ancestry, and kinship make meaning. As 
Marilyn Strathern has suggested, in our understanding of the gene, “Knowledge and kinship 
become momentarily inseparable.”434 And as Priscilla Wald has argued, genetics “claims to make 
new sense of human beings, populations, and relatedness itself.”435 These “populations” in 
genetic science are almost always named for geographic regions. Accordingly, genetic ancestry 
knowledge amplifies the category of geography within our understandings of kinship and 
relatedness. In the case of Jewish genetic ancestry, this has meant new ways of conceptualizing 
diaspora. 
This concluding chapter will suggest that the phenomenon of imagining and articulating 
Jewish diaspora through genetic knowledge has literary antecedents, which are themselves 
 
434 Marilyn Strathern, Kinship, Law and the Unexpected: Relatives Are Always a Surprise (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 74. 
435 Priscilla Wald, “Future Perfect: Grammar, Genes and Geography,” New Literary History 31, no. 4 (2000): 695, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/nlh.2000.0051. 
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significant expressions of the biological imagination. Indeed, literary works anticipate the sort of 
“genetic Jewish history” that would be written by scientists decades later. I’ll be looking at two 
works written before genetic technology allowed scientists to isolate specific genetic sequences 
that mark Jewish inherence (and before companies like MyHeritageDNA could commodify 
them). In particular, genetics allows the poet Adrienne Rich to produce and contain a 
proliferation of historical trajectories, rather than a definitive genetic “map.” As a foil to Rich’s 
genetic diasporic optimism, I will also gesture towards the (ironic) biological diasporic 
pessimism of Philip Roth—which brings our attention to the interrelation of vertical transmission 
(inheritance) and horizontal transmission (contagion). Both works suggest that writing about a 
Jewish inheritance through biological metaphor can be a poetic act of affiliation—of 
(re)claiming, rather than naturalizing, a Jewish inheritance. And the comparison of the two will 
help begin to show the ethical indeterminacy of genetic conceptions of the self and history. 
The Project Thus Far 
This argument emerges from research I have conducted over the past several years into 
the contemporary discourse of Jewish genetics, which has analyzed both how this scientific 
knowledge is produced and how it is disseminated in the public sphere. In two recent papers, I 
found myself drawn to—yet unable to explore fully—the ways that Jewish genetic discourse 
might shore up, or complicate, other more established conceptions of Jewish diaspora. Jewish 
diaspora as a concept is often foundational to the writing of Jewish genetic history. It also 
determines the sort of information sought about Jews through genetics, whether studies seek out 
founders, or the “real origins” of Ashkenazi Jews, or proof that Jews around the world are 
connected historically and genetically to one another and to the Middle East. 
For instance, in the information provided by genetic ancestry testing companies—who 
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market the idea of certainty around genetic origins—Ashkenazi Jewish genetic ancestry 
introduces ambiguity. On their website, the company 23andMe explains that, “Ashkenazi Jews 
settled in Central and Eastern Europe in the late Middle Ages,” without stating from where these 
Ashkenazi Jews arrived.436 The description continues, “Their modern descendants remain 
genetically more similar to other Jewish populations than to their European neighbors, reflecting 
shared western Asian origins.”437 Even within the company’s classification system, the category 
of Ashkenazi ancestry stands out for being peculiarly non-geographical. 23andMe sub-divides 
European ancestry into the categories of Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, and 
Ashkenazi. Therefore, as I have argued elsewhere, “‘Ashkenazi’ is both instead of and outside of 
the geographic categorization. Through such a system, Ashkenazi ancestry receives heightened 
visibility as a seemingly major subcategory of European ancestry. Yet at the same time, it also 
becomes an outlier among European categories for its non-geographic nature, for its 
nowhereness.”438 Companies like 23andMe are always trying to trace back to roots, to origins, 
but they imply that the Ashkenazi origin itself is no origin but itself a secondary landing spot—
an origin that is already a diaspora. 
One other particularly striking reference to the concept of diaspora, articulated through 
genetic knowledge, comes from the book Jacob’s Legacy: A Genetic View of Jewish History 
(2008), a book written by geneticist David B. Goldstein, aimed at a public (non-scientist) 
audience. This book is filled with not only scientific findings, but also stories of discovery and 
 
436 “23andMe Reference Populations & Regions,” 23andMe Customer Care, accessed December 25, 2018, 
http://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/212169298-Reference-Populations. 
437 This detail is somewhat complicated by the fact that 23andMe does not identify unique ancestry categories for 
any other Jewish populations beside Ashkenazi. 
438 Dory Fox, “Jewish Genetic Potency: The Meaning of Jewish Ancestry in the 21st-Century United States,” 
American Jewish History 104, no. 1 (2020): 71, https://doi.org/10.1353/ajh.2020.0014. 
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the emotions that these discoveries created for Goldstein. In a prefatory anecdote, he writes about 
a rock concert that he attended in the Roman amphitheater in Caesarea, Israel, “I often think back 
to that concert and those kids taking off their shirts and swirling them around, those Cohen Y 
chromosomes and varied mitochondria that may have started there and somehow found their way 
back after two millennia.”439 Goldstein imagines these shirtless concert goers stripped down to 
the molecular level, revealing biological, material remnants of Jewish history. These Cohen 
alleles and mitochondrial DNA are, for Goldstein, solid links between the dancing, youthful 
bodies and the land that they dance upon. Biology allows him to see this return as 
“simultaneously concrete and miraculous,” and somehow beyond the realm of geopolitics.440 He 
sees their genetic material as both the record of and the mandate for the ingathering of the exiles. 
In other words, Goldstein uses genetic knowledge to explain what he sees as the end of Jewish 
diaspora.441 This transcendent miracle of return is, for Goldstein, material rather than 
metaphorical. 
Theories and Practices of Diaspora 
The questions that genetic ancestry introduces—about connections between bodies across 
time and space—dovetail with a broader critical understanding of diaspora. These questions 
might be understood, as Adrienne Rich writes in Sources,  
“With whom do you believe your lot is cast? 
 From where does your strength come? 
I think somehow, somewhere 
 every poem of mine must repeat those questions 
 
439 David B. Goldstein, Jacob’s Legacy: A Genetic View of Jewish History (Yale University Press, 2008), xiii. 
440 Dory Fox, “‘We Are in the First Temple’: Fact and Affect in American Jews’ Emergent Genetic Narrative,” 
Shofar 36, no. 1 (2018): 74–107, https://doi.org/10.5703/shofar.36.1.0074. 
441 Nadia Abu El-Haj, The Genealogical Science: The Search for Jewish Origins and the Politics of Epistemology 
(University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
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Which are not the same. There is a whom, a where 
 that is not chosen    that is given    and sometimes falsely given”442 
 
Diaspora as a concept allows us to think through questions of whom and where, and whether 
these are bound together or separable, whether they are given or chosen. 
The term diaspora has most notably entered the current critical lexicon through the work 
of postcolonial and critical race scholars. Paul Gilroy has used the word to describe relationships 
across the Black Atlantic, which he theorizes has combined “structures of feeling, producing, 
communicating, and remembering.”443 Diaspora connects a heterogeneous network of people, 
separated geographically, or temporally. Diaspora is a way to organize the connection between 
bodies, texts, and ideas across time and space. Theorized as such, diaspora permits, and even 
maintains, difference between individuals and cultures, and does not call for a return to an 
originary center. Diaspora’s initial meaning was the dispersal or displacement of a people from 
their point of origin; and implicit in this concept is an always-impending return to the “origin” or 
an ingathering at a “center.” Indeed, many theorists work over and against the structures of a 
“center” and “periphery,” such as Stuart Hall, who has proposed the term “diaspora” as a way to 
understand cultural identity that is predicated on difference, not return.444 
Within the study of Jewish literature and culture, diaspora is crucial as both a structure 
and a motif.445 As George Steiner argues, diaspora can be understood as the precondition for 
Jewish creativity, not only in the modern period, but also for millennia prior. Contemporary 
 
442 Rich, Sources, 12. 
443 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1993), 3. 
444 Hall, qtd. Edwards, The Practice of Diaspora, 12. 
445 This was especially true as “exile” became not only a metaphor for alienation, but a condition of life for Yiddish 
authors in the twentieth century, as Norich argues. Norich, Discovering Exile. 
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scholars such as Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi and Maeera Schreiber echo this claim, regarding Jewish 
poetry in particular. The term can mark the “transnational cultural production” of modern Jewish 
literature (a phenomenon that Allison Schachter has traced within interwar Jewish modernism, 
and which she frames partially as an analog to the Black Atlantic).446 Daniel Boyarin and 
Jonathan Boyarin have theorized Jewish diaspora as a cultural power, distinct from state’s 
coercive power.447 Diaspora, for Boyarin and Boyarin, is more chaotically rhizomatic than 
statically “rooted.” Specifically, they argue, diaspora challenges linear, secular historiography of 
progress, and allows for alternative modes of identification besides the state (for Jews, and for 
anyone).  
It is no coincidence that Hall’s insistence on diaspora without a compulsory return 
attempts to sever the term from Zionist associations. Both outside of and within Jewish studies, 
Zionism, the state of Israel, and the condition of world Jewry since Israel’s establishment, exerts 
tremendous pressure on the theorization of and critical engagement with the term, “diaspora.” 
While some might view the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 as the end of Jewish 
diaspora, it would be more appropriate to note that this national political consolidation is by no 
means an end, but rather a particular historical fold in the history of Jewish diaspora. It is due to 
the contrast—the oft-rehearsed Israel-diaspora binary—that rigorous and creative concepts of 
diaspora have become ever more critical to Jewish studies scholarship in the second half of the 
twentieth century.  
When it comes to theorizing diaspora, genetics can be understood as either a conduit or a 
 
446 Allison Schachter, Diasporic Modernisms: Hebrew and Yiddish Literature in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 17. 
447 Jonathan Boyarin and Daniel Boyarin, Powers of Diaspora: Two Essays on the Relevance of Jewish Culture 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), vii. 
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hinderance. As Priscila Wald points out, population geneticists “use maps of genetic traits to 
chronicle the movements and migrations of human populations: The Great Human Diasporas, as 
the title of a book by a prominent population geneticist proclaims.”448 This is perhaps a 
“conventional” notion of genetic diaspora. By contrast, scholars like David Eng advocate for 
“reconceptualizing diaspora not in conventional terms of ethnic dispersion, filiation, and 
biological traceability, but rather in terms of queerness, affiliation, and social contingency,” with 
the goal of “reorganizing national and transnational communities based not on origin, filiation, 
and genetics, but on destination, affiliation, and the assumption of a common set of social 
practices or political commitments.”449 This Queer Diaspora, according to Eng, is made through 
affiliation not filiation, social contingency not biological traceability, and political commitments 
not genetics.  
It is unsurprising that Jonathan Freedman likewise describes Queer Diasporism 
(discussed in Chapter 5 as analogous to Queer Yiddishkeit) as a model of cultural production and 
reproduction that is not only “anti-normative,” but also “anti-genetic.”450 This sort of diaspora 
arises through connection, community, and kinship forged through consent rather than descent 
(the latter figured as biology and genetics). These articulations of “non-genetic” diaspora 
resonate with those outlined by Boyarin and Boyarin, Gilroy, and Edwards, which I also adopt as 
a framework. And yet, I propose that genetics might be incorporated into the same project of re-
imagining the forms and possibilities of diaspora through poetic acts of affiliation.  
 
448 Wald, “Future Perfect,” 692. 
449 Eng, “Transnational Adoption and Queer Diasporas,” 5. 
450 Freedman, Klezmer America, 93. 
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I use the term genetic diaspora here to describe a way of understanding the relations 
between bodies across time and space, aided by genetic knowledge. Such imaginations are 
indeed affiliative, even if they are at the same time circuited through knowledge of DNA. The 
anthropologist Noah Tamarkin, for instance, uses the term “genetic diaspora” to describe the 
networks of knowledge and feelings of relation between Lemba people in South Africa and Jews 
in North America and Israel, aided by discoveries of genetic similarities.451 Those feelings of 
connection to in some ways rely on ostensibly definitive genetic maps of dispersion. However, 
the genetic diaspora Tamarkin describes is a matter of feeling, believing, remembering—even if 
genetic knowledge initiates these acts. Brent Hayes Edwards has argued that “diaspora” can 
serve as either an abstraction or as an “anti-abstraction.”452 Genetic diaspora, too, can serve as 
both an abstraction and an anti-abstraction. The poetry of Adrienne Rich that I consider bellow 
was written decades before genetic ancestry technology would become a mass-market 
commodity. This work illustrates how genetic knowledge can be the grounds for imagining an 
affiliative, contingent, untraceable diaspora. 
Adrienne Rich’s Dream of a Common Project 
Scientific knowledge often looms large in discussions of Adrienne Rich, from a number 
of critical angles. Biographical records of Rich’s life tend to emphasize that her father was a 
physician and chair of pathology at Johns Hopkins medical school. Additionally, especially in 
recent years, feminist readers, scholars, and activists have attempted to sort out the legacy of 
Rich’s feminism and her stance on the biological body (especially the ability to know or 
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determine women’s bodies medically). However, the relationship between biology and 
Jewishness in her work has not yet received sufficient scholarly attention. This is surprising, 
because science is a prominent source of inspiration in her writing. Perhaps most famously, in 
the poem “Power,” which opens the collection The Dream of a Common Language (1978), Rich 
writes of reading about the scientist Marie Curie. Of Curie’s innovative, and ultimately lethal, 
research into radiation, Rich writes that, “her wounds came from the same source as her 
power.”453 For Rich, Curie represents the price women pay for being in the public sphere, for 
being engaged in discovery—whether scientific or poetic. By using Curie as a figure in this way, 
Rich gestures toward her belief in a common project of knowledge—fusing poetry, science, and 
politics—an aim that becomes a prominent theme in her writing.  
In one essay, Rich writes admiringly of another intellectual foremother, the Jewish 
American poet Muriel Rukeyeser, whom she describes as, “our twentieth-century Coleridge, our 
Neruda, and more,” someone who “feels in her imagination the excitement of the lost 
connections between science and poetry.”454 In another, Rich writes of her own dedication to 
resolving the bifurcation of poetry and science (or what C.P. Snow called “the two cultures”). 
She outlines a broad project of connecting science, literature, and politics in the essay “Woman 
and Bird,” 
“The impulse to enter, with other humans, through language, into the order and disorder of the 
work, is poetic at its root as surely as it is political at its root. Poetry and politics both have to do 
with description and with power. And so, of course, does science. We might hope to find these 
activities—poetry, science, politics—triangulated, with extraordinary electrical exchanges 
moving from each to each through our lives. Instead, over centuries, they have been separated—
poetry from politics, poetic naming from scientific naming, an ostensibly ‘neutral’ science from 
political questions, ‘rational’ science from lyrical poetry—nowhere more than in the United 
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States over the past fifty years.”455 
 
In this light, we are invited to read Rich’s work for moments that bind together the common 
project of “description and power” shared by poetry, politics, and science. The ecocritic Gioia 
Woods marshals Rich’s writing to suggest that scientific metaphor is not “simply the 
transformation of a scientific concept into poetic language; it’s the proposition that disparate 
discourses like science and beauty resemble one another, that they exist as kin, and that both 
blossom forth—move from thing to process—when they are mapped together as metaphor.”456 
Scientific metaphors in Rich’s poetry present just such co-“blossoming,” or parallel naming.  
In the 1982 cycle of poems, Sources, Rich describes how scientific knowledge of the 
world around her creates her poetic subject. Naming birds (and other flora and fauna) becomes 
an act of rootedness, an act of determining the aforementioned questions of “whom” and 
“where.” As a whole, Sources moves through questions of geography, inheritance, diaspora, and 
biology. In the cycle’s final poem, Rich describes reading the eighteenth-century English 
naturalist Gilbert White’s Natural History of Selborne (1789), which has been described by 
Tobias Menely as a “literary geography,” which in true Romantic form is a “retrospective 
idealization that transforms history into heritage.”457 White’s detailed, attentive descriptions of 
the history and geography of his parish found notable admirers in the likes of Charles Darwin, 
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Samuel Coleridge, Virginia Woolf, and W.H. Auden.458 But Rich attests that, “I can never know 
this land I walk upon/as that English priest knew his.”459 
Rich fills Sources with textured descriptions of nature in the eastern United States, but 
then, in the following lines of this final poem, Rich feigns to emulate the work of the natural 
scientist, identifying generic “rockledge soil insect bird weed tree,” without describing or naming 
them. She explains, while switching from first to second person, “I will never know those things 
because…/Because you  have chosen/ something else: to know other things…Because you grew 
up in a castle of air/disjunctured.” Rich lacks the naturalistic knowledge (as in natural history) of 
the land, because she lacks a naturalized relationship to it— here she repeats a motif from the 
cycle, that she “grew up in a castle of air.” This lack of knowledge is an ambivalent lack, and a 
choice, as she chose to know other things. Rich is not like the aforementioned British authors 
who could read White’s Natural History and adopt a coherent history, heritage, and relationship 
to geography. She instead lays claim to an inheritance that is not rooted in specific geography. 
And in order to do so, she turns to genetic metaphor. 
In Sources, Rich invokes the biological concept of genetic code and vertical relations of 
inheritance in order to chart her own diaspora. The poems are full of rhetorical questions that 
probe at Rich’s relationship to Jewish history, Zionism, the land of Israel, and the land of the 
United States. At one point, she proposes that, “Are there spirits in me, diaspora-driven/that 
wanted to lodge somewhere…”460 A later poem (mentioned in the introduction to this 
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dissertation) presents a version of such “diaspora-driven” spirits as “half-chances, unresolved” 
found “in the genetic code.”461 Rich writes, 
They say such things are stored 
In the genetic code — 
 
Half-chances, unresolved 
Possibilities, the life 
 
Passed on because unlived — 
A mystic biology? —462 
 
Stored in her genetic code are not her ancestors’ experiences, but their alternatives. These 
possibilities, “Passed on because unlived,” were attempted by other women—those who sailed 
from Europe to Palestine—but their hopes were also unfulfilled. The women at the center of this 
poem are drawn into Zionism’s promise of “equality in the promised land,” just as they’d been 
drawn to, and disappointed by, similar promises from communism and anarchism.463  
In Rich’s poem, the genetic code houses unfulfilled, unlived possibilities, and through 
them, her body also contains diasporic, non-linear connections to Jewish women of the past. The 
poem closes with the suggestion of these women’s disappointment, that “Zion by itself is not 
enough” to realize the dream of social liberation—gender or otherwise.464 Rich is not merely 
pointing to the limits of Zionism, and thereby lauding diaspora by default. This poem’s genetic 
metaphor allows her to claim ties to multiple Jewish histories, multiple trajectories of geographic 
movement. This relation to history opposes the strict, linear positivism that many scholars 
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attribute to biology.465 In this poem, biology is not destiny, it is contingency. It is capacious 
multiplicity, recorded and stored in the body. In questioning, “a mystic biology?” the poem 
provides biology not as an answer, but a new set of names through which to ask the questions of 
“where?” and “whom?”. 
Genetic metaphor provides a contrasting logic to how Rich writes about Jewish 
inheritance in some of her essays. She muses, in “Split at the Root: An Essay on Jewish 
Identity,” written just one year before Sources, that both Jewish religious and radical feminist 
patterns of lineage-making would seemingly discount her one male, Jewish parent. She writes, 
“My mother is a gentile. In Jewish law I cannot count myself a Jew. If it is true that ‘we think 
back through our mothers if we are women’ (Virginia Woolf)—and I myself have affirmed 
this—then even according to lesbian theory, I cannot (or need not?) count myself a Jew.”466 Thus, 
claiming ties to Jewish women through the figure of DNA is an act neither explicitly traditional 
nor explicitly radical; it cannot be folded into these two lineage-making practices through which 
she had previously understood herself. Genetic metaphor presents an alternative framework to 
claim these “half-chances” that reside unresolved within her, yet which would otherwise go 
unrecognized in Jewish religious or feminist frameworks.  
While the language of genetics only appears midway through Sources, it emerges as a 
potential organizing metaphor for questions posed from the beginning of the cycle. The cycle’s 
second poem reads in full: 
I refuse to become a seeker for cures. 
Everything that has ever 
helped me has come through what already 
lay stored in me.      Old things, diffuse, unnamed, lie strong 
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across my heart. 
                             This is from where  
my strength comes, even when I miss my strength 
even when it turns on me 
like a violent master.467 
 
 The image of “Old things, diffuse, unnamed,” which “already/ lay stored in me” suggests 
DNA—an inheritance spread throughout the body. This phrase, “Old things” holds echoes of I.J. 
Singer’s term, “yerushe-zakhn” (“legacy things” or “inheritance things”); both phrases reveal a 
need for biological knowledge in order to describe an organic yet diffuse, felt yet unknown, 
legacy. Not unlike Singer’s description of an inheritance with its own agency over the individual, 
Rich’s image of the “old things” as a source of strength shifts at the end of the poem. The “old 
things” become separable from herself—something she can miss, something that can turn on her 
violently, something that can act as a master over her. Indeed, this inherited strength—which is 
old, which is already stored in her—has its own agency, alien to the poet. 
The poem’s second half begins with the answer, “This is from where/my strength 
comes.” The statement preempts the question, “from where?” which is repeated five times in the 
following poem. There, the question encompasses geography and internal mapping—where in 
your body and where in the world? The poem indicates a location that is internal and diffuse on 
the one hand, and external and distant on the other. That poem begins; 
From where?   the voice asks coldly. 
 
This is the voice in cold morning air 
 that pierces dreams.     From where does your strength come? 
 
Old things… 
 From where does your strength come, you Southern Jew? 
split at the root, raised in a castle of air? 
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Yes.   I expected this.     I have known for years 
The question was coming.           From where 468 
 
This poem repeats the titular metaphor of Rich’s essay describing her Christian-Jewish heritage, 
“split at the root.” That phrase and the question “from where” come not from the poetic speaker 
herself, but from an outside voice. That voice, by asking coldly, “From where,” seems to ask the 
poet where she is from and assures her that she is not from here. For the poet, as a Southern Jew 
(seemingly an identity so specific to a place), the blinking question, “from where” implies that 
she is connected here and now to another place in another time. “From where” becomes a 
statement—a status—that encompasses both temporal and geographic otherness. The phrase, 
“from where,” describes a diasporic subjectivity. This is why her “strength” comes not from 
those around her (those she calls Protestant “Jew-baiters,” known to enact racial violence), but 
from “Old things,” or “what already/ lay stored in me.”  
The diasporic status of “from where” questions her belonging in the concrete present, just 
as the image, “raised in a castle of air” does. Indeed, to be “raised in a castle of air” is, in a 
sense, to be raised inside of an idea: a location and imagined, present and diffuse. Recall, in the 
final poem of the collection, she states that being raised in a “castle of air” is the reason why she 
has “chosen to know other things.” This is why she will never know the land she walks upon 
well enough, even as the second half of poem III enlists vivid (even Romantically bent) 
descriptions of nature: how green the mountains are, how the collapsed shed boards “gleam like 
pewter in the dew,” and how the “realms of touch-me-not fiery with tiny tongues/ cover the wild 
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ground of the woods.”469 Instead, raised in a castle of air, she locates herself geographically in a 
diaspora. 
This poetic conceptualization of diaspora is most cohesively articulated through Rich’s 
biological metaphor. I don’t wish to too narrowly define the poems’ ambiguous terms—after all, 
it matters a great deal that a poet who cares so deeply about names should call the “old things” 
within her, “diffuse, unnamed.” The genetic imagery in Sources is an answer proposed, though 
never definitively adopted (consider the tenuousness of the phrase, “they say such things are 
stored in the genetic code,” and the question mark after “a mystic biology?”). If she does not 
explicitly name those things “genes,” then why should I, her reader, do so forty years later? 
To answer my own rhetorical question, the genetic symbolism proposed in the cycle fits 
into a rich thematic schema of diaspora. It helps to respond to the questions of “whom” and 
“where” that are both geographic and bodily in these poems. Furthermore, the diasporically 
inflected “genetic code” is able to forge a relationship between the bodily “from where” and the 
geographic “from where.” By projecting historical multiplicity rather than tracing a precise 
lineage, Rich develops distinct possibilities for the genetic construction of Jewish diaspora in 
American literature (and exhibits a distinctly genetic form of the biological imagination). Rich’s 
cycle serves as a paradigmatic and optimistic example of genetic diaspora in Jewish American 
culture. 
A Brief Counterexample 
If Rich presents a diasporic optimism through biology, a parallel diasporic pessimism is 
presented in one of the most prominent works of postwar Jewish American fiction: Philip Roth’s 
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Portnoy’s Complaint (1967). (I ensure my readers that the comparison of Rich and Roth is 
intended to do more than shock their sensibilities.) In Roth’s novel, diasporic consciousness and 
diasporic conflict are imagined through biological contagion, as well as through biological 
inheritance.470 When the protagonist, Alexander Portnoy travels to Israel at the end of the novel, 
he meets an Israeli woman, Naomi, who appraises him as the abject culmination of generations 
of Jewish diaspora, and he registers that, “By dawn I had been made to see that I was the epitome 
of what was most shameful about ‘the culture of the diaspora.’ Those centuries and centuries of 
homelessness had produced just such disagreeable men as myself…”471 Portnoy tries to force 
himself on Naomi, but is met with his own impotence (sexually and, by metaphor, Jewish-
historically). In the midst of their physical struggle, Portnoy frames his violent act of sexual 
coercion through a fantasy of biological contagion. He bitterly imagines that he will transmit a 
venereal disease to her, so that he can show her, “This is what it’s like in the diaspora…this is 
what it’s like in the exile!”472 He invokes tropes of ghetto degeneracy and disease—the very sort 
of pathologized Jewish inheritance invoked in prewar texts cited throughout this dissertation. He 
turns sour the Boyarins’ idealistic model of diaspora as chaotic (yet, ultimately chaotic and 
good) horizontal contagion. 
Roth’s protagonist specifically associates Jewish pathology with the diasporic condition 
(in opposition to the condition of Jews in Israel). This scene reflects the Zionist notion that by 
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moving to Israel and working the land, Jews like Naomi’s parents had somehow rid their bodies 
of any trace of Jewish history—that they could re-make and un-make the (perhaps pathological) 
Jewish diasporic body. It is this very project that Portnoy invokes as he makes an attempt at 
“contaminating the pride and future of Zion” with his own “centuries and centuries of 
homelessness.”473 In this way, Roth, too uses biological knowledge to conceive of the 
connections and differences between individual Jewish bodies, according to their historical and 
geographical positions. Portnoy continues to think of Naomi as “blood of my blood” as he wills 
her to have sex with him, yet he promises, “I am about to poison your organs of reproduction! I 
am about to change the future of the race!”474 For Portnoy, the horizontal, geographical contagion 
between the diaspora Jew and the Israeli Jew was an attempt to change the “future of the race,” 
by way of marking her body with a diasporic history that he had inherited but she had 
supposedly heretofore evaded. The character is attempting to infuse multiple Jewish histories 
into the woman’s body, not as an act of optimism, but as an act of ironic revenge.  
The brief comparison between Rich and Roth shows not only the difference between a 
feminist and a misogynist, or poetry and prose, but also the difference between an author who 
envisions Jewish diaspora optimistically and one who views it with ironic pessimism. Rich’s 
musings on half-chances residing in the genetic code stand in stark contrast to Roth’s allegory of 
coercive transmission of inherited history. Indeed, the extent to which they present differing 
perspectives on diaspora makes it hard to reconcile the fact that they both use biological 
metaphor to write the multiplicity and contingency of Jewish history into the body. Indeed, 
Roth’s narrative conveys that there is nothing inherently non-coercive about diaspora—nor about 
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its attendant version of history as contingent and multiple. Biology need not be mystic and it 
need not be laced with optimism. The last forty-some-odd years have not necessarily proven the 
poetry of Rich wrong; nor have they proven Roth wrong, either. 
Genetic Metaphor and Text 
Rich’s poetry is evidence that DNA has introduced a significant set of motifs and 
metaphors to contemporary culture. The central metaphors of genetics, enumerated by literary 
scholar Patricia E. Chu, include, “information, code, reading, text, linguistics, cloning, 
editing.”475 They have come to saturate popular imagination of bodily inheritance and determine 
the mode through which we interpret genetic information. In the genetic age, it seems that we all 
imagine that our bodies, in each and every cell, hold a text in which our pasts and futures are 
written out. This emphasis on writing is of special interest to those in the field of literature and 
science. As Wald has noted, besides the metaphor of the text, the other most common metaphor 
applied to genes is the map; she contends that these two metaphors “represent two different and 
competing relationships to their material,” with the text suggesting interpretive mutability and 
the map suggesting relative certitude.476 Wald continues to argue that public-facing writings of 
geneticists “register a constant tension between the desire to establish meaning (create a 
definitive map, find the right reading) and the recognition and even celebration of its 
proliferation: the poetry of the gene.”477 As at-home genetic ancestry tests (and the animation 
described in this chapter’s opening) suggest, the map may be the dominant image through which 
we receive and interpret genetic information nowadays. The map also seems an obvious image 
 
475 Chu, “The American Genome Project,” 212. 
476 Wald, “Future Perfect,” 681. 
477 Wald, 682. 
 226 
for understanding genetic diaspora (as in, geographic dispersal and movement). Yet Rich’s work 
suggests that the “poetry of the gene”—which is to say, the proliferation of meaning and of past 
possibilities that still wait to be fulfilled—might be a more satisfying way to conceive of genetic 
diaspora. 
Coda 
These have been strange years to write a dissertation about the past and present of 
American immigration, race, literature, and science’s role in how people think about these hefty 
topics. The longer I delved into the past, the more the present began to echo what I had perhaps 
once smugly regarded as distant mistakes, misguided beliefs, or intellectual trends that the 
contemporary thinker could summarily disregard. I could not have imagined at the outset that I 
would finish this dissertation amid the seismic turmoil and grief of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
“Biology” seems to be all around us, and we have been made acutely aware of science and 
culture’s entanglement. On the face of it, what we’re all so concerned about is not the kind of 
biological thinking that I’ve studied. It’s all contagion, never inheritance. But then I think about 
the past year’s spike in virus-inspired hate crimes, or the rush to pathologize (rather than 
contextualize) disparate death rates among racial and ethnic groups. Again, I think of how it all 
continues, and all connects. Inheritance and contagion may be different models, but they are not 
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